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ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY: THE
TOXIC MIX OF FAKE NEWS,
HYPERPOLARIZATION, AND
PARTISAN ELECTION
ADMINISTRATION
BY ANTHONY J. GAUGHAN∗
INTRODUCTION
The 2016 presidential election shook American democracy to its
foundations. In an unprecedented development, the CIA and FBI
concluded that the Russian government hacked and leaked
Democratic Party emails in an effort to help Donald Trump win the
election.1 Trump himself fueled further controversy during the
campaign when he alleged that the Democrats had rigged the election
against him and predicted that massive voter fraud would occur on
Election Day.2 Still more controversy came in the days after the
election when Jill Stein, the defeated Green Party candidate for
president, demanded a recount, suggesting without evidence that
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Will Be Rigged at Polling Sites, TIME (Oct. 17, 2016), http://time.com/4532679/donald-trumpelection-rigged/; Jon Greenberg, Fact-checking the integrity of the vote in 2016, POLITIFACT (Dec.
17, 2016), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2016/dec/17/fact-checking-claims-vot
er-fraud-2016.
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Russia may have hacked voting machines on Trump’s behalf.3 Most
remarkable of all, President-elect Trump responded to his Electoral
College victory by claiming without evidence that he lost the popular
vote because of millions of illegal votes cast for his Democratic
opponent, Hillary Clinton.4
The stunning turn of events and the unprecedented controversy
that surrounded the election had a profound impact on public opinion.
A majority of Americans now question the integrity of the nation’s
election system.5 Accordingly, this article contends that we have
entered into a dangerous new chapter in the nation’s history that not
only threatens public confidence in election fairness but potentially
could even undermine the long-term health of the nation’s democracy.
In an era of widespread false allegations of election fraud, historic
levels of hyperpolarization, and intensifying partisanship in election
administration, the basic voting rights that Americans take for granted
face serious threats on multiple fronts.
For the moment at least, the situation is not as bleak as it appears.
The good news is that the public’s lack of trust in the integrity of
American elections is not justified. Despite the widespread belief that
voter fraud is pervasive, the reality is that America’s democratic
institutions still compare favorably to those of other nations. President
Trump’s claims of widespread voter fraud had no factual basis, as postelection investigations repeatedly demonstrated.6 Moreover, recent
3. Amanda Holpuch & Jon Swaine, Jill Stein requests Wisconsin recount, alleging hackers
filed bogus absentee ballots, GUARDIAN (Nov. 25, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2016/nov/25/jill-stein-election-recount-clinton-trump-michigan-pennsylvania-wisconsin;
David E. Sanger, U.S. Officials Defend Integrity of Vote, Despite Hacking Fears, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/25/us/politics/hacking-russia-election-fears-barackobama-donald-trump.html.
4. Andrew Restuccia, Trump’s baseless assertions of voter fraud called ‘stunning,’
POLITICO (Nov. 27, 2016), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/11/trump-illegal-voting-clinton231860; Michael D. Shear & Maggie Haberman, Trump Claims, With No Evidence, That ‘Millions
of People’ Voted Illegally, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/27/us/po
litics/trump-adviser-steps-up-searing-attack-on-romney.html.
5. Giovanni Russonello, Voters Fear Their Ballot Won’t Count, Poll Shows, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/26/us/politics/voter-fraud-poll.html; The
Economist/YouGov Poll (Dec. 17–20, 2016), https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_
uploads/document/ljv2ohxmzj/econTabReport.pdf; Kathy Frankovic, Belief in conspiracies
largely depends on political identity, YOUGOV (Dec. 27, 2016), https://today.
yougov.com/news/2016/12/27/belief-conspiracies-largely-depends-political-iden.
6. See David Cottrell, Michael C. Herron & Sean Westwood, We checked Trump’s
allegations of voter fraud. We found no evidence at all, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/12/02/we-checked-trumps-alleg
ations-of-voter-fraud-we-found-no-evidence-at-all/?utm_term=.1a79491491d6 (“[A]n extensive
study of voter fraud in the 2016 election . . . found no evidence that could support anything like
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academic studies give the United States high marks for having honest
elections characterized by robust levels of freedom of speech.7 The
integrity of the American election system is undergirded by the state
and federal judiciaries, which have a federal constitutional mandate to
block racial and gender discrimination in voting and to maintain equal
protection under the law for all voters. Thus, although not without its
faults, the United States still stands among the leading liberal
democracies in the world.
Ironically, however, the unjustified fear of voter fraud has itself
become a threat to America’s democratic principles. This article
identifies three toxic developments that if left unchecked threaten the
future of voting rights in America. The first is the rise of fake news. As
the traditional news media has lost its gate-keeper status and as the
internet has facilitated the rapid spread of misinformation, false
allegations of voting fraud dominate news cycles. The pervasive nature
of the claims has triggered a precipitous decline in public confidence in
election integrity, even though there is no factual basis to justify the
public’s fear of widespread fraud. The second is the phenomenon of
hyperpolarization. The partisan divide has reached such historic levels
that Republicans and Democrats increasingly view the opposing party
as a threat to the nation’s well-being. Hyperpolarization makes
partisans more inclined to attempt to limit the political influence of
opposing voters, a development that is particularly dangerous in the
United States because of the third toxic feature of contemporary
politics: partisan control of election administration. Unusual among

Trump’s accusations.”); Nate Cohn, ‘Serious Voter Fraud’ in California and Elsewhere? Um, No,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/28/upshot/serious-voter-fraud-umno.html; Nate Cohn, Trump’s Claim of Millions of Illegal Votes? There’s Simply No Evidence,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/28/upshot/serious-voter-fraud-umno.html?_r=0; Abby Phillip & Mike DeBonis, Without evidence, Trump tells lawmakers 3 million
to 5 million illegal ballots cost him the popular vote, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/01/23/at-white-house-trump-tellscongressional-leaders-3-5-million-illegal-ballots-cost-him-the-popular-vote/?utm_term=.617a28
b56c01&wpisrc=nl_politics&wpmm=1; Nicholas Fandos, Trump Won’t Back Down From His
Voting Fraud Lie. Here Are the Facts, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/01/24/us/politics/unauthorized-immigrant-voting-trump-lie.html ?hp&action=click&pgtype
=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=first-column-region&region=top-news&WT
.nav=top-news.
7. Claire Cain Miller & Kevin Quealy, Democracy in America, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/23/upshot/democracy-in-america-how-is-it-doing.html?rref=
collection%2Fbyline%2Fkevin-quealy&action=click&contentCollection=undefined&region
=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=1&pgtype=collection;
Results from the Bright Line Watch U.S. Democracy Survey, BRIGHT LINE WATCH,
http://brightlinewatch.org/?p=167.
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major democracies, the United States entrusts the majority party with
responsibility for administering elections and setting voting rules. In
recent years, partisans have become increasingly aggressive in adopting
election laws that benefit one party at the expense of the other. The
real scandal of American politics is not illegal vote-rigging or voter
fraud but rather the extent to which partisans are legally permitted to
manipulate election rules for political advantage.
The United States thus stands at a uniquely dangerous moment in
its history. Public figures on all ends of the ideological spectrum are
rightfully warning of the danger to American democracy. Fareed
Zakaria has observed that the United States risks becoming an
“illiberal democracy,”8 a term that describes the global phenomenon of
democratically-elected governments “routinely ignoring constitutional
limits on their power and depriving their citizens of basic rights.”9
Zakaria is not alone in seeing a rising threat to America’s liberal
democratic norms. Many leading conservative intellectuals, such as
Bret Stephens10 and David Brooks,11 have also sounded the alarm that
democratic institutions are in jeopardy. Former Bush presidential
speechwriter David Frum has warned that the Trump Administration
may usher in a form of populist autocracy by subverting “the
institutions of democracy and the rule of law.”12 Republican elected
officials have also expressed deep concern. Senator Lindsay Graham
8. Fareed Zakaria, America’s democracy has become illiberal, WASH. POST (Dec. 29, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/america-is-becoming-a-land-of-less-liberty/2016/12
/29/2a91744c-ce09-11e6-a747-d03044780a02_story.html?utm_term=.638c57ec08f3.
9. FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT HOME
AND ABROAD 17 (2007).
10. See Bret Stephens, Don’t Dismiss President Trump’s Attacks on the Media as Mere
Stupidity, TIME (Feb. 21, 2017), http://time.com/4675860/donald-trump-fake-news-attacks (“The
most painful aspect of this has been to watch people I previously considered thoughtful and
principled conservatives give themselves over to a species of illiberal politics from which I once
thought they were immune.”); see also Robert Kraychik, Bret Stephens: ‘I’m Gonna Vote for
Clinton,’ DAILY WIRE (Oct. 26, 2016), http://www.dailywire.com/news/10233/bret-stephens-imgonna-vote-hillary-clinton-robert-kraychik# (reporting that on FOX News Stephens “repeatedly
described Donald Trump as ‘a threat to the Republic’”); Bret Stephens, My Former Republican
Party, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/my-former-republican-party1477353852.
11. David Brooks, The Republican Fausts, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/opinion/the-republican-fausts.html?rref=collection%2F
column%2Fdavid-brooks; see also David Brooks, How Should One Resist the Trump
Administration, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/14/opinion/howshould-one-resist-the-trump-administration.html?_r=0 (“It is hard to imagine America turning
into full fascism, but it is possible to see it sliding into the sort of ‘repressive kleptocracy.’ . . . In
such a regime, democratic rights are slowly eroded.”).
12. David Frum, How to Build an Autocracy, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/03/how-to-build-an-autocracy/513872/.
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declared that Trump’s false claim of widespread voter fraud “shakes
confidence in our democracy.”13 He urged the president to stop
“making accusations against our electoral system without
justification.”14
The risk that America may evolve into an illiberal democracy is
particularly high in light of the ongoing battle over voter registration
restrictions and other laws that limit access to voting.15 In the name of
safeguarding election integrity, legislatures across the country have
adopted new voting laws that many courts and scholars have concluded
made it harder for poor and minority voters to participate in the
democratic process.16 While reasonable minds may disagree over the
merits of strict voter identification laws, the fact that such laws are
implemented by partisan officials in an atmosphere of
hyperpolarization makes the potential for voter suppression very real
indeed. All signs suggest the battle over voting laws will only intensify
in the years ahead. At least 27 states are considering controversial new
restrictions on voter registration and voting access in 2017.17 As the
president himself promotes baseless fears of massive voter fraud,18 the
risk is rising that partisans will be emboldened to further escalate the
polarized political environment by purging voter registration rolls in
the name of promoting election integrity.19 A more restrictive approach
13. Manu Raju & Tom LoBianco, Graham blasts Trump after latest voter fraud claim, CNN
(Jan. 24, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/24/politics/lindsey-graham-trump-illegal-votes.
14. Id.
15. Zoltan L. Hajnal, Nazita Lajevardi & Lindsay Nielson, Do voter identification laws
suppress minority voting? Yes. We did the research, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/02/15/do-voter-identificationlaws-suppress-minority-voting-yes-we-did-the-research/?utm_term=.6df6a6e544c5.
16. See, e.g., Atiba R. Ellis, The Cost of the Vote: Poll Taxes, Voter Identification Laws, and
the Price of Democracy, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1023, 1035 (2009) (“Political science research
suggests that such costs, as represented by registration requirements and photo identification
requirements, in and of themselves form a barrier to political participation for those who are
socioeconomically disadvantaged”); N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204,
214 (4th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he legislature requested data on the use, by race, of a number of voting
practices. Upon receipt of the race data, the General Assembly enacted legislation that restricted
voting and registration in five different ways, all of which disproportionately affected African
Americans.”); Sari Horwitz, Getting a photo ID so you can vote is easy. Unless you’re poor, black,
Latino or elderly, WASH. POST (May 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_
law/getting-a-photo-id-so-you-can-vote-is-easy-unless-youre-poor-black-latino-or-elderly/2016
/05/23/8d5474ec-20f0-11e6-8690-f14ca9de2972_story.html?utm_term=.8a1bb41d1ef4.
17. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., VOTING LAWS ROUNDUP 2017, (Feb. 27, 2017),
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voting-laws-roundup-2017.
18. Michael D. Shear & Peter Baker, After His Claim of Voter Fraud, Trump Vows “Major
Investigation,” N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/25/us/politics/
trump-voting-fraud-false-claim-investigation.html.
19. See Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson, Voter ID Laws Are So Last (Election) Season,
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to voter qualifications could also be on the horizon. President Trump
has advocated ending birthright citizenship,20 a measure that would
have enormous potential to disenfranchise large numbers of people.
Finally, a new round of redistricting looms in 2020. The parties are
already jockeying for control of the redistricting process and the
opportunity to promote partisan gerrymandering through the next
decade.21 The rise of big data has given both parties a powerful new tool
for drawing district lines that dilute votes cast for the opposition party.22
All of these developments make clear that the voting wars are
escalating.23 As Americans increasingly view election stakes in
apocalyptic terms, as false allegations of election fraud spread like
wildfire, and as partisan officials control election rules, America’s
democratic institutions face their most serious domestic challenge since
the enactment of the Voting Rights Act in 1965.
This article concludes by proposing three steps to defend and
preserve the vitality of America’s liberal democratic norms. The first is
nationwide adoption of non-partisan administration of state and
federal elections. Peer nations such as Canada long ago embraced nonpartisan election administration as a sensible and necessary measure to
ensure that all parties and voters are treated fairly in the election
process. Unfortunately, however, the likelihood of such a reform being
adopted in the United States is virtually non-existent, at least for the

BLOOMBERG BNA (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.bna.com/voter-id-laws-n73014449451/; see also
Mark Joseph Stern, Donald Trump’s Vote Fraud Investigation Will Finish What the GOP Started,
SLATE (Jan. 25, 2017), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/01/
donald_trump_s_vote_fraud_investigation_will_finish_what_the_gop_started.html (noting that
Trump’s voter fraud investigation “will primarily serve as pretext for an assault on voting rights
at both the state and federal level”).
20. Max Ehrenfreund, Understanding Trump’s plan to end citizenship for undocumented
immigrants’ kids, WASH POST (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/
2015/08/17/understanding-trumps-plan-to-end-citizenship-for-undocumented-immigrants-kids/?
utm_term=.1cd8f2f7c147.
21. Edward-Isaac Dovere, Obama, Holder to lead post-Trump redistricting campaign,
POLITICO (Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/obama-holder-redistrictinggerrymandering-229868.
22. David Daley, The House the GOP Built: How Republicans Used Soft Money, Big Data,
and High-Tech Mapping to Take Control of Congress and Increase Partisanship, N.Y. MAG. (Apr.
24, 2016), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/04/gops-house-seats-are-safe-heres-why.
html; see also 2012 REDMAP Summary Report, THE REDISTRICTING MAJORITY PROJECT (Jan.
4, 2013), http://www.redistrictingmajorityproject.com/.
23. On the concept of the “voting wars,” see RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS:
FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO THE NEXT ELECTION MELTDOWN xii (2012). Hasen warns that
“[p]artisans on both sides now buy into the rhetoric of electoral unfairness” as social media outlets
“allow pernicious messages to be amplified, repeated, and distorted in an echo-chamber of likeminded voters.” Id.

GAUGHAN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY

4/20/2017 11:44 AM

63

next few years. Amid hyperpolarization, majority parties in the state
legislatures are extremely unlikely to unilaterally relinquish the
political advantages that come with control of election administration.
As a result, the reality is that non-partisan election administration is
years and perhaps even decades away.
Accordingly, the second step is the most realistic and important in
the short and medium term: judicial intervention. Historically the state
and federal judiciaries have generally taken a deferential approach to
legislative control of election administration. But the Supreme Court
itself has recognized the constitutional threat posed by partisan control
of election administration. In a famous footnote to the 1938 United
States v. Carolene Products case,24 the Supreme Court suggested that
voting rules that insulate incumbent parties from political competition
or target minority voters should be closely scrutinized by the courts.25
In this dangerous political era, courts should take an aggressive posture
to defend voting rights from toxic partisanship. Recent rulings suggest
that the federal circuit courts of appeal increasingly recognize that
partisan-inspired voting restrictions threaten to disenfranchise voters.
Reason exists, therefore, for cautious optimism that more state and
federal courts will see the need for judicial intervention to protect
voting rights and democratic institutions.
The third and final step involves a new tool—the bipartisan
supermajority principle—that will further assist courts in policing
hyper-partisanship in election administration. As recent scholarship
has made clear, there are a variety of constitutional grounds that courts
may invoke to prevent partisan control of election administration from
resulting in diminished competition and voter suppression.26 In
building on that scholarship, this article concludes by proposing that
courts should view any new law that burdens voting rights as
presumptively invalid if not adopted by a bipartisan supermajority of
the legislature.

24. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
25. Id. at 152 n.4.
26. See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 16, at 1067 (“Rather than a balancing test that defaults to the
interests of the state, the test should be structured to require the state to demonstrate that the
means it has adopted in its voter identification laws represent a significant interest in preventing
voter fraud coupled with a showing that the conditional costs—direct and indirect—to the voter
are minimized in the scheme the government is implementing.”); Joshua A. Douglas, The Right
to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. 89, 138–39 (2012) (“Flipping the normal
federal framework and imposing a presumption of invalidity to laws that add voter qualifications
is justified because state constitutions already support this analytical move.”).
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The bottom line is that hyperpolarization, partisan election
administration, and unfounded fears of election fraud must not be
allowed to subvert America’s liberal democratic norms. Whatever
mechanism that the courts ultimately choose to adopt, the long-term
health of our democratic institutions depends on preventing partisan
political operators from curtailing voting rights, undermining political
competition, and eroding the pluralistic principles of modern American
democracy.27
I. THE TOXIC MIX
The notion is deeply rooted in America that the story of democracy
is one of linear progress.28 Writing in the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville
observed that the inevitable march of American history was one in
which the “forces of democracy are strengthened.”29 But the 2016
election put optimistic faith in the resilience of American democracy to
a searing test. The vicious, ugly and disheartening election was plagued
by false allegations of voter fraud, extreme partisanship, efforts to
rollback voting rights, and widespread paranoia that the election’s
outcome was rigged. This toxic combination has produced a stunning
and dangerous decline in public confidence in the integrity of the
American election system.
A. Fake News
As the 2016 campaign demonstrated, American political campaigns
unfold within a news media environment that is vastly more
fragmented than ever before. In the 1970s, print and broadcast
journalism was highly concentrated in a handful of major national news
outlets, such as CBS News, Time magazine, and newspapers such as the
Wall Street Journal and the New York Times.30 A far different news
world prevails today. Traditional news journalism has shrunk
dramatically both in terms of consumers and profitability. For example,
average daily newspaper readership has fallen to 50-year lows,31 20,000
27. On this issue, see generally Richard L. Hasen, Foxes, Henhouses, and Commissions:
Assessing the Nonpartisan Model in Election Administration, Redistricting, and Campaign
Finance, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 467 (2013).
28. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES xxi (2009).
29. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 28 (1990).
30. HERBERT J. GANS, DECIDING WHAT’S NEWS: A STUDY OF CBS EVENING NEWS, NBC
NIGHTLY NEWS, NEWSWEEK, AND TIME xi–xii (2004).
31. PHILIP MEYER, THE VANISHING NEWSPAPER: SAVING JOURNALISM IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 1–2 (2d ed. 2009).
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newspaper workers have been laid off since the 1990s,32 and the
financial value of the newspaper industry has contracted
precipitously.33 Broadcast television news has not fared any better. A
2016 study by Oxford University found that television news audiences
are shrinking just as fast as newspaper readership, especially among
younger viewers.34 In a sign of the potentially bleak future of television
news, the average age of Fox News viewers has risen to 67 and the
average age of CNN viewers is now almost 62.35 In contrast, social
media and online sites have benefited from the decline of the
traditional news media. Facebook, a social media website, is now a news
source for 44 percent of Americans.36 As advertising revenue has
steadily shrunk for newspapers like the New York Times, Facebook saw
its advertising revenue increase by nearly 60%.37
There are many positive features of the democratization of
information. In the pre-internet age, traditional news media outlets—
such as the Wall Street Journal or CBS News—served as gatekeepers of
national news information. The print and broadcast media’s monopoly
on access to information limited the public’s ability to decide for itself
what was newsworthy. Conservatives also often complained that
gatekeeper institutions such as CBS News improperly injected a liberal
editorial slant on ostensibly neutral news reports.38 The rise of the
internet has ended the monopoly exercised by the traditional news
media and in the process it has made more information available to
more people than ever before.39 The range of news sources on the
32. Michael Barthel, Newspapers: Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (June 15, 2016),
http://www.journalism.org/2016/06/15/newspapers-fact-sheet.
33. Amy Mitchell & Katerina Eva Matsa, The declining value of U.S. newspapers, PEW RES.
CTR. (May 22, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/05/22/the-declining-value-of-us-newspapers.
34. Peter Preston, TV news faces a threat familiar to newspapers, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 17,
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/11/the-print-apocalypse-and-how-tosurvive-it/506429.
35. Id.
36. Jeffrey Gottfried & Elisa Shearer, News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2016, PEW
RES. CTR. (May 26, 2016), http://www.journalism.org/2016/05/26/news-use-across-social-mediaplatforms-2016/; Mike Isaac, Facebook, in Cross Hairs After Election, Is Said to Question Its
Influence, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/14/technology/facebook
-is-said-to-question-its-influence-in-election.html?_r=0.
37. Derek Thompson, The Print Apocalypse and How to Survive It, THE ATLANTIC (Nov.
3, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/11/the-print-apocalypse-and-how-tosurvive-it/506429.
38. See generally BERNARD GOLDBERG, BIAS: A CBS INSIDER EXPOSES HOW THE MEDIA
DISTORTS THE NEWS (2002).
39. JACK FULLER, WHAT IS HAPPENING TO THE NEWS: THE INFORMATION EXPLOSION
AND THE CRISIS IN JOURNALISM ix, 2–3 (2010).
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internet covers all ends of the ideological spectrum from Breitbart to
the Huffington Post. The democratization of news has even extended
to journalistic activities. The internet has empowered ordinary
Americans to create their own news platforms and disseminate
information for free on the internet.40
But one consequence of media fragmentation has been the rise of
“fake news,” a phenomenon that became a defining feature of the 2016
election.41 Although partisans might describe any news report they do
not like as “fake news,”42 the term generally refers to baseless
allegations republished in the guise of a genuine news story.43 The
internet has played a key role in the rise of fake news. Academic studies
have found that people often have difficulty distinguishing fact from
fiction on the internet, which makes it the ideal forum for disseminating
misinformation.44 The 2016 election confirmed such findings, as a
bewildering array of fabricated election stories received extraordinarily
wide circulation.45 Stories ranged from claims that Pope Francis
endorsed Donald Trump to allegations that Hillary Clinton sold
weapons to the terrorist group ISIS.46 By a 4 to 1 margin, most “fake
news” stories targeted Clinton’s campaign.47
40. Jessica Clark & Tracy Van Slyke, How Journalists Must Operate in a New Networked
Media Environment, in WILL THE LAST REPORTER PLEASE TURN OUT THE LIGHTS: THE
COLLAPSE OF JOURNALISM AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO FIX IT 239–40 (Robert W. McChesney
and Victor Pickard eds. 2011).
41. Angie Drobnic Holan, 2016 Lie of the Year: Fake News, POLITIFACT (Dec. 13, 2016),
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2016/dec/13/2016-lie-year-fake-news/; Elizabeth
Dwoskin, Caitlin Dewey & Craig Timberg, Why Facebook and Google are struggling to purge
fake news, WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/
why-facebook-and-google-are-struggling-to-purge-fake-news/2016/11/15/85022897-f765-422e9f53-c720d1f20071_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.28e91b07d94c.
42. Jeremy W. Peters, Wielding Claims of ‘Fake News,’ Conservatives Take Aim at
Mainstream Media, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/25/us/politics/
fake-news-claims-conservatives-mainstream-media-.html.
43. Elle Hunt, What is fake news? How to spot it and what you can do to stop it, GUARDIAN
(Dec. 16, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/dec/18/what-is-fake-news-pizzagate.
44. See Jean-Bruno Renard, Negatory Rumors: From the Denial of Reality to Conspiracy
Theory, in RUMOR MILLS: THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF RUMOR AND LEGEND 236 (Gary Alan Fine
et al., eds., 2005) (“[T]he Internet tends to make it difficult to distinguish between true
information and false rumor, reality and fiction.”).
45. Andrew Higgins, Mike McIntire & Gabriel J.X. Dance, Inside a Fake News Sausage
Factory: ‘This Is All About Income,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
11/25/world/europe/fake-news-donald-trump-hillary-clinton-georgia.html.
46. Hannah Ritchie, Read all about it: The biggest fake news stories of 2016, CNBC (Dec. 30,
2016), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/12/30/read-all-about-it-the-biggest-fake-news-stories-of-2016.
html.
47. Craig Silverman, This Analysis Shows How Viral Fake Election News Stories
Outperformed Real News on Facebook, BUZZFEED (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.buzzfeed.com
/craigsilverman/viral-fake-election-news-outperformed-real-news-on-facebook?utm_term=.
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One of the leading examples was a fake news story that spun a
conspiracy theory out of the tragic murder of a young Democratic
National Committee staffer named Seth Rich.48 Although police
believed that Rich was the victim of a random robbery attempt,49 a
website alleged that a Democratic hit team killed the staffer to prevent
him from testifying against Hillary Clinton in the FBI investigation of
Clinton’s State Department email system.50 The internet site Wikileaks
picked up the baseless conspiracy theory, spreading it further,51 which
in turn led the traditional news media to report on the allegations
against Clinton. Although mainstream news outlets described the
conspiracy theory as “wild Internet speculation”52 and “another round
of Clinton conspiracy theories,”53 such reporting gave the false
allegations even wider circulation.
In a normal election, the significance of fake news might be
downplayed as an unimportant sideshow. After all, American politics
have a long history of baseless and defamatory allegations.54 But four
things made the influence of fake news in the 2016 election different
and more dangerous than previous incarnations of politicallymotivated misinformation and scurrilous allegations. First, fake news
spread at an alarmingly fast rate in 2016.55 The internet’s
uunR5eGnX#.oqOZvdxj1.
48. Manuel Roig-Franzia, Seth Rich wasn’t just another D.C. murder victim. He was a meme
in the weirdest presidential election of our times, WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/seth-rich-wasnt-just-another-dc-murder-victimhe-was-a-meme-in-the-weirdest-presidential-election-of-our-times/2017/01/18/ee8e27f8-dcc011e6-918c-99ede3c8cafa_story.html?utm_term=.398de8324749.
49. Max Kutner, Seth Rich’s Death: Why a GOP Lobbyist Will Pay $100,000 to Learn Who
Killed the DNC Staffer, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 16, 2016), http://www.newsweek.com/gop-lobbyistreward-seth-rich-dnc-499653; Roig-Franzia, supra note 48.
50. Kim LaCapria, Seth Rich Homicide: A conspiracy site latched on to the tragic murder of
young DNC staffer Seth Rich to spread false information about his killing, SNOPES (Aug. 10, 2016),
http://www.snopes.com/seth-conrad-rich/.
51. Jeremy Stahl, WikiLeaks Is Fanning a Conspiracy Theory That Hillary Murdered a DNC
Staffer, SLATE (Aug. 9, 2016), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2016/08/09/wikileaks
_is_fanning_a_conspiracy_theory_that_hillary_murdered_a_dnc_staffer.html.
52. See, e.g., Joseph Morton, WikiLeaks Offers $20,000 Reward For Help Finding Omaha
Native Seth Rich’s Killer, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Aug. 11, 2016), http://www.omaha.
com/news/crime/wikileaks-offers-reward-for-help-finding-omaha-native-sethrich/article_cfb287bc-5e98-11e6-ae0c-8b471b8cbfbb.html.
53. Jeff Stein, Seth Rich: Inside the Killing of the DNC Staffer, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 20, 2016),
http://www.newsweek.com/seth-rich-murder-dnc-hack-julian-assange-hillary-clinton-donaldtrump-492084.
54. See, e.g., Adrienne LaFrance, How the Fake News Crisis of 1896 Explains Trump, THE
ATLANTIC (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/01/the-fakenews-crisis-120-years-ago/513710/.
55. Sapna Maheshwari, How Fake News Goes Viral: A Case Study, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20,
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democratization of the dissemination of information has facilitated the
spread of fake news like never before. A study by BuzzFeed concluded
that in the final three months of the 2016 campaign, the twenty most
popular fake election stories on Facebook reached more than 8.7
million readers, whereas the twenty most popular real election news
stories on Facebook only reached 7.3 million readers.56 Critics pointed
out that the Buzzfeed analysis underestimated the number of real news
stories on Facebook because the analysis did not include stories from
Reuters, the Associated Press and small newspapers.57 But in any case
it is clear that fake news stories reached a massive audience that
rivalled real news during the 2016 election.58 Facebook and Google
both took the problem so seriously that after the election they
announced plans to combat the spread of fake news on their websites.59
Their response reflected the undeniable fact that Facebook, Google,
and other websites facilitated the dissemination of news—fake and real
alike—to a degree impossible in previous eras.
Second, the public has proven to be remarkably gullible when it
comes to fake news circulated on the internet. A new study by Stanford
University found that even young people, who tend to be more
technologically sophisticated than older Americans,60 are “easily
duped” by fake news stories.61 The public’s inability to distinguish truth
from fact is particularly troubling for democracies, since the quality of
self-government depends on voters making informed choices. Thus, in
summarizing their findings, the authors of the Stanford study warned,
“we worry that democracy is threatened by the ease at which
disinformation about civic issues is allowed to spread and flourish.”62
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/business/media/how-fake-news-spreads.html.
56. Silverman, supra note 47.
57. Paul Crookston, Report on Scourge of Fake News Turns Out to Be Faked, NAT’L REV.
(Nov. 17, 2016), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/442291/buzzfeed-facebook-fake-newsstudy-methodology-questioned.
58. Ahiza Garcia & Justin Lear, 5 Stunning Fake News Stories That Reached Millions, CNN
(Nov. 2, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/11/02/media/fake-news-stories/.
59. Nick Wingfield, Mike Isaac & Katie Benner, Google and Facebook Take Aim at Fake
News Sites, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/technology/googlewill-ban-websites-that-host-fake-news-from-using-its-ad-service.html.
60. Patricia Reaney, Teens More Resilient, Tech Savvy Than Older Millennials: Study,
REUTERS (June 19, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-millennials-poll-idUSBRE95I1
J420130619.
61. Brooke Donald, Stanford Researchers Find Students Have Trouble Judging the
NEWS
CTR.
(Nov.
22,
2016),
Credibility
of
Information
Online,
STAN.
https://ed.stanford.edu/news/stanford-researchers-find-students-have-trouble-judgingcredibility-information-online.
62. STAN. HIST. EDUC. GROUP, EVALUATING INFORMATION: THE CORNERSTONE OF
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A post-election survey confirmed the Stanford researchers’ warnings.
A December 2016 Pew Research Center poll found that eighty-eight
percent of Americans believe that fake news has caused some
confusion over basic facts and sixty-four percent believe it has caused
great confusion.63 The public’s confusion undermines the notion of
commonly agreed upon objective facts64 and exacerbates the natural
human tendency toward confirmation bias, whereby we selectively
choose facts that support our pre-existing biases.65 Confirmation bias
thus reinforces political polarization, as Republicans and Democrats
seek out information, including fake news, which reinforces their
political worldview.66 Acknowledging the problem, Facebook founder
Mark Zuckerberg expressed regret that fake news on Facebook had
increased political polarization.67
Third, fabricated news reports did more than just cast false
aspersions on the candidates. During the 2016 campaign, fake news
stories spread baseless fears about the integrity of the election results.68
For example, six weeks before Election Day, a Republican legislative
aide in Maryland named Cameron Harris created a fake internet
newspaper in order to circulate a completely fabricated story that Ohio
CIVIC ONLINE REASONING 5 (2016), https://sheg.stanford.edu/upload/V3LessonPlans/Executive
% 20Summary%2011.21.16.pdf.
63. Michael Barthel, Amy Mitchell & Jesse Holcomb, Many Americans Believe Fake News
Is Sowing Confusion, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.journalism.org/2016/12/15/
many-americans-believe-fake-news-is-sowing-confusion/.
64. See Sabrina Tavernise, As Fake News Spreads Lies, More Readers Shrug at the Truth,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/06/us/fake-news-partisanrepublican-democrat.html (“Fake news, and the proliferation of raw opinion that passes for news,
is creating confusion, punching holes in what is true, causing a kind of fun-house effect that leaves
the reader doubting everything, including real news.”).
65. See Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many
Guises, 2 REV. OF GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 176 (1998) (“People may treat evidence in a biased way
when they are motivated by the desire to defend beliefs that they wish to maintain.”).
66. See Adam J. Berinsky, Rumors and Health Care Reform: Experiments in Political
Misinformation, 47 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 241, 245 (2015) (“Surveys show that Democrats and
Republicans (and liberals and conservatives) approach the same rumor in very different ways.
More generally, research has found that people are more likely to accept rumors that are
consistent with their pre-existing attitudes.”).
67. Andrew V. Pestano, Mark Zuckerberg: Fake News Creates Polarization in Beliefs, UPI
(Feb. 17, 2017), http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2017/02/17/Facebooks-Mark-ZuckerbergFake-news-creates-polarization-in-beliefs/6871487342178.
68. Jim Rutenberg, Media’s Next Challenge: Overcoming the Threat of Fake News, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/07/business/media/medias-nextchallenge-overcoming-the-threat-of-fake-news.html; Katie Rogers & Jonah Engel Bromwich,
The Hoaxes, Fake News and Misinformation We Saw on Election Day, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/09/us/politics/debunk-fake-news-election-day.html?action=
click&contentCollection=Technology&module=RelatedCoverage&region=EndOfArticle&pgty
pe=article.
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Democrats had been caught in a criminal conspiracy to commit election
fraud.69 Under the headline “BREAKING: ‘Tens of thousands’ of
fraudulent Clinton votes found in Ohio warehouse,” the Republican
aide’s fake news story alleged that “the Clinton campaign’s likely goal
was to slip the fake ballot boxes in with the real ballot boxes when they
went to official election judges on November 8th.”70 The fake news
story even included a picture of a man standing behind dozens of ballot
boxes, which the story falsely claimed showed the Ohio “electrical
worker” who discovered the boxes.71 In fact, the picture actually
showed a British campaign worker during an election in the United
Kingdom.72 Nevertheless, the fake news story was so widely
disseminated that more than 6 million people shared the story on the
internet and Ohio election authorities found themselves forced to
launched an investigation into the allegations.73 Although Ohio
authorities debunked the story,74 the damage had already been done.
Even Harris himself later expressed surprise that so many people
believed the fake news story: “At first it kind of shocked me — the
response I was getting. How easily people would believe it. It was
almost like a sociological experiment.”75 The New York Times called it
a “fake news masterpiece.”76 The circulation of fake news stories about
voter fraud was so pervasive that in his final days in the White House,
President Barack Obama made a point of publicly condemning
allegations of election fraud as “fake news” that “has constantly been
disproved.”77
Fourth, the spread of fake news was not limited to shadowy internet
sites. The winner of the 2016 presidential election himself played a key
69. Scott Shane, From Headline to Photograph, a Fake News Masterpiece, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/us/fake-news-hillary-clinton-cameron-harris.
html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=b-ledepackage-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=1; Ovetta Wiggins, Aide to Md.
Lawmaker fabricated article on fraudulent votes for Clinton, WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/aide-to-md-lawmaker-fabricated-article-onhillary-clinton-rigging-the-election/2017/01/18/5219bd0c-ddd7-11e6-acdf-14da832ae861_story.
html?hpid=hp_hp-more-top-stories_mdlawmaker943pm%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term
=.a89d0fca178d.
70. Shane, supra note 69.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Tal Kopan, Obama calls voter fraud fears ‘fake news,’ CNN (Jan. 18, 2017),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/18/politics/obama-voter-fraud-fake-news/.
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role in spreading false allegations of voting fraud. Throughout the
campaign, and even after his victory, Donald Trump impugned the
integrity of the electoral process. For example, when he lagged in the
polls in mid-October,78 Trump claimed without evidence that the
election was “rigged” against him79 “at many polling places”80 by “large
scale voter fraud happening on and before [E]lection [D]ay.”81 Even
more remarkable were allegations that Trump made after the election.
When the states’ certified election results revealed that Hillary Clinton
had won the popular vote by nearly 3 million votes,82 Trump baselessly
claimed that “millions” of people had voted illegally for Clinton.83 On
Twitter he declared, “In addition to winning the Electoral College in a
landslide, I won the popular vote if you deduct the millions of people
who voted illegally.”84 In a subsequent Tweet he wrote, “Serious voter
fraud in Virginia, New Hampshire and California — so why isn’t the
media reporting on this? Serious bias — big problem!”85 Without
offering evidence, Trump later told congressional Republicans that
three to five million illegal votes were cast against him in the election,
a figure that conveniently exceeded Clinton’s popular vote margin of
victory.86
Trump’s allegations of voter fraud and vote-rigging were
completely baseless.87 A post-election investigation by the Washington
78. US election 2016: Trump says election ‘rigged at polling places,’ BBC (Oct. 17, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2016-37673797.
79. Johnson, supra note 2.
80. Gajanan, supra note 2.
81. Greenberg, supra note 2.
82. David Wasserman, 2016 Popular Vote Tracker, COOK POL. REP. (Jan. 3, 2017),
http://cookpolitical.com/story/10174.
83. Restuccia, supra note 4; Michael D. Shear & Maggie Haberman, Trump Claims, With
No Evidence, That ‘Millions of People’ Voted Illegally, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/27/us/politics/trump-adviser-steps-up-searing-attack-onromney.html.
84. Glenn Kessler, Donald Trump’s bogus claim that millions of people voted illegally for
Hillary Clinton, WASH. POST (Nov. 27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/factchecker/wp/2016/11/27/trumps-bogus-claim-that-millions-of-people-voted-illegally-for-hillaryclinton/?utm_term=.69eaa1b078f7.
85. Victor Morton, Donald Trump Alleges ‘Serious Voter Fraud’ in Virginia, New
Hampshire, California, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2016/nov/27/donald-trump-alleges-serious-voter-fraud-virginia.
86. Phillip & DeBonis, supra note 6; Michael D. Shear & Emmarie Huetteman, Trump
Repeats Lie About Popular Vote in Meeting With Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/us/politics/donald-trump-congress-democrats.html?emc=
edit_na_20170123&nl=breaking-news&nlid=69180613&ref=headline&_r=0; Fandos, supra note
6.
87. See Cottrell, Herron & Westwood, supra note 6 (“An extensive study of voter fraud in
the 2016 election . . . found no evidence that could support anything like Trump’s accusations.”);
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Post found only four confirmed cases of voter fraud in the entire 2016
election.88 Likewise, Dartmouth College researchers conducted a
comprehensive study of the 2016 election and found no evidence to
support Trump’s allegations.89 Even leading Republicans, such as
House Speaker Paul Ryan and Senator Lindsay Graham, admitted that
“no evidence” had been found to support Trump’s allegations.90 Jon
Husted, the Republican Secretary of State of Ohio, responded to
Trump’s voter fraud claims by observing that while it was “[e]asy to
vote” in American elections, it was “hard to cheat.”91 As Husted
explained, voter fraud “is rare and when it happens, we hold people
accountable.”92 Similarly, the National Association of Secretaries of
State, an organization whose membership is made up primarily of
Republicans,93 announced that it was “not aware of any evidence that
supports the voter fraud claims made by President Trump.”94 Most
remarkable of all, during the 2016 recount in Michigan, Trump’s own

Cohn, Um, No, supra note 6; Danielle Kurtzleben, Here Are The Problems With the Trump
Team’s Voter Fraud Evidence, NPR (Nov. 28, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/11/28/503628803/
here-are-the-problems-with-the-trump-teams-voter-fraud-evidence; Greenberg, supra note 2;
Cohn, Simply No Evidence, supra note 6; Phillip & DeBonis, supra note 6; Fandos, supra note 6.
88. Phillip Bump, There Have Been Just Four Documented Cases of Voter Fraud in the 2016
Election, WASH. POST, (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2016/12/01/0-000002-percent-of-all-the-ballots-cast-in-the-2016-election-were-fraudulent
/?utm_term=.15bac4b66806.
89. Cottrell, Herron & Westwood, supra note 6; David Cottrell, Michael C. Herron & Sean
Westwood, Evaluating Donald Trump’s Allegations of Voter Fraud in the 2016 Presidential
Election (Dec. 2, 2016), http://www.dartmouth.edu/~voterfraud.
90. Rebecca Savransky, Trump to Ask For ‘Major Investigation Into Voter Fraud,’ HILL
(Jan. 25, 2017), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/316006-trump-to-ask-for-majorinvestigation-into-voter-fraud; Jennifer Calfas, Graham to Trump: Stop Alleging Voter Fraud,
HILL (Jan. 24, 2017), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/315832-graham-to-trumpstop-lying-about-voter-fraud.
91. Sari Horwitz & Jenna Johnson, Voting Rights Advocates Fear Trump’s Unfounded
Fraud Claims Will Lead to More Restrictive Laws, WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/voting-rights-advocates-fear-trumpsunfounded-fraud-claims-will-lead-to-more-restrictive-laws/2017/01/25/fcadba36-e320-11e6-a5475fb9411d332c_story.html?utm_term=.9d44e3ad29d5.
92. Ohio Secretary of State Investigation Found Non-Citizens Registered to Vote, Cast Illegal
Ballots, WCMH (Feb. 27, 2017), http://wdtn.com/2017/02/27/ohio-secretary-of-stateinvestigation-found-non-citizens-registered-to-vote-cast-illegal-ballots/.
93. Philip Bump, 28 Things to Remember About Trump’s ‘Investigation Into Voter Fraud,’
WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/01/25/28things-to-remember-about-trumps-investigation-into-voter-fraud/?utm_term=.d4c08db4c8a2.
94. Mark Berman, While Trump Promises Voter Fraud Probe, Election Officials Say They
Don’t Know ‘Of Any Evidence’ Backing His Claims, WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/01/24/state-election-officials-wedont-know-of-any-evidence-backing-trumps-voter-fraud-claims/?utm_term=.54ed8aa07124.
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legal team admitted that “all available evidence suggests that the 2016
general election was not tainted by fraud or mistake.”95
Trump was not the only presidential candidate to question the
integrity of the election with false claims. On the other end of the
political spectrum, Green Party candidate Jill Stein filed for recounts in
Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan on the basis of her unfounded
allegation that “we have a voting system which has been proven to
basically be wide open to hackers”96 She further asserted without proof
that hackers might have submitted fraudulent absentee ballots.97 To be
sure, Stein’s demand for a recount came in the context of extraordinary
foreign involvement in the presidential campaign. In the summer of
2016, Wikileaks disclosed Clinton campaign emails that the Russian
government had hacked from Democratic National Committee
computer systems.98 An investigation by the FBI and CIA concluded
that the Russian government had hacked the emails in order to
embarrass the Democrats and facilitate Trump’s victory in the
presidential election.99
Crucially, however, Stein had no evidence that Russia or anyone
else tampered with the nation’s voting machines.100 Although court
orders ended the recounts in Michigan and Pennsylvania before they
could be completed,101 Wisconsin’s recount confirmed Trump’s victory

95. Philip Bump, Reminder: In an Anti-Recount Filing, Trump’s Lawyers Said the Election
Was ‘Not Tainted By Fraud or Mistake,’ WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/12/05/in-an-anti-recount-filing-trumpslawyers-say-the-election-was-not-tainted-by-fraud-or-mistake/?utm_term=.4bb075fcd91e.
96. Sanger, supra note 3.
97. Amanda Holpuch & Jon Swaine, Jill Stein Requests Wisconsin Recount, Alleging
(Nov.
25,
2016),
Hackers
Filed
Bogus
Absentee
Ballots,
GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/25/jill-stein-election-recount-clinton-trumpmichigan-pennsylvania-wisconsin.
98. David E. Sanger, Obama Strikes Back at Russia for Election Hacking, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/29/us/politics/russia-election-hacking-sanctions.html.
99. Adam Entous & Ellen Nakashima, FBI in Agreement with CIA That Russia Aimed to
Help Trump Win White House, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/clinton-blames-putins-personal-grudge-against-her-for-election-interference/2016/12/
16/12f36250-c3be-11e6-8422-eac61c0ef74d_story.html?utm_term=.3a70e9145dd9.
100. Carl Bialik & Rob Arthur, Demographics, Not Hacking, Explain The Election Results,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 23, 2016), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/demographics-nothacking-explain-the-election-results/.
101. Steve Eder, Stein Ends Recount Bid, but Says It Revealed Flaws in Voting System, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/us/stein-ends-recount-bid-but-saysit-revealed-flaws-in-voting-system.html; Monica Davey, Federal Judge Clears Way to End
Michigan Recount, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2016), https:san//www.nytimes.com/2016/12/07
/us/politics/michigan-recount-jill-stein.html.
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in the state102 and turned up no evidence that hackers had compromised
the state’s voting systems.103 Most important of all, an examination of
voting systems by the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security
found no evidence whatsoever that hackers had tampered with voting
machines in the 2016 election.104 Nevertheless, because a presidential
candidate demanded a recount on the basis of her false allegations of
election fraud, traditional news outlets105 ended up reporting on the
baseless speculation that the election system was rigged by Russia.106
The ease with which fake news, misinformation, and false
allegations spread like wildfire is now a disturbing hallmark of modern
politics. Vice President Al Gore once celebrated the internet as the
“information superhighway,”107 but instead of becoming a powerful
instrument for the dissemination of facts, the internet has confused and
misled Americans as much as it has informed them. The implications
for election administration and American democracy are deeply
troubling. In the internet age, even an election with no evidence of
improprieties or significant tabulation errors can be inundated with
false claims of voter fraud.
But fake news is only one of the toxic elements of contemporary
American politics. Hyperpolarization constitutes the second poisonous
development as America’s internal political divisions have taken on
epidemic proportions.

102. Michael Finnegan, Final Wisconsin Recount Tally Strengthens Trump’s Victory, L.A.
TIMES (Dec. 12, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/trailguide/la-na-trailguideupdates-final-wisconsin-recount-tally-1481584948-htmlstory.html.
103. Jason Stein, Recount Confirms Trump’s Victory in Wisconsin, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL
(Dec. 12, 2016), http://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/12/12/recountdrawing-close-wisconsin/95328294/; Alex Hern, US Recounts Find No Evidence of Hacking in
Trump Win But Reveal Vulnerabilities, GUARDIAN (Dec. 28, 2016), https://www.theguardian
.com/us-news/2016/dec/28/election-recount-hacking-voting-machines.
104. Katie Bo Williams, FBI, DHS Release Report on Russia Hacking, HILL (Dec. 29, 2016),
http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/312132-fbi-dhs-release-report-on-russia-hack ing.
105. Gabriel Sherman, Experts Urge Clinton Campaign to Challenge Election Results in 3
Swing States, N.Y. MAG. (Nov. 22, 2016), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/11/activistsurge-hillary-clinton-to-challenge-election-results.html.
106. Paul Musgrave, If You’re Even Asking if Russia Hacked The Election, Russia Got What
it Wanted, WASH. POST (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything
/wp/2016/11/28/whether-or-not-russians-hacked-the-election-they-messed-with-ourdemocracy/?utm_term=.f087480531f3.
107. See Glenn Kessler, A Cautionary Tale for Politicians: Al Gore and the ‘Invention’ of the
Internet, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/factchecker/wp/2013/11/04/a-cautionary-tale-for-politicians-al-gore-and-the-invention-of-theinternet/?utm_term=.8ddbe9e5f985 (observing that Gore “popularized the term ‘the Information
Superhighway’”).
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B. Hyperpolarization
Even in the best of times, rampant charges of election fraud would
shake confidence in American democracy. But these are far from the
best of times in American politics. The 2016 election played out against
the backdrop of years of intensifying political polarization as
Republicans and Democrats increasingly see each other as a threat to
the country.
The term “polarization” refers to intense partisan conflict that
replaces traditional norms of civil discourse and bipartisan agreement
with bitterly hostile political rhetoric and straight party-line voting.108
When polarization occurs, the political center shrinks as both parties
move toward their ideological extremes.109 In a polarized political
system, ideological differences between the two parties are stark and
the opportunities for compromise and consensus are sharply
constricted if not eliminated altogether.110
Polarization has occurred in cycles throughout American history.
The first major episode of political polarization occurred in the 1790s
as the new nation divided between the urban-centered Federalists of
Alexander Hamilton and the agrarian-focused DemocraticRepublicans of Thomas Jefferson.111 In the 1860s the United States
experienced the most devastating episode of political polarization in its
history. The national divide over slavery culminated in the secession of
11 southern states, which in turn led to the Civil War.112 The war ended
in Union victory, but at the cost of more than 600,000 American lives.113
On a far less destructive scale, episodes of polarization would continue
to plague the country in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries until a fragile political consensus took root during the era of
the Second World War and early Cold War.114 The mid-century political
108. On the concept of polarization, see Nathaniel Persily, Introduction, in SOLUTIONS TO
POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN AMERICA 4–14 (Nathaniel Persily, ed., 2015).
109. Id. at 4–5.
110. Id. at 4–10.
111. JOHN FERLING, JEFFERSON AND HAMILTON: THE RIVALRY THAT FORGED A NATION
(2014).
112. See DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS, 1848-1861 449 (1976) (“[T]he sectional
conflict had neutralized their many affinities, causing antislavery men to depreciate the value of
a Union which was flawed by slavery, and causing men in the slaveholding states to give the
defense of the slave system such a high priority that they could no longer offer loyalty to a Union
which seemed to threaten that system.”).
113. See JAMES MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 854 (1988)
(“More than 620,000 soldiers lost their lives in four years of conflict.”).
114. See WENDY L. WALL, INVENTING THE AMERICAN WAY: THE POLITICS OF CONSENSUS
FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 8–9 (2008) (“The war against the Axis
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consensus resulted from the fact that the parties accepted ideological
diversity within their ranks, as the Republican Party included a strong
liberal-progressive wing and the Democratic Party included a strong
southern-conservative wing.115
Today, however, American politics are experiencing an
extraordinarily intense period of polarization, the most extreme in
more than 100 years.116 The trend toward hyperpolarization began in
the 1970s and steadily intensified in the years that followed.117 The
trend toward hyperpolarization closely tracked the growing ideological
homogeneity of the two major parties, as liberals congregated in the
Democratic Party and conservatives congregated in the Republican
Party.118 Some studies have found that Republicans have moved more
sharply to the right than Democrats have to the left,119 but a 2015 study
found that polarization “appears uniform across parties.”120 In any case,
the ideological resorting of the parties has given rise to wide policy
differences on issues such as abortion, health care, foreign policy, and
taxes.121 The center of the political spectrum has contracted accordingly,

powers brought the federal government into the act of promoting national cohesion and produced
an infrastructure of institutions devoted to publicly defining for Americans their common ground.
It also forced groups on both ends of the political spectrum to curtail the vitriolic rhetoric they
had sometimes used during the 1930s.”).
115. See, e.g., MATTHEW LEVENDUSKY, THE PARTISAN SORT: HOW LIBERALS BECAME
DEMOCRATS AND CONSERVATIVES BECAME REPUBLICANS 2 (2009) (“In the 1950s and 1960s,
Democratic and Republican elites were relatively heterogeneous, with a liberal ‘Rockefeller
Republican’ wing and a cadre of conservative southern Democrats.”).
116. See Persily, supra note 108, at 14 (observing that “the U.S. political system is more
polarized than at any time in the past century”).
117. KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, IDEOLOGY & CONGRESS 106 (2d ed. 2007);
William A. Galston & Pietro S. Nivola, Delineating the Problem, in RED AND BLUE NATION?:
CHARACTERISTICS AND CAUSES OF AMERICA’S POLARIZED POLITICS 20 (William A. Galston
and Pietro S. Nivola, eds., 2006); Nolan McCarthy, What We Know and Don’t Know About Our
Polarized Politics, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2014/01/08/what-we-know-and-dont-know-about-our-polarizedpolitics/?utm_term=.d59b951c63db.
118. See generally Alan I. Abramowitz & Kyle L. Saunders, Ideological Realignment in the
U.S. Electorate, 60 J. POL. 634 (1998).
119. See McCarthy, supra note 117 (“Despite the widespread belief that both parties have
moved to the extremes, the movement of the Republican Party to the right accounts for most of
the divergence between the two parties.”); Norm Ornstein, Yes, Polarization Is Asymmetric—and
Conservatives Are Worse, THE ATLANTIC (June 19, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2014/06/yes-polarization-is-asymmetric-and-conservatives-are-worse/373044/.
120. See Shanto Iyengar & Sean J. Westwood, Fear and Loathing across Party Lines: New
Evidence on Group Polarization, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 690, 705 (July 2015),
https://pcl.stanford.edu/research/2015/iyengar-ajps-group-polarization.pdf
(finding
that
“polarization scores (both explicit and implicit) for partisans on the left and right were generally
indistinguishable”).
121. Carroll Doherty & Samantha Smith, 5 Facts About Republicans and National Security,
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leaving little room for political compromise or even dialogue across
ideological lines.122 The parties are so ideologically divided that
Congressional voting patterns are more polarized than at any time
since the Civil War and Reconstruction era.123 Further complicating
matters is the internal fragmentation of the two parties, which has
reduced the power of party leaders to find common ground and bridge
party divides.124 The closely-contested nature of recent elections has
only intensified polarization levels, as the outcome of a single election
can result in dramatic changes in domestic and foreign policy
depending on which party prevails.125
Polarization even extends to disagreement over basic facts. As Carl
Cannon has observed, “excess partisanship literally inhibits Americans
from processing information that challenges their biases.”126 A 2010
study by Adam Berinsky underscored the political ramifications of fake
news when it found that partisan biases make Democrats and
Republicans particularly receptive to misinformation that reinforces
their preexisting beliefs.127 For example, Republicans opposed to

PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/12/15/5-facts-aboutrepublicans-and-national-security/; see also Jeff Stonecash, The Two Key Factors Behind Our
Polarized Politics, in POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 72 (Daniel J. Hopkins
and John Sides, eds., 2015) (“The result is a fundamental difference between liberals and
conservatives regarding how much government should help people.”); Hannah Fingerhut, On
Abortion, Persistent Divides Between – and Within – the Two Parties, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 8,
2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/04/08/on-abortion-persistent-divides-betweenand-within-the-two-parties-2/.
122. See generally ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ, THE DISAPPEARING CENTER: ENGAGED
CITIZENS, POLARIZATION, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2010); Richard H. Pildes, Why the
Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CAL. L. REV.
273, 276 (2011) (warning that “our era’s hyperpolarized politics primarily reflect deep historical
and structural transformations in American democracy”).
123. Christopher Hare & Keith T. Poole, The Polarization of Contemporary American
Politics, 46 POLITY 411 (2014). See also Christopher Hare, Keith T. Poole, & Howard Rosenthal,
Polarization in Congress Has Risen Sharply. Where is it Going Next? WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/02/13/polarization-in-congresshas-risen-sharply-where-is-it-going-next/?utm_term=.d2052da99638.
124. On fragmentation, see Richard H. Pildes, Focus on Political Fragmentation, Not
Polarization, in SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN AMERICA 150–51 (Nathaniel
Persily, ed., 2015).
125. Francis Lee, American Politics is More Competitive Than Ever. That’s Making
Partisanship Worse, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2014/01/09/american-politics-is-more-competitive-than-ever-thats-making-partisanshipworse/?utm_term=.cabc6fb45095.
126. Carl Cannon, Polarization Runs Deep, Even by Yesterday’s Standards, in RED AND
BLUE NATION?: CHARACTERISTICS AND CAUSES OF AMERICA’S POLARIZED POLITICS 170
(William A. Galston and Pietro S. Nivola, eds., 2006).
127. See Berinsky, supra note 66, at 245 (“Surveys show that Democrats and Republicans
(and liberals and conservatives) approach the same rumor in very different ways. More generally,
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environmental regulation consistently get basic facts wrong about
climate change when surveyed.128 Even objective evidence fails to
change the minds of those determined to view facts in a subjectively
partisan light. For example, after President Trump’s inauguration
ceremony, 15 percent of his supporters insisted that Trump’s inaugural
drew the largest crowd ever, even after being confronted with
photographic evidence that the 2009 Obama inauguration attracted a
much larger crowd of onlookers.129 But it is not just Republicans who
wear partisan blinders. Democrats also show similar biases.130 Studies
have found that Republicans and Democrats alike tend to ignore news
stories that challenge their pre-existing beliefs and blindly accept
stories that reinforce their partisan prejudices, even if the information
is false.131 Hence, fake news and political polarization go hand-inhand.132
Hyperpolarization is particularly alarming at a time when partisan
affiliation correlates strongly with race. The United States is a
multiracial democracy but the two parties increasingly reflect different
Americas. In 2016 Clinton carried African Americans by a margin of 88
percent to 8 percent, and she carried Latinos and Asian Americans by
a margin of 65 percent to 29 percent.133 Trump, in contrast, carried
whites by a margin of 58 percent to 37 percent.134 The 2016 election was
consistent with long-term trends whereby the Republican Party has
become increasingly white and rural and the Democratic Party has
become increasingly diverse and urban.135 The racial realignment of the
research has found that people are more likely to accept rumors that are consistent with their preexisting attitudes.”).
128. Jennifer Hochschild & Katherine Levine Einstein, ‘It Isn’t What We Don’t Know that
Gives Us Trouble, It’s What We Know that Ain’t So’: Misinformation and Democratic Politics, 45
BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 467, 470–71 (2014).
129. Brian Schaffner & Samantha Luks, This is what Trump voters said when asked to
compare his inaugural crowd with Obama’s, WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/01/25/we-asked-people-whichinauguration-crowd-was-bigger-heres-what-they-said/?utm_term=.52b5795b0c90.
130. Brendan Nyhan, Why More Democrats Are Now Embracing Conspiracy Theories, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/15/upshot/why-more-democrats-arenow-embracing-conspiracy-theories.html.
131. Amanda Taub, The Real Story About Fake News Is Partisanship, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/upshot/the-real-story-about-fake-news-is-partisan
ship.html.
132. Nyhan, supra note 130.
133. Election 2016: Exit Polls, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2016/11/08/us/politics/election-exit-polls.html?_r=0.
134. Id.
135. Frank Newport, Democrats Racially Diverse; Republicans Mostly White, GALLUP (Jan.
8, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/160373/democrats-racially-diverse-republicans-mostly-white

GAUGHAN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY

4/20/2017 11:44 AM

79

two parties dates to the 1960s and 1970s when a backlash against the
Civil Rights Movement led white southerners to move from the
Democratic Party to the Republican Party.136 Conversely, African
Americans shifted their political allegiances from Republicans to
Democrats,137 and today Latino and Asian American voters also
predominantly affiliate with the Democratic Party.138 The disturbing
conclusion is that with the two parties divided by race,139
hyperpolarization threatens to intensify racial antagonism. Indeed, it is
probably not a coincidence that the rise in political polarization closely
parallels recent surveys that find Americans increasingly view race
relations as bad and getting worse.140
The risk that hyperpolarization will intensify racial divisions is
amplified by historic levels of partisan antipathy. Republicans and
Democrats have come to profoundly dislike one another. A 2012 study
in Public Opinion Quarterly of survey data from 1960 to 2010 found an
8-fold increase in the percentage of Republicans and Democrats who
said they would be “displeased” if their son or daughter married a
member of a different political party.141 Other recent surveys have also
recorded unprecedented levels of partisan antipathy not just among
party elites but also among ordinary Americans.142 A 2014 Pew
.aspx.
136. A full analysis of the reasons behind the racial realignment of the two parties goes far
beyond the scope of this article, but the scholarly literature on the subject is deep and rich. See,
e.g., EARL BLACK & MERLE BLACK, THE RISE OF SOUTHERN REPUBLICANS (2003); KARI
FREDERICKSON, THE DIXIECRAT REVOLT AND THE END OF THE SOLID SOUTH, 1932-1968
(2003); DAN T. CARTER, THE POLITICS OF RAGE: GEORGE WALLACE, THE ORIGINS OF THE
NEW CONSERVATISM, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS (2d ed. 2000).
137. JULES WITCOVER, PARTY OF THE PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF THE DEMOCRATS (2003);
LEWIS L. GOULD, THE REPUBLICANS: A HISTORY OF THE GRAND OLD PARTY 340–41 (2014).
138. See David L. Leal, Latino Public Opinion: Does It Exist?, in LATINO POLITICS:
IDENTITY, MOBILIZATION, AND REPRESENTATION 41 (Rodolfo Espino et al., eds., 2007)
(“Latinos also uniquely support the Democratic Party and Democratic politicians.”).
139. Paul Taylor, The Demographic Trends Shaping American Politics in 2016 and Beyond,
PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/01/27/thedemographic-trends-shaping-american-politics-in-2016-and-beyond/.
140. Krissah Thompson & Scott Clement, Poll: Majority of Americans Think Race Relations
Are Getting Worse, WASH. POST (July 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/morethan-6-in-10-adults-say-us-race-relations-are-generally-bad-poll-indicates/2016/07/16/665489364aa8-11e6-90a8-fb84201e0645_story.html?utm_term=.beddc9ed29b4; Giovanni Russonello, Race
Relations Are at Lowest Point in Obama Presidency, Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/14/us/most-americans-hold-grim-view-of-race-relations-pollfinds.html.
141. Shanto Iyengar, Gaurav Sood & Yphtach Lelkes, Affect, Not Ideology: A Social Identity
Perspective on Polarization, 76 PUB. OPINION Q. 405, 417–19 (2012).
142. Political Polarization in the American Public: Section 2: Growing Partisan Antipathy,
PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2014), http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-
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Research Center analysis of public opinion data concluded that “the
level of antipathy that members of each party feel toward the opposing
party has surged over the past two decades. Not only do greater
numbers of those in both parties have negative views of the other side,
those negative views are increasingly intense.”143 A 2015 study by
Shanto Iyengar and Sean Westwood found that partisan hostility
promotes biases that are even stronger than racial discrimination.144
Polarization has become so intense and so pervasive it undermines
the ties that bind the nation together. The country is self-sorting into a
collection of like-minded partisan enclaves, where the idea of
ideological diversity is viewed with disdain and hostility.145 For example,
demographic studies have found that Republican voters increasingly
choose to live among fellow Republicans in low population density
areas and Democratic voters increasingly choose to live among fellow
Democrats in high population density areas.146 The 2016 election
highlighted the extraordinary extent to which Republicans and
Democrats have separated themselves geographically. Over 60 percent
of Americans live in “landslide” counties that voted for either Clinton
or Trump by at least 20 percentage points.147 In contrast, in 1992 only 38
percent of Americans lived in a county that the Republican or
Democratic presidential candidate carried by 20 points or more.148 The
disturbing conclusion is that the United States is evolving into two
distinct countries—a racially-diverse Democratic Party concentrated in
the-american-public/.
143. Id.
144. See Iyengar & Westwood, supra note 120, at 703 (“Compared with the most salient social
divide in American society—race—partisanship elicits more extreme evaluations and behavioral
responses to ingroups and outgroups.”).
145. See Nate Cohn, Polarization Is Dividing American Society, Not Just Politics, N.Y. TIMES
(June 12, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/12/upshot/polarization-is-dividing-americansociety-not-just-politics.html?_r=0 (describing social science research that finds that “[l]iberals
and conservatives prefer to associate with and live near their fellow partisans”); Political
Polarization in the American Public, supra note 142. See also BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY
CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED AMERICANS IS TEARING US APART 39 (2009) (“Today we seek
our own kind in like-minded churches, like-minded neighborhoods, and like-minded sources of
news and entertainment. . . . [L]ike-minded homogeneous groups squelch dissent, grow more
extreme in their thinking, and ignore evidence that their positions are wrong.”).
146. See, e.g., Wendy K. Tam Cho, James G. Gimpel & Iris S. Hui, Voter Migration and the
Geographic Sorting of the American Electorate, 103 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 856, 866
(2013) (describing that “Republican migrants show a preference for moving to areas that are even
more Republican” and “Democrats display a similar preference for their own”).
147. Gregor Aisch, Adam Pearce & Karen Yourish, The Divide Between Red and Blue
America Grew Even Deeper in 2016, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2016/11/10/us/politics/red-blue-divide-grew-stronger-in-2016.html.
148. Id.
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the cities and a heavily-white Republican Party concentrated in rural
areas, small towns, and exurbs.149 Moreover, the two countries despise
and distrust each other, as the partisan antipathy surveys reveal.
The geographical and social separation of Democrats and
Republicans bodes ominously for the future unity of the nation and the
vitality of its democratic institutions. In the hyperpolarized political
environment that prevails today, partisans view election stakes as
existential in nature. According to a Pew Research Center study, 36%
of Republicans view Democratic policies as a “threat to the nation’s
well-being” and 27% of Democrats express the same dark view of
Republicans.150 The study also found that 43 percent of Republicans
and 38 percent of Democrats have a “very unfavorable” view of the
other party.151 Amid such a hyperpolarized political system, the
defeated party views the winning side as illegitimate and unworthy of
governing.152 In such a poisonous political atmosphere, partisans are
incentivized to go outside the normal conventions of politics to block
the other party from governing effectively.153 The government
shutdown in 2013154 and the Senate’s refusal in 2016 to even grant a
hearing to Merrick Garland, President Obama’s Supreme Court

149. Clayton Nall, The Political Consequences of Spatial Policies: How Interstate Highways
Facilitated Geographic Polarization, 77 J. POL. 394 (2015); Emily Badger, Quoctrung Bui & Adam
Pearce, The Election Highlighted a Growing Rural-Urban Split, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/12/upshot/this-election-highlighted-a-growing-rural-urbansplit.html; Emily Badger & Quoctrung Bui, Why Republicans Don’t Even Try to Win Cities
Anymore, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/03/upshot/whyrepublicans-dont-even-try-to-win-cities-anymore.html?_r=0.
150. Carroll Doherty, Which Party is More to Blame For Political Polarization? It Depends
on the Measure, PEW RES. CTR. (June 17, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2014/06/17/which-party-is-more-to-blame-for-political-polarization-it-depends-on-themeasure/.
151. Political Polarization in the American Public, supra note 142.
152. See Iyengar & Westwood, supra note 120, at 705 (“The level of animosity across party
lines also implies a reduced willingness to treat the actions of partisan opponents as legitimate.”);
Abby Philip, Trump-Lewis Feud Could Be Harbinger of New Round of Hyper-Partisanship,
WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-lewis-feud-couldbe-harbinger-of-new-round-of-hyper-partisanship/2017/01/14/f72db5a2-da8d-11e6-9a361d296534b31e_story.html?utm_term=.5f8d8ac1f135.
153. See Ilya Somin, Three issues I Changed My Mind About in 2016, WASH. POST (Dec. 31,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/12/31/three-issues-ichanged-my-mind-about-in-2016/?utm_term=.6404652a5117 (“The more polarized we are, the
greater the partisan bias, and the greater the tendency to reject anything associated with the
opposition. Polarization also makes voters and political activists more willing to tolerate bad
behavior by their own party and its leaders.”).
154. Molly Ball, Republicans Shut Down the Government for Nothing, THE ATLANTIC (Oct.
16,
2013),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/10/republicans-shut-down-thegovernment-for-nothing/280611/.
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nominee,155 are just two of many recent examples of the increasing
willingness of partisans to break with institutional precedent and
engage in systematic obstructionism.156 The departure from historical
norms of political accommodation and compromise has set off a cycle
of escalation, whereby both parties engage in ever more extreme tactics
to stymie the opposing party.157 The result is a profoundly dysfunctional
government and a toxic political atmosphere.
From the vantage point of election administration, the crucial point
is hyperpolarization makes partisans far more willing to engage in antidemocratic measures. After all, if the stakes are nothing less than the
well-being of the nation, merely voicing disagreement with the
opposing party is not enough. Self-serving patriotic justifications may
thus inspire partisans to seek ways to make it harder for the other side
to get its vote out. Unfortunately, the long-standing American practice
of partisan election administration gives partisans the opportunity to
do precisely that.
C. Partisan Election Administration
Hyperpolarization and unfounded fears of systemic voting fraud
pose a threat to any democracy, but they are particularly dangerous in
the United States. Most western democracies place control of election
administration in the hands of neutral, non-partisan officials.158 But not

155. Robin Bradley Kar & Jason Mazzone, The Garland Affair: What History and the
Constitution Really Say about President Obama’s Powers to Appoint a Replacement for Justice
Scalia, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 53, 53 (2016); Adam Liptak, Study Calls Snub of Obama’s
Supreme Court Pick Unprecedented, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016
/06/14/us/politics/obama-supreme-court-merrick-garland.html.
156. See Michael J. Barber & Nolan McCarty, Causes and Consequences of Polarization, in
SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN AMERICA 51 (Nathaniel Persily ed., 2015) (“The
negotiation failures resulting from polarization have done much to undermine governance in the
United States by leading to gridlock and lower quality legislation and by harming the functioning
of the executive and judicial branches.”).
157. The federal court nomination process is a preeminent example. See Russell Wheeler,
Judicial Nominations and Confirmations: Fact and Fiction, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 30, 2013),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2013/12/30/judicial-nominations-and-confirmations-factand-fiction/ (“[T]he process is now so broken than both parties might see it in their self-interest
to consider a three-branch, truly bi-partisan commission to suggest fixes that the president and
senate in place in 2017 might consider.”); SARAH A. BINDER AND FORREST MALTZMAN,
ADVICE AND DISSENT: THE STRUGGLE TO SHAPE THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 103 (2009)
(“Intense ideological disagreement coupled with the rising importance of a closely balanced
federal bench has brought combatants in the wars of advice and consent to new tactics and new
crises as the two parties struggle to shape the future of the courts.”).
158. See Thomas E. Mann, Redistricting Reform: What is Desirable? Possible?, in PARTY
LINES: COMPETITION, PARTISANSHIP, AND CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 93 (Thomas E.
Mann & Bruce E. Cain eds., 2005) (“The United States is clearly an outlier in the democratic
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the United States. Unusual among leading democracies, the United
States entrusts the administration of elections to partisan political
operators.159 Consequently, for all of the controversy over allegations
of voter fraud and other forms of illegal election activity, the real
scandal of American politics is what is legal.
The American practice of partisan election administration
manifests itself in two ways. The first is in the selection of election
officials. In 33 of the 50 states, the chief election officer is a partisan
politician.160 And in many of the remaining states the governor chooses
the chief election officer, an appointment method that only thinly veils
the political nature of the selection process.161 Often holding the office
of Secretary of State, the chief election officer is extremely important
in both federal and state election administration.162
The Florida election controversy in 2000 demonstrated how
partisan control of the Secretary of State’s office can influence election
outcomes. In the extremely close 2000 presidential election between
Texas Governor George Bush and Vice President Al Gore, the
Electoral College outcome turned on the results in the state of
Florida.163 Bush led Gore by only a few hundred votes in Florida after
state election officials conducted a machine recount.164 In the days
following the machine recount, the critical question was whether
Florida law permitted a statewide hand recount before the secretary of
state, Katherine Harris, certified the election results.165 Harris was a
world when it comes to the role that politicians play in shaping the rules that affect their electoral
future.”).
159. See Daniel P. Tokaji, The Future of Election Reform: From Rules to Institutions, 28 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 125, 127 (2009) (“The United States also is unusual, though not unique, in
vesting responsibility in officials who are affiliated with political parties.”).
160. MICHAEL R. DIMINO, SR., BRADLEY A. SMITH & MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE,
UNDERSTANDING ELECTION LAW AND VOTING RIGHTS 215 (2017).
161. See Tokaji, supra note 159, at 132 (“Other states have appointment processes, but, in
many of those states, the chief election official is appointed by the state’s governor (who, of
course, is elected through a partisan process).”).
162. See Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Democracy and The Secretary: The Crucial Role of State
Election Administrators in Promoting Accuracy and Access to Democracy, 27 ST. LOUIS U. PUB.
L. REV. 343, 343–44 (2008) (“While there are several entities and actors that each interact to
shape, enforce, and execute election law and policy, none plays a role that is as crucial as the
individual or group of individuals who are charged with overseeing the administration of all
elections in the state.”); id. at 346 (“[I]t is the Secretary of State who plays the pivotal role in
properly administering and overseeing elections to ensure that these dual values of accuracy and
access are promoted, enforced, and attained.”).
163. KEYSSAR, supra note 28, at 258.
164. EDWARD B. FOLEY, BALLOT BATTLES: THE HISTORY OF DISPUTED ELECTIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 286 (2016).
165. Id. at 286–87.
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Republican elected official who headed Bush’s campaign committee in
Florida, and thus had an obvious conflict of interest.166 Rather than
recuse herself, however, she openly consulted with Bush’s lawyers and
embraced their argument that Florida law did not provide for a manual
recount before certification of the election results.167 By refusing to
direct a pre-certification manual recount, she succeeded in delaying the
proceedings to such an extent that the United States Supreme Court
ultimately determined that Florida lacked sufficient time to complete
the recount, a decision that effectively handed the election to Bush.168
The revelation that Harris had hired a private company to conduct a
purge of alleged felons from Florida’s voting rolls using lists of
questionable accuracy further deepened Democratic bitterness over
Harris’s relentlessly partisan approach to the 2000 election.169 The
haphazard and nakedly partisan procedure removed from the voting
lists many qualified voters, most of whom appeared to be Democrats.170
It is important to note that Harris’s interpretation of Florida law
during the Bush v. Gore controversy was not without legal merit. The
state law governing the recount procedures was ambiguous, and
Harris’s contention that it did not require a pre-certification statewide
manual recount had a plausible textual basis in the pertinent statutes.171
Moreover, while the pre-election voting purge likely disenfranchised
qualified Democratic voters, it is also true that a post-election
investigation by the Miami Herald indicated that thousands of

166. See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO THE NEXT
ELECTION MELTDOWN 21 (2013) (“[W]hile supervising Florida’s 2000 election, Harris also served
as the cochair of the Bush for President election committee in Florida.”).
167. FOLEY, supra note 164, at 287; HASEN, supra note 166, at 22–28.
168. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (holding that “it is evident that any recount
seeking to meet the December 12 date will be unconstitutional” and thus reversing the Florida
Supreme Court order directing the recount to proceed).
169. See KEYSSAR, supra note 28, at 260 (“Subsequent investigation revealed that
Republican officials in Florida, anticipating a closely contested election and presuming that most
ex-felons—as members of minority groups—were likely to vote Democratic, had purchased lists
of convicted felons from private corporations . . . . [T]he lists of felons were of uncertain accuracy
and did not contain social security numbers or other reliable identifiers.”); HASEN, supra note
166, at 29 (“Florida hired an outside company, DBT Online, at a cost of several million dollars to
manage the voter rolls and purge ineligible felons from those rolls.”).
170. See KEYSSAR, supra note 28, at 260 (noting that the purged voters “were likely to vote
Democratic” and concluding that “Florida’s broad felon-exclusion laws, thus, had permitted
partisan state officials in the pursuit of political advantage to deny people their right to vote”);
HASEN, supra note 166, at 28 (“The purge was done badly: at least two thousand eligible voters
were removed from the rolls.”); id. at 29 (“Harris’s office was at least reckless in how it let a
private company conduct the purge.”).
171. FOLEY, supra note 164, at 286–93.
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ineligible voters cast ballots in the election,172 which showed that the
voting rolls did indeed need to be updated. But the problem lay in the
fact that undeniable conflicts of interest tainted every decision that
Harris made.173 She did not get the benefit of the doubt because she
gave every indication that she had already made up her mind to rule in
favor of Bush. Democrats had every right to question the secretary of
state’s fairness and objectivity when Harris herself appeared to
embrace the role of a fiercely partisan Republican.
The Florida 2000 deadlock thus exemplified the undeniable reality
that partisan officials will never possess the credibility of non-partisan
election administrators. As Martha Kropf and David Kimball observed
in their comprehensive 2012 study of American election administration
practices, “partisan election officials can put their thumb on the scale
of administration to help their political party. This should be troubling
to anyone interested in fair elections.”174 Unfortunately the trend is
toward more partisanship in election administration rather than less.
For example, in 2016 the Wisconsin legislature abolished the state’s
nonpartisan Government Accountability Board, which experts had
hailed as a model for the nation,175 and replaced it with a state election
commission controlled by partisan appointees.176
The second way in which partisanship in election administration
manifests itself is in the state legislatures’ adoption of voting rules that
benefit one party at the expense of another. The problem stems from
the United States Constitution itself, which entrusts the legislative
branch with responsibility for election administration. Article I, Section
4 states:
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives shall be prescribed in each state by the Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations . . .177

172. HASEN, supra note 166, at 31.
173. FOLEY, supra note 164, at 287.
174. MARTHA KROPF & DAVID C. KIMBALL, HELPING AMERICA VOTE: THE LIMITS OF
ELECTION REFORM 114 (2012).
175. See, e.g., Daniel P. Tokaji, America’s Top Model: The Wisconsin Government
Accountability Board, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 575, 607 (2013) (“The GAB thus serves as a worthy
model for the remaining forty-nine states, all of which still have partisan or bipartisan chief
election authorities . . . .”).
176. Scott Bauer, Wisconsin GAB in Final Days as State’s Elections Authority, MILWAUKEEWIS. J. SENTINEL (June 26, 2016), http://archive.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/wisconsin-gab-infinal-days-as-states-elections-authority-b99751280z1-384455051.html.
177. U.S. CONST. art I, § 4.
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Although partisans might cite the Constitution as the strongest
defense of politically-motivated election administration, the historical
record clearly indicates that the Constitution’s framers did not grasp
the partisan implications of what they had done in Article I, Section 4.
At the time of the Constitution, parties in a modern sense did not even
exist yet.178 In addition the Constitution’s framers expressed a deep
hostility to partisan factionalism.179 As James Madison warned in
Federalist No. 10, when factionalism divides a polity, “the public good
is disregarded” and public policy “is too often decided, not according
to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the
superior force of an interested and overbearing majority.”180 Likewise,
in his farewell address, President Washington condemned the “baneful
effects of the spirit of party,” which he viewed as the “worst enemy” of
democracy.181 He warned that “[t]he alternate domination of one
faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge natural to party
dissension” would lead to “horrid enormities” and “a frightful
despotism.”182 The framers thus structured the Constitution with the
intent of impeding the rise of political parties.183
Contrary to the framers’ intentions, however, the Constitution did
not prevent the rise of large and powerful factions in American
politics.184 Political parties gradually took shape in the early national
period,185 which meant that Article I’s assignment of election rules to
legislatures had sweeping ramifications far beyond what the framers
envisioned. Legislative control of election rules allowed majority

178. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON,
MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 17 (2005) (“Nothing resembling the
modern party system had yet emerged as an historical reality.”).
179. See id. at 17 (“[The Founders] equated parties with factions, which they saw as evils.”).
180. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 41–42 (James Madison) (Mary Carolyn Waldrep & Jim
Miller eds., 2014).
181. George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796), reprinted in SPEECHES OF THE
AMERICAN PRESIDENTS 17, 21 (Janet Podell & Steven Anzovin eds., 2d ed. 2001).
182. Id.
183. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the
Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 713 (1998) (citation omitted) (“[T]he constitutional
structure was specifically intended to preclude the rise of political parties, which were considered
the quintessential form of ‘faction.’”).
184. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 180, at 84 (stating that the Constitution was
designed to ensure that “[t]he influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their
particular States but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States”).
185. See JOHN F. HOADLEY, ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES: 1789-1803 7
(2015) (“The period from 1789 to 1803 witnessed dramatic events that can only be adequately
described as a process of party development, a process that was remarkable for its swift
appearance during an era when the idea of parties was greatly feared.”).
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parties in the state legislatures to draft laws with the implicit goal of
denying their political opponents access to the ballot box. Jim Crow
segregation is a case in point. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, the southern Democratic Party adopted a series of
disenfranchising laws—including poll taxes, grandfather clauses, and
literacy tests—designed to deny the right to vote to African Americans,
who were politically aligned with the Republican Party.186 The voting
restrictions were highly effective at severely curtailing black suffrage
rights. For example, the number of registered African American voters
in Louisiana fell from 130,000 in 1896 to 1,342 by 1904.187 Not until the
adoption of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, which invalidated racially
discriminatory voting laws, would African American registration rates
in the South begin to rival rates among whites.188 For example, between
1965 and 2004, African American registration rates in Mississippi rose
from 6.7% to 72.3%.189 By closely scrutinizing and policing the voting
rules that emanated from partisan southern legislatures, the VRA
proved highly effective at creating a truly biracial democracy in the
South.190 As Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged in Shelby County v.
Holder, the VRA was “immensely successful at redressing racial
discrimination and integrating the voting process” in the South.191
But in recent years, the parties have once again been aggressive in
utilizing their control of election administration. Partisan redistricting
is the most obvious example.192 Article I, Section 2 of the United States
Constitution provides that congressional districts must be redrawn
every 10 years,193 and the states follow the same pattern for legislative
districts. Since the earliest days of the American republic, the parties
186. KEYSSAR, supra note 28, at 66–69, 84–93.
187. Id. at 91.
188. Id. at 212.
189. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2626 (2013).
190. See id. at 2625 (citation omitted) (“Nearly 50 years later, things have changed
dramatically . . . . ‘[V]oter turnout and registration rates now approach parity. Blatantly
discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare. And minority candidates hold office at
unprecedented levels.’”).
191. Id. at 2626.
192. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of
Political Fairness, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1643, 1661–62 (1993) (“[P]arties in power can enhance their
electoral opportunities by displacing incumbents of the other party from their established
constituents, thus denying the displaced incumbents the benefits obtained from name recognition,
past delivery of constituent services, and prior social investment in the district.”); ROYCE
CROCKER, CONG. RES. SERV., R42831, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING: AN OVERVIEW 5
(2012) (“By concentrating more like-minded voters into fewer districts with super-majorities, . . .
the group of like-minded voters will be able to elect fewer of their preferred candidates.”).
193. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
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have drawn district lines in a manner that maximizes the votes of the
incumbent party.194 The term “gerrymander”—which refers to
politically-motivated redistricting—originated with Massachusetts
Governor Elbridge Gerry, a skilled practitioner of partisan redistricting
in the early 1800s.195 Gerrymandering is deeply unpopular with the
public. A 2013 Harris Poll found that only 2% of Americans support
the idea of state legislatures drawing their own district lines and 50%
support the use of independent commissions.196 Popular opposition to
gerrymandering is understandable. After all, what sense does it make
to allow partisans to choose their own districts? The central idea of
democracy is that the voters choose their leaders, not the other way
around.197 But when partisans control the redistricting process,
incumbent legislators choose the voters who are assigned to their
districts.
Despite its undemocratic nature, gerrymandering is an entrenched
feature of most American elections. Only a handful of states use
independent commissions to draw district lines and one state—Iowa—
assigns redistricting responsibility to a nonpartisan legislative
bureau.198 In 43 of the 50 states, the legislature controls the redistricting
process.199 Although the Supreme Court has held that political
gerrymandering may give rise to equal protection claims under the
Fourteenth Amendment,200 the court has not yet agreed on a judicially
manageable standard for adjudicating partisan gerrymandering
claims.201 Consequently, partisan redistricting remains the law of the

194. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 274 (2004) (plurality opinion) (noting that
politically-motivated redistricting could be dated as far back as colonial Pennsylvania in the early
1700s).
195. See MARK E. RUSH, DOES REDISTRICTING MAKE A DIFFERENCE? 2 (1993) (“The term
gerrymander was first used in 1812 when the Democratic-Republican (i.e., Jeffersonian) majority
of the Massachusetts legislature split Essex County in order to dilute the strength of the
Federalists.”).
196. Americans Across Party Lines Oppose Common Gerrymandering Practices, HARRIS
POLL (Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.theharrispoll.com/politics/Americans_Across_Party_
Lines_Oppose_Common_Gerrymandering_Practices.html.
197. See How to Rig an Election, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 25, 2002),
http://www.economist.com/node/1099030 (“In a normal democracy, voters choose their
representatives. In America, it is rapidly becoming the other way around . . . .”).
198. CROCKER, supra note 192, at 16–18.
199. Id. at 16.
200. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986) (“[W]e hold that political gerrymandering
cases are properly justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause.”).
201. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“[N]o judicially
discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims have
emerged.”).
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land in the great majority of states and is employed by both parties.
Moreover, sophisticated data mining methods have made
gerrymandering more potent than ever.202
Besides gerrymandering, partisan elected officials also dictate the
rules that govern voting procedures. Such power may seem mundane,
but it has enormous practical significance. In both federal and state
elections, partisan officials set voter registration requirements, maintain
and purge voter rolls, and select polling sites and hours of operation.203
Everything that goes into voting is thus controlled by political
operators who have a vested interest in the outcome of the election.
The Trump Administration has made clear that it intends to make
full use of partisan control of election administration. After taking
office in January 2017, President Trump established a presidential
commission for a “major investigation” of voter fraud,204 expressed
skepticism about early voting,205 and pledged a “full evaluation of
voting rolls.”206 Following the administration’s lead, legislatures in
twenty-seven states are considering new voting restrictions in 2017.207
For example, in Iowa, the Republican-controlled legislature announced
202. See Daley, supra note 22 (explaining that the Republican Party “was also able to take
advantage of massive new amounts of public data drawn from social media that allowed them to
pinpoint likely voters with more accuracy than ever before, and advances in mapping technology
that made it possible to redraw districts precisely around the location of those voters”); 2012
REDMAP Summary Report, supra note 22.
203. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., NEW VOTING RESTRICTIONS IN PLACE FOR 2016
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (Sept. 12, 2016), http://www.brennancenter.org/voting-restrictionsfirst-time-2016; Strawbridge Robinson, supra note 19.
204. Alan Yuhas, Pence to Head Commission Investigating Baseless Voter Fraud Claim,
Trump Says, GUARDIAN (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/05/
donald-trump-mike-pence-commission-voter-fraud; Rebecca Savransky, Trump to Ask for
‘Major Investigation into Voter Fraud,’ HILL (Jan. 25, 2017), http://thehill.com/homenews/
administration/316006-trump-to-ask-for-major-investigation-into-voter-fraud; Josh Gerstein,
Trump’s Call for Election-fraud Probe Fraught with Peril, POLITICO (Jan. 25, 2017),
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/trump-voter-fraud-234183.
205. Ben Kamisar, Trump Questions Merits of Early Voting, HILL (Dec. 9, 2016),
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/309738-trump-questions-merits-of-early-voting.
206. Mike DeBonis, In Private Meeting, Pence Vows ‘Full Evaluation of Voting Rolls’ over
Claims of Fraud, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/inprivate-meeting-pence-vows-full-evaluation-of-voting-rolls-over-claims-of-voting-fraud/2017
/01/27/1c1fa1de-e49a-11e6-a547-5fb9411d332c_story.html?utm_term=.14f42954b55d
&wpisrc=al_alert-COMBO-politics%252Bnation; Jenna Johnson & David Nakamura, Trump to
Sign Executive Order Related to Voter Fraud, WASH. POST (Jan. 26, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/01/26/trump-to-sign-executiveorder-related-to-voter-fraud/?utm_term=.ae1f30e6a3b3&wpisrc=nl_politics-pm&wpmm=1; Ben
Jacobs & Sam Levin, Mike Pence: Trump Administration Planning ‘Full Evaluation’ of Voter
Fraud, GUARDIAN (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/ jan/26/trumpadministration-voter-fraud-investigation-mike-pence.
207. VOTING LAWS ROUNDUP 2017, supra note 17.
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plans to adopt a new voter ID law even though the state’s top election
official has declared that voter fraud is not a problem in Iowa.208 In
addition, Republican secretaries of state across the country have
indicated that they will engage in a major review of voting rolls to purge
ineligible voters in preparation for the 2018 election.209 Meanwhile,
former President Barack Obama and former Attorney General Eric
Holder have announced that they will campaign to help Democrats
control the redistricting process following the 2020 Census.210 The battle
for control of election administration is thus certain to escalate in the
years ahead.
To date, the Supreme Court has consistently upheld partisan
control of election administration, even in highly controversial
contexts. For example, in Crawford v. Marion County,211 the Court
upheld Indiana’s strict photo identification law on grounds that the
state’s legitimate interest in protecting election integrity remained
valid despite the fact that “partisan considerations may have played a
significant role in the decision to enact” the law.212 And in the 2013
Shelby County case, the Supreme Court struck down the VRA’s
preclearance formula,213 clearing the way for partisan legislatures in the
South and other previously covered jurisdictions to reassert their
control over voting rules.
Partisan control of election administration is thus a long-standing
and deeply entrenched problem in American history, one with its
origins in the Constitution itself and one that has gone largely
unchallenged by the Supreme Court. But in the toxic atmosphere of
contemporary politics, partisan control of election administration is
more dangerous than ever. In a time of hyperpolarization and pervasive

208. Rod Boshart, Iowa Secretary of State Pate Refutes Claims of Rigged Election: Calls
Iowa’s System Fair, Honest, CEDAR RAPIDS GAZETTE, (Oct. 17, 2016),
http://www.thegazette.com/subject/news/government/elections/iowa-secretary-of-state-paterefutes-claims-of-rigged-election-20161017; David Weigel, Despite Few Reports of Election
Fraud, Iowa GOP Moving Ahead on Voter ID Law, WASH. POST (Jan. 6, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/01/06/despite-few-reports-ofelection-fraud-iowa-gop-moving-ahead-on-voterid/?utm_term=.d70eedb7ecfc&wpisrc=nl_politics-pm&wpmm=1.
209. Robinson, supra note 203.
210. Edward-Isaac Dovere, Obama, Holder to Lead Post-Trump Redistricting Campaign,
POLITICO (Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/obama-holder-redistrictinggerrymandering-229868.
211. 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
212. Id. at 203.
213. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (“The formula in that section can
no longer be used as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to preclearance.”).
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fears of voter fraud, the anti-democratic risk posed by partisan election
administration is all too real.
II. THE ANTI-DEMOCRATIC CONSEQUENCES
The 2016 election made clear that American democracy is in
trouble. Historic levels of hyperpolarization are undermining
democratic norms and encouraging partisans to view their opponents
as a threat to the nation. Meanwhile, declining public confidence in
election fairness coupled with partisan manipulation of the system is
building momentum for stricter voting regulations, which in turn
heightens the threat of voter disenfranchisement. The result is America
runs the risk of becoming an illiberal democracy, one in which the
incumbent party uses its control of election administration to
disenfranchise just enough supporters of the opposition party to keep
the incumbent party in power indefinitely.
A. Eroded Public Confidence in Election Integrity
Historically, one of the great stabilizing features of American
democracy is the fact that losing presidential candidates have a long
tradition of accepting defeat gracefully. The 1960 election is a prime
example. When John Kennedy defeated Richard Nixon in the
exceptionally close presidential election that year, Nixon suspected
that Kennedy may have owed his narrow victory to election fraud in
Illinois and Texas.214 Nixon’s suspicion may have had at least some basis
in fact. Scholars who have examined the historical record have
concluded that Kennedy supporters may indeed have stuffed ballot
boxes in Illinois and Texas.215 Nevertheless, keenly aware of the fact that
he was unlikely to prove definitively that fraud cost him the election,
Nixon declined to challenge Kennedy’s victory.216 As Nixon later
explained, “A presidential recount would require up to half a year,
during which time the legitimacy of Kennedy’s election would be in
question. . . . I could not subject the country to such a situation.”217
Nixon’s display of statesmanship spared the nation a divisive and
destructive dispute over the 1960 election results.
Similarly, when the Supreme Court ordered an end to the Florida
recount in the 2000 election, Al Gore accepted defeat and issued a
214.
215.
216.
217.

RICHARD MILHOUS NIXON, RN: THE MEMOIRS OF RICHARD NIXON 224 (1978).
FOLEY, supra note 164, at 218–24.
STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, NIXON: THE EDUCATION OF A POLITICIAN 606 (1987).
NIXON, supra note 214, at 224.

GAUGHAN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

92

4/20/2017 11:44 AM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 12:3

strong endorsement of the democratic process.218 Gore urged his fellow
Democrats to accept the Court’s decision in order to reaffirm
America’s democratic institutions.219 As Gore explained in a
nationally-televised concession speech, it was critically necessary for
Democrats to accept the legitimacy of Bush’s victory “for the sake of
our unity as a people and the strength of our democracy.”220
But the tradition of candidates honoring democratic norms ended
in dramatic fashion in 2016 when the winner of the presidential election
falsely claimed to be a victim of massive voter fraud.221 Although late
night comedians ridiculed Trump for the absurd nature of his claims,222
the president’s allegations dealt an extremely serious blow to public
confidence in America’s democratic institutions. As the Washington
Post observed, Trump’s false allegation of widespread voter fraud
“spread like a virus” across the country.223 Despite the fact that he
offered no evidence, Trump’s supporters believed his allegation that the
Democrats attempted to rig the election against him.224 A December
2016 Economist/YouGov poll found that a staggering 62 percent of
Trump voters believed that millions of illegal votes were cast during the
election.225 The Economist/YouGov poll was consistent with polling
taken during the fall campaign when Trump began his attacks on the
integrity of the election system. A September 2016 Washington Post218. See FOLEY, supra note 164, at 279–305; HASEN, supra note 166, at 11–40 (describing the
Bush-Gore Florida deadlock).
219. Richard L. Berke & Katharine Q. Seelye, The 43rd President: The Vice President; Bush
Pledges To Be President For ‘One Nation,’ Not One Party; Gore, Conceding, Urges Unity, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 14, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/14/us/43rd-president-vice-presidentbush-pledges-be-president-for-one-nation-not-one.html.
220. Id.
221. See supra Section I.A.
222. E.g., Kristine Phillips, Colbert Mocks Bannon, Miller, Other Trump Aides: ‘It’s a Rough
Time for the Stephen Community,’ WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/arts-and-entertainment/wp/2017/02/18/colbert-mocks-bannon-miller-other-trump-aides-itsa-rough-time-for-the-stephen-community/?utm_term=.1e88f0acf49e; Megan McCluskey, Watch
Seth Meyers Slam Trump Advisor Stephen Miller’s ‘Deranged’ Voter Fraud Claims, TIME (Feb.
14, 2017), http://time.com/4670443/seth-meyers-stephen-miller-voter-fraud/.
223. Jenna Johnson, The Tale of a Trump Falsehood: How His Voter Fraud Claim Spread
Like a Virus, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/the-tale-ofa-trump-falsehood-how-his-voter-fraud-claim-spread-like-a-virus/2017/01/30/47081e32-e4ed11e6-ba11-63c4b4fb5a63_story.html?hpid=hp_hp-top-table-low_falseweek-7a%3Ahomepage
%2Fstory&utm_term=.c10c24886368.
224. Kait Richmond & Tatianna Amatruda, Why Trump Supporters Stand by Debunked
Claim, CNN (Dec. 2, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/01/politics/donald-trump-supporterscheck-in-camerota-new-day-cnntv/.
225. The Economist/YouGov Poll, supra note 5, at 61; Kathy Frankovic, Belief in
Conspiracies Largely Depends on Political Identity, YOUGOV (Dec. 27, 2016),
https://today.yougov.com/news/2016/12/27/belief-conspiracies-largely-depends-political-iden/.
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ABC News poll found that 46 percent of Americans, and 69 percent of
Trump voters, believed that voter fraud occurs often.226 Likewise, an
October 2016 Politico/Morning Consult poll found that 73 percent of
Republicans believed that Democrats might steal the election from
Trump through voter fraud.227 Trump’s Electoral College victory did
not allay his supporters’ concerns. A December 2016 Washington Post
poll found that half of all Republicans believed that Trump actually
won the popular vote228 despite the official certified results to the
contrary.229
It was not just Trump supporters who expressed doubts about the
integrity of the election results. Jill Stein’s allegations and public
confusion over the nature of the Russian intervention in the election—
which the FBI concluded involved hacking of DNC emails, not hacking
of voting tallies—undermined Democratic voters’ confidence in the
integrity of the 2016 election. In December 2016, the
Economist/YouGov poll found that 50 percent of Clinton voters
believed that the Russian government manipulated voting tallies to rig
the election in favor of Trump.230 A post-election poll also found that
one-third of Clinton supporters viewed Trump’s victory as
“illegitimate.”231 Irrespective of party, therefore, doubts about the
integrity of the election system are broad, deep, and growing. For
example, an October 2016 PRRI poll found that a large majority of
226. Washington Post-ABC News Poll (Sept. 5–8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
page/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2016/09/15/National-Politics/Polling/question_17201.xml
?uuid=kmJFjnszEeaAZMHdyKckuw; Emily Guskin & Scott Clement, Poll: Nearly Half of
Americans Say Voter Fraud Occurs Often, WASH. POST (Sept. 15, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/09/15/poll-nearly-half-of-americans-sayvoter-fraud-occurs-often/?utm_term=.cadf5479eeec.
227. Jake Sherman & Steven Shepard, Poll: 41 Percent of Voters Say Election Could be
‘Stolen’ from Trump, POLITICO (Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/poll-41percent-of-voters-say-the-election-could-be-stolen-from-trump-229871. A September 2016 poll
found that almost 50 percent of Americans believe that voter fraud occurs routinely. See Guskin
& Clement, supra note 226.
228. Rachael Revesz, Half of Republicans Incorrectly Believe Donald Trump Won the
Popular Vote, Poll Shows, INDEPENDENT (Dec. 18, 2016), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/americas/donald-trump-online-poll-half-republicans-believe-candidate-won-popular-voteconspiracy-theories-a7482966.html.
229. AP Fact Check: How do Trump’s Voter Fraud Allegations Hold Up?, PBS NEWSHOUR:
THE RUNDOWN (Nov. 29, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown /ap-fact-check-trumpsvoter-fraud-allegations-hold/.
230. The Economist/YouGov Poll, supra note 5, at 62; Frankovic, supra note 225.
230. Washington Post-ABC News Poll, supra note 226.
231. Scott Clement, One-third of Clinton Supporters Say Trump Election is Not Legitimate,
Poll Finds, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2016/11/13/one-third-of-clinton-supporters-say-trump-election-is-not-legitimate-pollfinds/?utm_term=.36d3ddc04661.
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Americans feared that America’s democratic process has been
compromised, with 41 percent fearing voter suppression and 37 percent
fearing voter fraud.232
The 2016 poll results were deeply disturbing. The legitimacy and
stability of democratic government depends on the public’s confidence
that votes are tabulated honestly and accurately.233 But the latest survey
results indicate that the public has lost faith in election integrity, a
profoundly disquieting development that raises fundamental questions
about the future of American democracy. As the Commission on
Federal Election Reform has warned, “Democracy is endangered when
people believe that their votes do not matter or are not counted
correctly.”234
In an era of hyperpolarization and short attention spans brought on
by 24-hour news cycles, it is easy to underestimate the corrosive effects
of false allegations that the election system is rigged. After all, the sad
reality is Americans have grown accustomed to extremely harsh
political rhetoric. Even the United States Senate, a traditional paragon
of decorum, has seen a precipitous decline in civility among its
members.235 The loss of civility and decency in public discourse extends
beyond the political world and reflects a broader coarsening of
American culture. A nationwide survey in 2014 found that over 90
percent of Americans believe that incivility in America is a problem
and over 60 percent believe that it has risen to “crisis levels.”236 Thus,
when the president makes false claims that his opponents have
perpetrated massive voter fraud, one might be inclined to rationalize
the significance of such remarks as just another example of the harsh
and hyperbolic culture of early twenty-first century America.

232. Russonello, supra note 5.
233. Lonna Rae Atkeson, Voter Confidence in 2010: Local, State, and National Factors, in
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: THE STATE OF REFORM AFTER BUSH V.
GORE 102, 103 (R. Michael Alvarez & Bernard Grofman eds., 2014).
234. COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS 1
(Sept. 2005), https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/AssetManager/Exhibit%20M.pdf.
235. On the decline in civility in the Senate during her decades in Washington, see the recent
speech by Maine Senator Susan Collins at the University of Maine, Senator Susan Collins,
Keynote Address on Hyperpartisanship in Wash. at the Univ. of Me. (Apr. 3, 2015),
https://www.collins.senate.gov/newsroom/senator-collins-addresses-hyperpartisanshipwashington-delivers-keynote-lecture-university.
236. WEBER SHANDWICK, CIVILITY IN AMERICA 2014 3 (2014), http://www.webershand
wick.com/uploads/news/files/civility-in-america-2014.pdf.
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But minimizing false claims of election fraud would be a mistake,
particularly when it is the president who has played a key role in
propagating the baseless allegations. Trump’s claims regarding the
“rigged” 2016 election represent a stunning departure from historical
and democratic norms. His cynical and reckless tactics suggest the
nation has crossed a line in which anything now goes in political
discourse. If even the president feels no obligation to exercise caution
and restraint when discussing the integrity of America’s democratic
institutions, who else will? The president’s lack of self-control in his
public comments about the election system is particularly alarming at
a time when the internet is already facilitating the rapid spread of fake
news and when hyperpolarization is promoting dangerous levels of
animosity between Republicans and Democrats.
Consequently, we have reached a disturbing turning point.
Confidence in the nation’s democratic institutions was once a central
theme of American history. In an 1862 address, Abraham Lincoln
described American democracy as “the last best hope of earth.”237 In
1917 Woodrow Wilson declared that America would help make the
world “safe for democracy.”238 And in 2001 President George W. Bush
proclaimed, “Ours is the greatest democracy in the world.”239 But today
the public doubts whether we even have an honest and functional
democracy. If the voters lose faith in their democratic institutions, they
may well lose faith in the concept of democracy itself.
Public cynicism about election integrity is dangerous for another
reason. The United States is not a nation founded on a common racial,
ethnic, or religious identity. It is founded instead on the pluralistic
principles of liberal democracy, which include a shared national
commitment to the rule of law and the democratic process. Public
confidence in the vitality and integrity of our democratic institutions is
one of the key ties that bind Americans of diverse backgrounds
together.
The public’s loss of faith in the integrity of the election system thus
strikes at the heart of both American democracy and Americans’

237. Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 1, 1862), in 5 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 537 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1983).
238. Address to a Joint Session of Congress (April 2, 1917), in 41 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW
WILSON 525 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1983).
239. Interview with George W. Bush, with AM. SOC’Y OF NEWSPAPER EDS. (Apr. 5, 2001),
in AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=45678&st
=greatest+democracy&st1=.
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shared sense of national identity. It also potentially sets the stage for a
significant new effort to erode voting rights under the pretext of
restoring election integrity.
B. Abridged Voting Rights
To understand the controversy over voting rights, it is crucial to
understand the current political landscape. A razor’s edge separates the
two major parties. In the 2016 election Donald Trump won the
Electoral College by 304 votes to 227 for Hillary Clinton.240 But Clinton
won the popular vote by nearly 3 million votes, and Trump’s Electoral
College victory was contingent upon his narrow victories in Michigan,
Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania.241 Trump’s margins in each state were
exceedingly close: a 10,000 vote margin in Michigan out of 4.8 million
votes cast (a 0.2% victory margin), a 22,000 vote margin in Wisconsin
out of 3 million votes cast (a 0.7 % victory margin), and a 44,000 vote
margin in Pennsylvania (a 0.7% victory margin) out of 6.1 million votes
cast. Thus, out of 136 million ballots cast in the presidential election
overall, the outcome was decided by 76,000 votes in just three states.242
Congressional elections are similarly divided. In the 2016 House
elections, Republicans won the popular vote by 1.3 million votes out of
128 million cast,243 a margin of only 1%.
In a nation where victory margins are so narrow, the temptation to
use election administration to promote a small but significant
difference in election outcomes is powerful. In recent years, two areas
of election law in particular have become flashpoints of political
controversy. The first is the redistricting process; the second is the
adoption of strict voter identification requirements and other laws that
place new burdens on the effort to vote.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that partisan
gerrymandering threatens the constitutional rights of voters under the
Fourteenth Amendment.244 The reason is because politically-motivated
redistricting dilutes the voting strength of the party out of power. In

240. Kiersten Schmidt & Wilson Andrews, A Historic Number of Electors Defected, and Most
Were Supposed to Vote for Clinton, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2016/12/19/us/elections/electoral-college-results.html?_r=0.
241. Wasserman, supra note 82.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986) (“[W]e hold that political
gerrymandering cases are properly justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause.”).
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Reynolds v. Sims,245 the Supreme Court observed that “the right of
suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a
citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free
exercise of the franchise.”246 For example, the incumbent party may
draw district lines to pack a single district with the minority party’s
voters, thus leading to many wasted votes, or it may spread the minority
party’s voters thinly across many districts, minimizing their voting
power on election day. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has
acknowledged that partisan gerrymanders “are incompatible with
democratic principles.”247
The constitutional implications of gerrymandering are most
obvious in the context of race.248 The Supreme Court has made clear
that redistricting practices that dilute the votes of minority voters are
impermissible.249 In the March 2017 case of Bethune-Hill v. Virginia
State Board of Elections,250 the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the
“Equal Protection Clause prohibits a State, without sufficient
justification, from ‘separat[ing] its citizens into different voting districts
on the basis of race.’”251 The Court further noted that “even when a
reapportionment plan respects traditional principles” of redistricting—
such as compactness and contiguity—it may still violate the equal
protection clause if racial considerations were the state’s predominant
motivation in drawing the lines.252 Bethune-Hill reinforces the Supreme
Court’s commitment to scrutinizing and policing instances of racial
gerrymandering.
245. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
246. Id. at 555.
247. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 292 (2004) (plurality opinion); id. at 316 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in judgment).
248. On the dilution of the votes of minority voters, see Heather K. Gerken, Understanding
the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663 (2001). Gerken explains that in a racial
polarized electorate, “[a] state could take advantage of this type of voting pattern by drawing
district lines that give whites a majority in a disproportionate share of districts, thus ensuring that
minority voters are unable to elect a candidate of their choice. Section 2 protects minority voters
from this type of injury, which we call ‘vote dilution,’ by requiring states to draw district lines that
offer racial minorities a fair chance to elect their candidates of choice.” Id. at 1666.
249. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986) (“The essence of a § 2 claim is that a
certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause
an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred
representatives.”); see also Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993) (holding that a state may not
“segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their race” absent “sufficient
justification”); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) (“[A State] may not separate its citizens
into different voting districts on the basis of race.”).
250. NO. 15-680, 2017 WL 774194 (Mar. 1, 2017).
251. Id. at *7 (alteration in original) (quoting Miller, 515 U.S. at 911).
252. Id. at *8.
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However, the Supreme Court has not yet agreed on a standard for
adjudicating partisan gerrymandering cases.253 In the 2004 case of Vieth
v. Jubelirer, a plurality of justices warned that if the courts adjudicated
partisan gerrymandering cases without agreed upon objective
redistricting standards, judges would find themselves cast “forth upon
a sea of imponderables” and forced “to make determinations that not
even election experts can agree upon.”254 The plurality thus concluded
that the Constitution does not provide “a judicially enforceable limit
on the political considerations that the States and Congress may take
into account when districting.”255
The Supreme Court’s inability to ascertain a judicially-manageable
redistricting standard has permitted partisan gerrymandering to
continue unabated across the country. Although the extent to which
gerrymandering actually affects election outcomes is hotly debated by
scholars,256 it is telling that the elected officials who do the line-drawing
clearly assume that it does matter. Recent elections support that
assumption. For example, because Republicans won sweeping victories
in state legislative races across the country in 2010, they were able to
draw district lines for four times as many House seats as were
Democratic-controlled legislatures.257 The Republican gerrymandering
following the 2010 Census was so successful that in 2012 Republicans
won a 33-seat House majority despite losing the popular vote
253. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“[N]o judicially
discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims have
emerged.”).
254. Id. at 290.
255. Id. at 305.
256. See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593,
624 (2002) (“[T]his pattern of incumbent entrenchment has gotten worse as the computer
technology for more exquisite gerrymandering has improved and political parties have ever more
brazenly pursued incumbent protection.”); Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding
Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116
HARV. L. REV. 649, 654 (2002) (“In reality, there has been steady and significant turnover both
in Congress and in state legislatures—a quite healthy level of ‘ritual cleansing’ despite bipartisan
gerrymanders.”); David Lublin & Michael P. McDonald, Is It Time to Draw the Line?: The Impact
of Redistricting on Competition in State House Elections, 5 ELECTION L.J. 144, 157 (2006)
(“[P]artisan gerrymanders sometimes fail . . . . However, these are exceptions to an overall pattern
indicating that partisan gerrymandering more often has a dampening effect on competition.”);
Thomas E. Mann, Polarizing the House of Representatives: How Much Does Gerrymandering
Matter?, in RED AND BLUE NATION?: CHARACTERISTICS AND CAUSES OF AMERICA’S
POLARIZED POLITICS 263, 268–69 (Pietro S. Nivola & David W. Brady eds., 2006).
257. Anthony J. Gaughan, To End Gerrymandering: The Canadian Model for Reforming the
Congressional Redistricting Process in the United States, 41 CAP. U. L. REV. 999, 1034 (2013); see
NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATORS, REPUBLICANS EXCEED EXPECTATIONS IN 2010 STATE
LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.ncsl.org/press-room/republicans-exceedexpectations-in-2010.aspx.
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nationwide in House elections by nearly 1.4 million votes.258 The 2016
House elections demonstrated that the 2011 redistricting continues to
benefit Republican candidates. The Republicans’ narrow 1% margin in
the popular vote in 2016 translated to a landslide congressional victory
as the Republicans carried 241 House seats to 194 for the Democrats.259
In other words, thanks to partisan gerrymandering, winning 49% of the
vote translated to over 55% of the seats. Thus, while scholars may be
uncertain as to the precise extent to which gerrymandering impacts
congressional and legislative races, experienced politicians have made
no secret of their conviction that it is a critical tool for gaining partisan
advantage on election day. As Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes
have explained, “procedural [election] rules affect politicians directly,
and politicians have particular expertise in the ways these rules affect
their interests.”260
Technological developments suggest that partisan gerrymandering
will become even more effective in future redistricting cycles. The
growing sophistication of big data analytics gives legislatures
extraordinary detail regarding the likely partisan voting patterns of
particular neighborhoods.261 Moreover, computer-assisted line drawing
enables the party that controls redistricting a degree of precision
unimaginable in previous eras.262 It is with good reason therefore that
former President Barack Obama and former Attorney General Eric
Holder have identified breaking the Republican hold over political

258. Sam Wang, The Great Gerrymander of 2012, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 2, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/opinion/sunday/the-great-gerrymander-of2012.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
259. See Donna Cassata, 5 Things to Know about the Incoming Republican Congress, PBS
NEWSHOUR: THE RUNDOWN (Jan. 2, 2017), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/congressushers-new-era-republican-rule/.
260. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 183, at 709.
261. See Daley, supra note 22.
262. See Robert Draper, The League of Dangerous Mapmakers, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 2012)
(“This ritual carving and paring of the United States into 435 sovereign units, known as
redistricting, was intended by the Framers solely to keep democracy’s electoral scales balanced.
Instead, redistricting today has become the most insidious practice in American politics—a
way . . . for our elected leaders to entrench themselves in 435 impregnable garrisons from which
they can maintain political power while avoiding demographic realities.”); Julian E. Zelizer, The
power that gerrymandering has brought to Republicans, WASH. POST (June 17, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/10/the-league-of/309084/
(“Using
sophisticated software such as Maptitude, GOP operatives crafted favorable districts filled with
conservative white voters, based on the kind of data available to corporations. The book is
brimming with fascinating portraits of wunderkinds who integrated micro-targeting, computer
mapmaking and gerrymandering.”).
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redistricting as essential to making House elections competitive
again.263
But the anti-democratic consequences of partisan gerrymandering
pale in comparison to the threat posed by partisan control of voting
regulations. Gerrymandering may dilute votes, but it does not deny
access to voting. Partisan control of voting qualifications and election
day procedures, however, poses a significant risk of disenfranchisement.
The leading example is the battle over strict voter identification laws.
In the aftermath of the Bush v. Gore election controversy in 2000, a
federal commission led by former President Jimmy Carter and former
Secretary of State James Baker proposed a series of election reforms,
including a proposal to require voters to show photo identification.264
Shortly thereafter, Republican legislatures across the country adopted
new voter ID laws that they described as necessary to modernize the
election system, prevent fraud, and safeguard voter confidence in the
election system’s integrity.265 Georgia and Indiana set the pattern when
they adopted strict voter ID laws that required voters to produce a
government-approved form of photographic identification.266
Critics, however, argue that strict photo identification laws
disenfranchise poor and minority voters.267 The debate over voter ID
laws has set off one of the most acrimonious disputes in the modern
history of American election law. As Daniel Tokaji has observed, “With
heated allegations of voter suppression coming from one side and
equally heated allegations of voter fraud from the other, it has become
difficult even to discuss the most important election administration
questions of the day civilly--much less to run elections in a manner that
engenders public confidence.”268

263. Alexander Burns & Jonathan Martin, Eric Holder to Lead Democrats’ Attack on
Republican Gerrymandering, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/us/
eric-holder-to-lead-democrats-attack-on-republican-gerrymandering.html.
264. COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, supra note 234, at 69, 93. For the full history of
Voter ID laws, see Joshua A. Douglas, Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, in ELECTION
LAW STORIES 457–73, 498–504 (Joshua A. Douglas & Eugene D. Mazo eds., 2016).
265. HASEN, supra note 166, at 43; see also, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cty. Bd. of Elections,
553 U.S. 181, 191 (2008) (describing the motivations behind Indiana’s voter ID law).
266. NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATORS, HISTORY OF VOTER ID (Apr. 18, 2016),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id-history.aspx.
267. KEYSSAR, supra note 28, at 277 (“Poor and minority communities seemed to be
particular targets of suppression efforts since their members (especially African Americans) were
regarded as overwhelmingly likely to vote Democratic.”).
268. Tokaji, supra note 175, at 576–77.
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The critical question is whether voter identification laws and other
election rules changes are necessary to preserve election integrity. It is
undeniably true that a haphazard system characterizes election
administration practices across the country. The American election
system is extremely decentralized and many states rely on outdated
registration and voting machine technologies.269 Despite the fact that
computers have been a mainstay of accounting practices in the private
sector for decades, voter records across the country are still maintained
in paper form.270 The paper-based registration system is susceptible to
error as well as difficult to update and maintain.271 Republicans thus
point to voter ID laws as an additional safeguard at a time when
election administrators across the country rely on outdated
technologies. Republicans also point out that voter ID laws are highly
popular with the public. A recent Gallup Poll found that 80 percent of
Americans—including a large majority of both parties—support voter
ID laws.272 Irrespective of party, the public clearly views voter ID laws
as an important measure for maintaining election integrity.
But is the public right? Are strict voter identification laws
necessary? The overwhelming weight of the evidence is that the answer
is no.273 Time and again, allegations of widespread fraud have been
disproved by academic studies, government investigations, and court
cases.274 For example, in the most comprehensive study ever
undertaken, Justin Levitt found only 31 credible incidents of potential

269. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, INACCURATE, COSTLY, AND INEFFICIENT: EVIDENCE THAT
AMERICA’S VOTER REGISTRATION SYSTEM NEEDS AN UPGRADE 1 (Feb. 2012),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2012/pewupgradingvoterregis
trationpdf.pdf.
270. Id. at 2, 3.
271. Id. at 3.
272. Justin McCarthy, Four in Five Americans Support Voter ID Laws, Early Voting,
GALLUP (Aug. 22, 2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/194741/four-five-americans-support-voterlaws-early-voting.aspx.
273. See, e.g., Justin Levitt, Election Deform: The Pursuit of Unwarranted Electoral
Regulation, 11 ELECTION L.J. 97 (2012).
274. See, e.g., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., DEBUNKING THE VOTER FRAUD MYTH (Jan. 25,
2017), http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/debunking-voter-fraud-myth; Nate Cohn, Illegal
Voting Claims, and Why They Don’t Hold Up, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/26/upshot/illegal-voting-claims-and-why-they-dont-holdup.html; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., ELECTIONS: ISSUES RELATED TO STATE VOTER
IDENTIFICATION LAWS 64–74 (Sep. 2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665966.pdf; Philip
Bump, Here’s How Rare In-person Voter Fraud is, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/08/03/heres-how-rare-in-person-voterfraud-is/?utm_term=.e79bf00a5c83; Alan Blinder, Questions and Answers on Voter Fraud, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/05/us/voter-id-laws-donald-trump.html.
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voter fraud out of one billion ballots cast between 2000 and 2014.275
Likewise, a News21 study at Arizona State University found only 10
cases of in-person voter fraud out of 146 million registered voters276 and
491 cases of absentee mail-in ballot fraud.277 A five year investigation
by President George W. Bush’s administration in the early 2000s turned
up no evidence of widespread voter fraud in federal elections.278 And in
2016 the Fifth Circuit observed that there were only two convictions for
in-person voter fraud out of twenty million ballots cast in Texas
elections in the ten years before the state adopted its photo ID law.279
The simple reality is in-person voter fraud makes little sense. The
person who commits it faces enormous risks and receives minimal
benefits. A single vote is unlikely to change an election result,
particularly in a federal or statewide election in which hundreds of
thousands or millions of votes are cast. Individuals have little incentive
to cast a fraudulent ballot when their vote is highly unlikely to change
an election outcome.280 Conversely, the criminal consequences of
engaging in election fraud are severe. Voter fraud is a felony punishable
by years behind bars. For example, in February 2017 a Texas court
sentenced a Mexican national to eight years in prison for voting
illegally in the 2012 and 2014 elections.281 The disincentives to in-person
voter fraud thus far outweigh any rational benefits that one would
derive from committing the crime.

275. Justin Levitt, A Comprehensive Investigation of Voter Impersonation Finds 31 Credible
Incidents out of One Billion Ballots Cast, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/08/06/a-comprehensive-investigation-ofvoter-impersonation-finds-31-credible-incidents-out-of-one-billion-ballots-cast/?utm_term=
.f8cb1950f0c0; see also LORRAINE C. MINNITE, THE MYTH OF VOTER FRAUD (2010); JUSTIN
LEVITT, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., THE TRUTH ABOUT VOTER FRAUD, (2007), http://www.
brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/The%20Truth%20About%20Voter%20Fraud.pdf.
276. Sami Edge & Sean Holstege, No, Voter Fraud Actually isn’t a Persistent Problem, WASH.
POST (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/09/01/voterfraud-is-not-a-persistent-problem/?utm_term=.e87d2dacbc40; Hope Yen, In-person Voting
Fraud is Rare, doesn’t Affect Elections, PBS NEWSHOUR: THE RUNDOWN (Aug. 20, 2016),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/person-voting-fraud-rare-doesnt-affect-elections/.
277. See Election Fraud in America, NEWS21 (Aug. 12, 2012), http://votingrights.news21.com/
interactive/election-fraud-database/ (“The nation has 2,068 cases of alleged election fraud since
2000. . . . The most prevalent fraud was Absentee Ballot Fraud at 24 percent (491 cases).”).
278. Eric Lipton & Ian Urbina, In 5-Year Effort, Scant Evidence of Voter Fraud, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 12, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/12/washington/12fraud.html.
279. Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 238 (5th Cir. 2016).
280. See, e.g., Levitt, supra note 275 (“[F]raud by individual voters is a singularly foolish and
ineffective way to attempt to win an election.”).
281. Michael Wines, Illegal Voting Gets Texas Woman 8 Years in Prison, and Certain
Deportation, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/10/us/illegal-votinggets-texas-woman-8-years-in-prison-and-certain-deportation.html?_r=0.
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But even if voter ID laws don’t prevent fraud, do they really harm
minority voters, and if so, to what extent? A tremendous amount of
scholarship has attempted to answer that question. The results are
bitterly contested and no consensus has yet emerged. Some studies
have found no correlation between voter ID laws and minority
turnout,282 whereas other studies have found that voter ID laws do have
a discernible suppressing effect on turnout that disproportionately
affects minorities.283 For example, an investigation by the Government
Accountability Office revealed that the adoption of voter ID laws in
Kansas and Tennessee drove down turnout in those states by 122,000
votes in the 2012 election.284 The turnout decline primarily consisted of
fewer younger voters, new voters, and African American voters.285
A new study using an unusually large and comprehensive data set
provides the most persuasive evidence that voter ID laws depress

282. See, e.g., Rene Rocha & Tetsuya Matsubayashi, The Politics of Race and Voter ID Laws
in the States: The Return of Jim Crow?, 67 POL. RES. Q. 666, 676 (2014) (finding that “the effect
of photo ID regulation does not vary by race or ethnicity”); M.V. Hood & Charles S. Bullock,
Much ado about nothing? An empirical assessment of the Georgia voter identification statute, 12
ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 394, 409 (2012) (“[A]lthough the law does slightly depress overall turnout,
this effect does not disproportionately affect racial or ethnic minority groups.”).
283. See, e.g., Reid Wilson, Report: Voter ID Laws Reduce Turnout More Among African
American and Younger Voters, WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/10/09/report-voter-id-laws-reduce-turnout-more-among-africanamerican-and-younger-voters/?utm_term=.287883782326 (“Laws requiring voters to show
identification when they cast a ballot have a greater impact on African Americans and younger
voters than on other racial and age groups, according to a new analysis.”); Jamelle Bouie, Ahead
of Trial, Pennsylvania Admits There is no Voter Fraud Problem, WASH. POST (July 24, 2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/post/pennsylvania-admits-it-no-voter-fraudproblem/2012/07/24/gJQAHNVt6W_blog.html?utm_term=.30805f9b7b3a; Bump, supra note 93;
Matt Barreto, Stephen Nuño & Gabriel Sanchez, The Disproportionate Impact of Voter-ID
Requirements on the Electorate—New Evidence from Indiana, 42 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 111, 113–
14 (2009); Timothy Vercellotti & David Anderson, Voter-Identification Requirements and the
Learning Curve, 42 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 117 (2009).
284. Philip Bump, Voter ID Laws in Kansas and Tennessee Dropped 2012 Turnout by over
100,000 Votes, WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2014/10/09/gao-voter-id-laws-in-kansas-and-tennessee-dropped-2012-turnout-by-over100000-votes/?utm_term=.4bf4359e3a7b (“Turnout dropped at least 1.9 percentage points in
Kansas and 2.2 percentage points in Tennessee thanks to the laws. By our calculations, that’s
122,000 fewer votes.”); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., ELECTIONS: ISSUES
RELATED
TO
STATE
VOTER
IDENTIFICATION
LAWS
2
(Sept.
2014),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665966.pdf [hereinafter GAO ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT]
(finding a 1.9 percent and 2.2 percent drop in Kansas and Tennessee respectively).
285. Bump, supra note 284 (“Young people, black people, and newly registered voters were
the groups that were more likely to see bigger drops in turnout.”); see also GAO
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 284 (“We estimate that turnout was reduced among
African-American registrants by 3.7 percentage points more than among Whites in Kansas and
1.5 percentage points more than among Whites in Tennessee.”).
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minority turnout.286 In an examination of elections in all 50 states
during the years 2006 to 2014, Zoltan Hajnal, Nazita Lajevardi, and
Lindsay Nielson found “substantial drops in minority turnout in strict
voter ID states and no real changes in white turnout.”287 In general
elections, the study founded a 7.1% decline in Latino turnout and a
5.4% decline in Asian American turnout in strict voter ID states.288
Interestingly, the study suggested that strict voter ID laws had no
discernible impact on African American or white turnout rates in
general elections.289
The difference between black turnout rates and those of other
minority groups during the 2006-14 period may be explained by the
special circumstances of the 2008 and 2012 elections. Both elections
saw African American turnout exceed white turnout for the first time
in history, including in southern states that had adopted strict Voter ID
laws.290 Barack Obama, the nation’s first black president, was on the top
of the Democratic ticket in 2008 and 2012, which undoubtedly
increased turnout among African American voters. Moreover, Jotaka
Eaddy, director of voting rights for the NAACP, cited a backlash against
voter identification laws as a contributing factor in inspiring higher
levels of black turnout.291 In fact, a study of the 2012 election found that
turnout increased after voters were informed of strict new voter ID
laws.292 It seems reasonable to surmise that the presence of Barack
Obama, the nation’s first African American president, combined with
a backlash against voter ID laws likely explains the paradoxical 2012
results.293

286. Zoltan Hajnal, Nazita Lajevardi & Lindsay Nielson, Voter Identification Laws and the
Suppression of Minority Votes, 79 J. POL. 363, 368 (2017).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. See id. (“For blacks, the gap is negligible in general elections but a full 4.6 percentage
points in primaries.”).
290. Rachel Weiner, Black Voters Turned out at Higher Rate than White Voters in 2012 and
2008, WASH. POST (Apr. 29, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/04/29/
black-turnout-was-higher-than-white-turnout-in-2012-and-2008/?utm_term=.5df8973d13ed; see
also Anthony J. Gaughan, Has the South Changed? Shelby County and the Expansion of the Voter
ID Battlefield, 19 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 109, 130–34 (2013).
291. Gaughan, supra note 290, at 135–36.
292. See Jack Citrin, Donald Green & Morris Levy, The Effects of Voter ID Notification on
Voter Turnout: Results from a Large-scale Field Experiment, 13 ELECTION L.J. 228, 235 (2014)
(“Turnout in the Warning condition was . . . approximately one percentage point higher than in
the control group, which runs counter to the conjecture that warnings about the need for proper
identification demobilize voters.”).
293. Gaughan, supra note 290, at 134–36.
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But a backlash can only be sustained for so long, and it is no defense
of restrictive voting regulations that they may occasionally provoke a
countervailing reaction that diminishes their effects. As Josh Chafetz
has argued, “even if the backlash thesis is correct—and the evidence
for it, thus far, is only anecdotal and circumstantial—it serves to
reinforce, rather than undermine, the partisan valence of the initial
decision to implement voting restrictions.”294
Moreover, it is undeniable that African American turnout declined
across the nation in 2016. Overall, turnout among whites went up, but
African American turnout fell by somewhere between 5 and 10
percent.295 In North Carolina the African American share of the
electorate fell from 23% in 2012 to just under 21% in 2016.296 Although
preliminary numbers indicate that Latino turnout increased overall
from 10% of the electorate in 2012 to 11% in 2016,297 it is entirely
possible the turnout increase would have been even higher without the
deterrent effect of restrictive voting laws. The 11% Latino share of the
2016 electorate is still far below their 17% share of the United States
population overall,298 a data point that supports the findings of the
Hajnal-Lajevardi-Nielson study that voter ID laws depress Latino
turnout.
But even if we assume that restrictive voting laws only have a
modest impact on turnout, why do the Republicans invest so much
effort in them? The answer lies in the razor thin margin of American
elections. Even laws that have only a modest dampening impact on
voter turnout can have a decisive impact on election results. As Richard
Hasen has explained, “The best argument against voter identification
laws is not that they will have a large effect—they most likely won’t—
but that such laws are unnecessary to prevent voter fraud, and in a

294. See Josh Chafetz, Governing and Deciding Who Governs, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 73,
104–05 n.169 (2015) (further noting that “the backlash, if it exists, is against precisely that
valence”).
295. Nate Cohn, How the Obama Coalition Crumbled, Leaving an Opening for Trump, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/23/upshot/how-the-obama-coalitioncrumbled-leaving-an-opening-for-trump.html.
296. Id.
297. JENS MANUEL KROGSTAD & MARK HUGO LOPEZ, PEW RES. CTR., HILLARY CLINTON
(2016),
WON LATINO VOTE BUT FELL BELOW 2012 SUPPORT FOR OBAMA
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/29/hillary-clinton-wins-latino-vote-but-fallsbelow-2012-support-for-obama/.
298. JENS MANUEL KROGSTAD & MARK HUGO LOPEZ, PEW RES. CTR., HISPANIC
POPULATION REACHES RECORD 55 MILLION, BUT GROWTH HAS COOLED (2015),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/06/25/u-s-hispanic-population-growth-surge-cools/.
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razor-thin election, we cannot dismiss the partisan ramifications of
disenfranchising even a small number of voters for no good reason.”299
Even if the effects of voter identification laws and other voting
restrictions are modest, there is disturbing evidence that the intent is
discriminatory.300 Many academic studies have concluded that the new
voting restrictions represent a Republican strategy to mitigate the
political influence of minority voters aligned with the Democratic
Party.301 A new study by the political scientists Daniel Biggers and
Michael Hanmer found that photo ID laws were mostly likely to be
adopted in red states with large minority populations and in which
Republicans had recently won control of both the legislature and the
governor’s office.302 A 2013 study by Keith Bentele and Erin O’Brien
concluded that “the Republican Party has engaged in strategic
demobilization efforts” with the result being that “the US, is actually
changing voting procedures in a racialized and restraining fashion in
the modern era—‘de-democratization’ along racial lines.”303 Likewise,
citing the move to adopt photo ID laws in southern states, Nicholas O.

299. HASEN, supra note 166, at 88.
300. See Jason Kander, There’s a Reason Trump Keeps Lying about Voter Fraud, WASH.
POST (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/theres-a-reason-trump-keepslying-about-voter-fraud/2017/01/27/8396adb4-e3ee-11e6-a453-19ec4b3d09ba_story.html?hpid=
hp_no-name_opinion-card-c%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.b5565b97f6bb (“Today, it’s
not that some GOP strategists don’t want black people, for example, to vote because they’re black
— it’s just that they don’t want them to vote because they don’t usually vote for Republicans.”).
301. See William D. Hicks, Seth C. McKee, Mitchell D. Sellers & Daniel A. Smith, A
Principle or a Strategy? Voter Identification Laws and Partisan Competition in the American States,
68 POL. RES. Q. 18 (2014). As the study’s authors explain:
[T]he Republican Party has proved incapable of expanding its appeal among the much
faster growing minority electorate—which just so happens to exhibit notably lower
turnout rates vis-à-vis the stagnant non-Hispanic white electorate that is more
supportive of Republican candidates. Faced with this reality, the GOP appears to have
opted for coalition maintenance instead of coalition expansion . . . by embracing several
restrictive voting reforms whose true purpose is to marginally curtail the participation
of voters typically aligned with the Democratic Party.
Id. at 29. See also Chafetz, supra note 294, at 104 (“Given the partisan makeup of the state
governments that created these impositions on the right to vote, it should be no surprise that these
provisions are most likely to affect groups that tend to vote Democratic.”); MINNITE, supra note
275, at 89 (stating that the “proliferation of unsupported fraud allegations” served to “veil a
political strategy for winning elections by tamping down turnout among socially subordinate
groups”); Joshua A. Douglas, (Mis)Trusting States to Run Elections, 92 WASH U. L. REV. 553, 556
(2015) (“[S]tates have increasingly enacted stricter election regulations, supposedly in the name
of ‘election integrity,’ but more likely to gain partisan advantage for the ruling party.”).
302. Daniel R. Biggers & Michael J. Hanmer, Understanding the Adoption of Voter
Identification Laws in the American States, 45 AMER. POL. RES. (forthcoming 2017),
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1532673X16687266.
303. Keith G. Bentele & Erin E. O’Brien, Jim Crow 2.0? Why States Consider and Adopt
Restrictive Voter Access Policies, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 1088, 1089, 1090 (2013).
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Stephanopoulos has observed, “Republicans’ political incentives point
unambiguously toward the enactment of additional franchise
restrictions.”304 The numbers would certainly seem to support such
conclusions. For example, it is a striking fact that in the primarily
Republican-controlled jurisdictions covered by the Voting Rights Act’s
preclearance formula prior to the 2013 Shelby County decision, there
were 868 fewer polling places in 2016 than 2012, with the impact felt
most heavily in minority voting precincts.305
It is not just academic studies that find a partisan motive at work in
the new voting restrictions. The federal courts have increasingly
described the Republicans’ primary goal as to disenfranchise enough
Democratic-supporting minority voters to tip a close election in the
Republicans favor. For example, in July 2016, a federal judge concluded
that the Wisconsin legislature’s restriction of in-person absentee voting
was intended “to suppress the reliably Democratic vote of Milwaukee’s
African Americans.”306 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit pointedly noted
that the election law changes adopted by the Republican-controlled
North Carolina legislature “target African Americans with almost
surgical precision.”307
North Carolina provides a disturbing case study of partisan efforts
to make it harder for minorities to vote.308 The day after the Supreme
Court’s 2013 decision in Shelby County v. Holder, which struck down
the VRA’s preclearance formula, the Republican-controlled North
Carolina legislature announced its plan to implement sweeping
election law changes.309 Before adopting the new law, the Republican
304. Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The South After Shelby County, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 55, 60
(2013).
305. THE LEADERSHIP CONF. EDUC. FUND, THE GREAT POLL CLOSURE 4 ( 2016),
http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/reports/2016/poll-closure-report-web.pdf; see also Dana Milbank,
The Election Really Was Rigged, WASH. POST (Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/the-election-really-was-rigged/2016/11/29/c2ed58d8-b666-11e6-a677-b608fbb3aaf6_
story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.594e8a7b3862 (describing increased incentive to suppress a
growing minority vote).
306. One Wis. Inst. v. Thomsen, No. 15-cv-324-jdp, 2016 WL 4059222, at *3 (W.D. Wis. July
29, 2016).
307. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 241 (4th Cir. 2016).
308. See Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party?: How Courts Should Think About Republican
Efforts to Make It Harder to Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 58, 63
(2014) (“Judged through a partisan lens then, North Carolina’s law is just the latest Republican
attempt to skew the electorate at least moderately to gain electoral advantage.”).
309. See N.C. State Conference, 831 F.3d at 214 (observing that “on the day after the Supreme
Court issued Shelby County v. Holder, . . . eliminating preclearance obligations, a leader of the
party that newly dominated the legislature (and the party that rarely enjoyed African American
support) announced an intention to enact what he characterized as an ‘omnibus’ election law”).
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legislature studied the voting practices of African Americans and then
adopted five different restrictions on voting and registration that
uniquely impacted black Democrats, including a photo ID requirement,
a ban on same day registration, and a truncated early voting period.310
When a challenge to the law came before the Fourth Circuit in 2016,
the federal appellate court concluded, “The only clear factor linking
these various ‘reforms’ is their impact on African American voters. The
record thus makes obvious that the ‘problem’ the majority in the
General Assembly sought to remedy was emerging support for the
minority party. Identifying and restricting the ways African Americans
vote was an easy and effective way to do so.”311 The 4th Circuit struck
down key provisions of the law, finding that the Republican legislature
acted with discriminatory intent in violation of the Voting Rights Act.
312
But Republican-controlled local election boards found alternative
means to make voting harder for Democrats, such as cutting the
number of early voting hours and locating early voting polling places
in locations far removed from African Americans and college students,
two core constituencies of the state’s Democratic Party.313
Most remarkable of all, a senior Republican official in North
Carolina frankly admitted the Republicans’ partisan motivations in
adopting the new voting rules. After the Fourth Circuit’s ruling, Dallas
Woodhouse, the executive director of the North Carolina Republican
Party, emailed his fellow Republicans and urged them to “call your
republican election board members and remind them that as partisan
republican appointees they have [sic] duty to consider republican

310. Id. at 216–17; see also id. at 214 (“[T]he legislature requested data on the use, by race, of
a number of voting practices. Upon receipt of the race data, the General Assembly enacted
legislation that restricted voting and registration in five different ways, all of which
disproportionately affected African Americans.”).
311. Id. at 238.
312. Id. at 215.
313. See, e.g., Michael Wines, Critics Say North Carolina Is Curbing Black Vote. Again., N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/31/us/politics/election-rules-northcarolina.html (“In a county where Democrats outnumber Republicans by better than two to one,
and four in 10 voters are black, the election plan limits voting to a single weekend day, and on
weekdays demands that residents, including those who are poor and do not own cars, make long
trips to cast a ballot.”); Jeremy W. Peters, Richard Fausset & Michael Wines, Black Turnout Soft
in Early Voting, Boding Ill for Hillary Clinton, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/02/us/politics/black-turnout-falls-in-early-voting-boding-illfor-hillary-clinton.html (“In North Carolina, where a federal appeals court accused Republicans
of an ‘almost surgical’ assault on black turnout and Republican-run election boards curtailed
early-voting sites, black turnout is down 16 percent.”); Jim Morrill, Mecklenburg Elections Board
Cuts Hours for Early Voting, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Aug. 15, 2016),
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-government/election/article95843437.html.
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points of view and that we support them as they ensure our elections
are secure.”314 He later defended the state’s restrictive laws on
unabashedly partisan grounds. “Does anybody think that Democrats
did not select early voting sites and set hours to advantage their voters
over Republicans?” he asked.315 “We are just attempting to rebalance
the scales.”316 Most remarkable of all, the North Carolina Republican
Party issued a press release celebrating the decline in African American
turnout and the increase in “Caucasian voters” in the 2016 election.317
Regardless of the precise number of voters affected by the
manipulation of election administration rules, the larger point is it is
unhealthy for any democracy to allow incumbent parties to target
voters of the opposition party through voting restrictions. The contrast
between America’s approach to voting rights and that of other nations,
such as Australia, is striking. Healthy democracies take steps to
encourage all eligible voters to participate in elections. In Australia, for
example, voting is mandatory and turnout rates routinely approach
100%.318 But in the United States, where voting rights are hotly
contested and the administrative burdens imposed on voters are rising,
participation rates are comparatively low. The turnout rate for the
presidential election was only 59% in 2016, which is typical for recent
elections.319 The unfortunate reality is in our current closely-divided
political environment, where elections are often decided by a small
margin and where a modest suppressing effect on turnout can be the
difference between winning and losing, Americans partisans have a
strong political incentive to discourage their opponents from showing
up to vote. Consequently, while in countries like Australia election law
is used to require all eligible voters to participate in elections, in the
United States election law is used to make it harder for eligible voters
to exercise their right to vote. The stark difference in approaches

314. E-mail from Dallas Woodhouse, Exec. Dir. of the N.C. Republican Party to N.C.
Republicans (Aug. 17, 2016), http://www.wral.com/full-email-sent-by-dallas-woodhouse/
15938449/.
315. Wines, supra note 313.
316. Id.
317. Emily Bazelon, The Supreme Court Ruled That Voting Restrictions Were a Bygone
Problem. Early Voting Results Suggest Otherwise., N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 7, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/07/magazine/the-supreme-court-ruled-that-voting-restrictionswere-a-bygone-problem-early-voting-results-suggest-otherwise.html.
318. Tim Evans, Compulsory Voting in Australia, AUSTL. ELECTORAL COMMISSION (Jan.
16, 2006), http://www.aec.gov.au/About_Aec/Publications/voting/files/compulsory-voting.pdf.
319. 2016 November General Election Turnout Rates, U.S. ELECTIONS PROJECT,
http://www.electproject.org/2016g.
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underscores the relative fragility of voting rights in the United States
as compared to other western nations like Australia.
Ultimately, however, the greatest threat to voting rights in the
United States stems not from the battle over voter identification laws,
but rather in the brewing battle over voter registration lists.320 There is
no doubt that the voter registration rolls are inaccurate and outdated.
A 2012 Pew Center on the States study found that the states’ voter
registration lists include 24 million invalid or inaccurate registrations.321
The reasons for the invalid and inaccurate registrations included voters
who had had changed addresses, moved out of state, or died.322 The
problem lies in the state-based, paper-dependent American
registration system, which is far less accurate and efficient than the
centralized online voter registration system used in countries like
Canada.323
Although the need to modernize the voter registration lists is clear,
there is significant danger that partisan election officials could
manipulate the registration process to disenfranchise voters on a scale
far beyond strict photo identification laws. Even when done for benign
purposes, the purging of voter registrations inherently involves huge
numbers of voters. For example, in 2014 the states removed 14.8 million
voters from voter registration lists on a variety of grounds, such as the
voter’s death or the fact that the voter had moved out of the state or
district.324 But control of voter registration lists could be weaponized by
partisans to conduct an overly broad purge of the lists. For the moment
at least, the National Voter Registration Act (the “NVRA”) requires
states to provide fair notice before cancelling voter registrations.325 But
the NVRA is merely a statute, which means to the extent it exceeds the
Constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection, the
320. See, e.g., Strawbridge Robinson, supra note 19; Mark Joseph Stern, Donald Trump’s
Vote Fraud Investigation Will Finish What the GOP Started, SLATE (Jan. 25, 2017),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/01/donald_trump_s_vote_fr
aud_investigation_will_finish_what_the_gop_started.html (stating that Trump’s voter fraud
investigation “will primarily serve as pretext for an assault on voting rights at both the state and
federal level”).
321. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 269, at 1.
322. Id. at 1–2.
323. Mackenzie Weinger, Report: 1.8 million dead registered to vote, POLITICO (Feb. 14,
2012), http://www.politico.com/story/2012/02/report-18m-dead-registered-to-vote-072830.
324. U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, THE 2014 EAC ELECTION ADMINISTRATION
AND VOTING SURVEY COMPREHENSIVE REPORT: A REPORT TO THE 114TH CONGRESS 3 (June
30, 2015), https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Page/2014_EAC_EAVS_Comprehensive_Report_508_
Compliant.pdf.
325. 52 U.S.C. § 20507(d)(1)(B)(i).
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NVRA could be amended to give states greater latitude to cancel voter
registrations with less notice than is currently required. Such a change
in the notice requirements could lead to a significant degree of voter
disenfranchisement in states without same day registration. Only 14
states and the District of Columbia currently offer same-day
registration.326 In the 36 states without same-day registration, voters
who are wrongfully purged from registration lists might not discover
the mistake until election day, at which point it would be too late to
correct the error.
The Trump Administration’s pledge to conduct a “full evaluation of
voting rolls” is thus chilling.327 President Trump has made clear that
purging the voting rolls will be a focus of his administration.328 The
importance of the issue to Trump was reflected in his announcement
that Vice President Mike Pence will lead the administration’s “major
investigation” of voter registration lists and state election
administration policies.329 In an interview with FOX News, President
Trump declared: “We can be babies, but you take a look at the
registration, you have illegals, you have dead people, you have this, it’s
really a bad situation, it’s really bad.”330 He further explained that the
326. NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATORS, SAME DAY VOTER REGISTRATION (Jan. 11,
2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/same-day-registration.aspx.
327. See, e.g., Mike DeBonis & Sari Horwitz, In private meeting, Pence vows ‘full evaluation
of voting rolls’ over claims of fraud, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/powerpost/in-private-meeting-pence-vows-full-evaluation-of-voting-rolls-over-claims-ofvoting-fraud/2017/01/27/1c1fa1de-e49a-11e6-a547-5fb9411d332c_story.html?utm_term=. 14f429
54b55d&wpisrc=al_alert-COMBO-politics%252Bnation; Ben Jacobs & Sam Levin, Mike Pence:
Trump administration planning ‘full evaluation’ of voter fraud, GUARDIAN (Jan. 27, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/26/trump-administration-voter-fraud-investigati
on-mike-pence; Jenna Johnson & David Nakamura, Trump to sign executive order related to voter
fraud, WASH. POST (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/
01/26/trump-to-sign-executive-order-related-to-voter-fraud/?utm_term=.ae1f30
e6a3b3&wpisrc=nl_politics-pm&wpmm=1.
328. See Reena Flores, Trump taps Mike Pence to lead panel investigating mass voter fraud,
CBS NEWS (Feb. 5, 2017), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-taps-mike-pence-to-lead-panelinvestigating-mass-voter-fraud/ (“When you look at the registration and you see dead people that
have voted, when you see people that are registered in two states, that have voted in two states,
when you see other things, when you see illegal people that are not citizens and they are on the
registration roles – look, Bill, we can be babies, but you take a look at the registration, you have
illegals, you have dead people you have this, it’s really a bad situation, it’s really bad.”).
329. See, e.g., Josh Gerstein, Trump’s call for election-fraud probe fraught with peril,
POLITICO (Jan. 25, 2017), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/trump-voter-fraud-234183;
Rebecca Savransky, Trump to ask for ‘major investigation into voter fraud,’ HILL (Jan. 25, 2017),
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/316006-trump-to-ask-for-major-investigation-intovoter-fraud; Alan Yuhas, Pence to head commission investigating baseless voter fraud claim,
Trump says, GUARDIAN (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/05/
donald-trump-mike-pence-commission-voter-fraud.
330. Yuhas, supra note 329.
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Pence Commission would scrutinize voting registration records across
the country “very, very carefully.”331 Trump has already gone on the
record to express his skepticism of the value of early voting,332 an
apparent signal to Republican election officials to curtail the practice
that minority voters disproportionately rely on. But a politicallymotivated purge of voting rolls would represent a dramatic and
destabilizing escalation of the voting wars. Although the ultimate scope
of the Pence Commission remains unclear, its potential for engaging in
political mischief is enormous.333 The Republican majorities in the
House and Senate give the Trump Administration a potential
opportunity to amend the NVRA to water down the act’s notice
provisions. And even within the framework of the NVRA’s current
protections, partisans may be emboldened by the Pence Commission to
only offer the most minimal notice of cancelled registrations.
If democratic norms regarding the maintenance of voting
registration lists break down, and partisans use their control over
registration to systematically disenfranchise eligible voters, the
ramifications for American democracy would be severe. Escalation and
retaliation would be inevitable. Indeed, registration purges could be
done by Democrats as easily as Republicans. Hyperpolarization has
already led both parties to see the partisan battle in existential terms.334
Democratic leaders have described Trump as an “illegitimate
president”335 and recent polls find that many Democrats see Trump as
a bigger threat to the nation than terrorism, unemployment, or
racism.336 In such a bitter and confrontational political atmosphere,

331. Id.
332. Ben Kamisar, Trump questions merits of early voting, HILL (Dec. 9, 2016),
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/309738-trump-questions-merits-of-early-voting.
333. See Bob Bauer, The Pence Commission on Voting Fraud, MORE SOFT MONEY HARD
LAW (Feb. 8, 2017), http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com /2017/02/pence-commission-votingfraud/ (“President Trump’s arrangement for an inquiry into election voting fraud is fatally
compromised by political self-interest.”).
334. See, e.g., Bob Bauer, Political Reform in an Era of “Existential Politics,” MORE SOFT
MONEY HARD LAW (Feb. 28, 2017), http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/2017/02/politicalreform-era-existential-politics; Richard Pildes, When Politics Becomes Existential, ELECTION
LAW BLOG (Feb. 26, 2017), https://electionlawblog.org/?p=91331.
335. Aaron Blake, John Lewis says Donald Trump isn’t a legitimate president, and Trump hits
back hard, WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2017/01/13/john-lewis-doesnt-think-donald-trump-is-a-legitimate-president/?utm_term
=.136177b53249.
336. PEW RES. CTR., ON EVE OF INAUGURATION, AMERICANS EXPECT NATION’S DEEP
POLITICAL DIVISIONS TO PERSIST (2017), http://www.people-press.org/2017/01/19/on-eve-ofinauguration-americans-expect-nations-deep-political-divisions-to-persist/#health-careeconomy-racism-among-top-national-problems.
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Democrats may be just as inclined as Republicans to attempt to
disenfranchise the opposing party’s base voters. Moreover, the selfsorting of the country geographically makes it just as easy to identify
likely Republican voters as it is to identify likely Democratic voters,
since the Republican base is now primarily made up of rural337 and
blue-collar whites.338 The geographically concentrated nature of the two
parties would permit Democratic-controlled legislatures to target likely
Republican voters just as North Carolina Republicans targeted African
American voters in 2016.339 The risk posed by partisan manipulation of
voting rolls is thus quite high and deeply disconcerting.
But the danger is not limited to voting rights. The voting wars
present an even broader threat to America’s democratic institutions as
a whole.
C. Undermined Democratic Institutions
Partisan-inspired voting restrictions may make the difference in
close elections, but do they really represent a long-term threat to
America’s democratic institutions? There are troubling trend-lines that
suggest the answer is yes. As Fareed Zakaria recently warned in the
wake of President Trump’s voter fraud allegations, the United States is
in danger of becoming an “illiberal democracy,”340 a nation that holds
elections but systematically violates the political and civil rights of
those who oppose the party in power.341 For at least the past decade,
surveys have consistently found that Americans view their political
system with a profound and rising degree of negativity.342 In a 2007
book on the subject, Zakaria observed that “if current trends continue,
democracy will undoubtedly face a crisis of legitimacy, which could
prove crippling.”343 Hyperpolarization has made the situation
significantly worse today. New research by the political scientists
337. Lazaro Gamio, Urban and rural America are becoming increasingly polarized, WASH.
POST (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/2016-election/urbanrural-vote-swing.
338. See, e.g., Cohn, supra note 295; Jim Tankersley, How Trump won: The revenge of
working-class whites, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/
wp/2016/11/09/how-trump-won-the-revenge-of-working-class-whites/?utm_term=.e127a5d60ab.
339. See, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 317; Michael Wines, supra note 313.
340. Zakaria, supra note 8.
341. Dani Rodrik & Sharun Mukand, Why Illiberal Democracies Are on the Rise, WORLD
POST (May 17, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dani-rodrik/illiberal-democracies-on-therise_b_7302374.html.
342. See ZAKARIA, supra note 9, at 24–25 (“Americans have a lower regard for their political
system than ever before.”).
343. Id. at 255.
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Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk suggests that the risk of
America evolving into an illiberal democracy is much higher than is
generally understood. In a study published in the Journal of Democracy
in January 2017, they found that Americans are increasingly
disenchanted with liberal democratic norms.344 According to Foa and
Mounk, Americans and citizens of other western democracies “are
growing more disaffected with established political parties,
representative institutions, and minority rights.”345 They are even
“increasingly open to authoritarian interpretations of democracy.”346
Donald Trump epitomizes the rejection of liberal democratic
norms, such as respect for the rule of law and minority voting rights. To
a degree without precedent in American history,347 he has challenged
the integrity and legitimacy of the federal judiciary, the branch of
government best positioned to adjudicate election law disputes in a
neutral and objective fashion.348 For example, during the 2016
campaign Trump claimed that the federal judge presiding over Trump’s
civil fraud trial was biased against him because the judge, who was born
in Indiana, was of Mexican-American heritage.349 Republican House
Speaker Paul Ryan condemned Trump’s attack on the judge as “the
textbook definition of a racist comment.”350 But Trump has not backed
down from his challenge to the federal judiciary’s independence. After
a federal court enjoined the Trump administration’s effort to ban
refugees from seven Muslim countries, President Trump condemned
the federal judge, describing him as a “so-called judge” and accusing
344. Roberto Stefan Foa & Yascha Mounk, The Signs of Deconsolidation, 28 J. OF
DEMOCRACY 5, 5 (2017).
345. Id. at 6.
346. Id.
347. Jeffrey Rosen, Not Even Andrew Jackson Went as Far as Trump in Attacking the Courts,
THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/a-historicalprecedent-for-trumps-attack-on-judges/516144.
348. See, e.g., Peter Baker, Trump Clashes Early With Courts, Portending Years of Legal
Battles, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/05/us/politics/donald-trumpmike-pence-travel-ban-judge.html; Thomas Fuller, ‘So-Called’ Judge Criticized by Trump Is
Known as a Mainstream Republican, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/02/04/us/james-robart-judge-trump-ban-seattle.html.
349. See, e.g., Jose A. DelReal & Katie Zezima, Trump’s personal, racially tinged attacks on
federal judge alarm legal experts, WASH. POST (June 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/2016/06/01/437ccae6-280b-11e6-a3c40724e8e24f3f_story.html?utm_term=.47281a62dcd3;
Hanna Trudo, Trump escalates attack on ‘Mexican’ judge, POLITICO (June 2, 1016),
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/donald-trump-judge-gonzalo-curiel-223849.
350. Jennifer Steinhauer, Jonathan Martin & David M. Herszenhorn, Paul Ryan Calls
Donald Trump’s Attack on Judge ‘Racist,’ but Still Backs Him, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/08/us/politics/paul-ryan-donald-trump-gonzalo-curiel.html?_
r=0.
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the judge of taking “law enforcement away from our country.”351
Trump’s pattern of impeaching the integrity of the judges who rule
against him encourages his supporters to question the legitimacy of all
government institutions, which is a profoundly dangerous development
for any democracy.
Even more disturbing, Trump has stoked fear of minorities among
his supporters by falsely claiming that illegal immigrants are voting in
American elections by the millions. In the process, Trump has fostered
an environment in which his supporters openly advocate
disenfranchising whole categories of American voters. For example,
Trump supporter and conservative columnist Ann Coulter has
insinuated that voting rights should be limited to only those citizens
who have four American-born grandparents.352 On the eve of the 2016
election she tweeted, “If only people with at least four grandparents
born in America were voting, Trump would win in a fifty state
landslide.”353 Ironically, Trump’s mother was born in Scotland and his
paternal grandfather was born in Germany, which would render him
ineligible to exercise suffrage rights under Coulter’s proposal.354 But
the larger point was that some of Trump’s most prominent and
influential supporters openly question whether all Americans deserve
the right to participate in American democracy.
It is not just Trump’s most vitriolic supporters who propose
disenfranchising whole classes of Americans. President Trump himself
has called for an end to birthright citizenship, a measure that
potentially could disenfranchise a huge number of Americans.355 Over
twenty million American adults and sixteen million American children
351. See, e.g., Thomas Fuller, ‘So-Called’ Judge Criticized by Trump Is Known as a
Mainstream Republican, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04
/us/james-robart-judge-trump-ban-seattle.html; Amy B. Wang, Trump lashes out at ‘so-called
judge’ who temporarily blocked travel ban, WASH. POST, (Feb. 4, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/02/04/trump-lashes-out-at-federal-judgewho-temporarily-blocked-travel-ban/?utm_term=.148fe988e02b.
352. Cleve Wootson, Ann Coulter’s ‘grandparent’ argument would exclude Trump from
voting, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2016/liveupdates/general-election/real-time-updates-on-the-2016-election-voting-and-race-results/anncoulters-grandparent-argument-would-exclude-trump-from-voting/?utm_term=.d8ad4b6c745f.
353. Philip Bump, Dear Ann Coulter: Just say you only want white people to vote, WASH.
POST (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/11/08/dear-anncoulter-just-say-you-only-want-white-people-to-vote/?tid=sm_tw&utm_term=.fa4a10bf800d.
354. Id.
355. Max Ehrenfreund, Understanding Trump’s plan to end citizenship for undocumented
immigrants’ kids, WASH. POST (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/
wp/2015/08/17/understanding-trumps-plan-to-end-citizenship-for-undocumented-immigrantskids/?utm_term=.1cd8f2f7c147.
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have at least one foreign-born parent356 and the numbers are growing.357
In addition, about 4.5 million American children have at least one
undocumented immigrant parent.358 The idea of stripping citizenship
rights from children born to unauthorized immigrants dates to the very
beginning of Trump’s presidential campaign. In his campaign
announcement address in 2015, he declared his opposition to the
automatic award of citizenship to children born in the United States.359
Many scholars believe that Trump’s position contradicts the Fourteenth
Amendment, which provides that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in
the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”360 It would thus
likely take more than unilateral action by the president to end
birthright citizenship. But notwithstanding the constitutional hurdles
that Trump’s proposal may face, the simple fact that he would like to
see an end to birthright citizenship is highly revealing. It reflects his
broader agenda to reduce the number of Americans allowed to
participate in democratic self-government.
Trump’s voter fraud crusade also risks politicizing the Justice
Department. The last time a president used the Justice Department to
launch a voter fraud investigation the results undermined the
credibility of the nation’s top law enforcement officials.361 In 2002 the
Bush Administration’s nationwide investigation into allegations of
voter fraud ultimately led to only 86 convictions for election-related
crimes out of hundreds of millions of votes cast.362 Five years Attorney
356. PEW RES. CTR., SECOND-GENERATION AMERICANS: A PORTRAIT OF THE ADULT
CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS (2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/02/07/second-genera
tion-americans.
357. D’VERA COHN, PEW RES. CTR. FUTURE IMMIGRATION WILL CHANGE THE FACE OF
AMERICA BY 2065 (2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/10/05/future-immigrationwill-change-the-face-of-america-by-2065.
358. Philip Bump, How many American children are ‘birthright’ citizens born to illegal
immigrants?, WASH. POST (Aug. 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2015/08/20/how-many-children-born-to-undocumented-immigrants-are-there-in-the-us/?utm_term=.05105c4b102a.
359. Tal Kopan, Birthright citizenship: Can Donald Trump change the Constitution?, CNN
(Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/18/politics/birthright-citizenship-trump-constitu
tion.
360. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
361. Michael Waldman, Voting Fraud Inquiry? The Investigators Got Burned Last Time, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/26/opinion/voting-fraud-inquiry-theinvestigators-got-burned-last-time.html?_r=0.
362. See, e.g., ADAM GITLIN & WENDY R. WEISER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., THE JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT’S VOTER FRAUD SCANDAL: LESSONS, 3 (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.brennan
center.org/sites/default/files/publications/Justice_Department_Voter_Fraud_Scandal_Lessons.p
df; Prepared Remarks of Attorney General John Ashcroft Voting Integrity Symposium, (Oct. 8,
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General Alberto Gonzales was forced to resign when evidence came to
light that the Bush Administration may have fired 3 U.S. Attorneys for
refusing to bring politically-motivated voter fraud cases.363 A 2008
report by the Inspector General concluded that the Justice
“Department’s removal of the U.S. Attorneys and the controversy it
created severely damaged the credibility of the Department and raised
doubts about the integrity of Department prosecutive decisions.”364
Now Trump wants to launch a new voter fraud investigation, only this
time it will be headed by the vice president.365 If the Bush experience is
any guide, Trump’s voter fraud investigation poses a serious threat to
the independence and impartiality of the Justice Department.
If Trump were a defeated candidate, his irresponsible statements
about systemic voter fraud could be written off as sour grapes and their
effects would be lessened with the passage of time. But Trump is
launching his attacks from the White House. He holds the most
powerful office in the American system of government, which means
his false claims of voting fraud generate nationwide attention and build
apprehension among his supporters that minority voters represent a
threat to democracy. As the highly respected Washington Post
journalist Dan Balz has recently warned, “Trump is now striking at the
foundation of a democratic society.” Trump’s claim that millions voted
illegally in 2016, Balz notes, “is either a deliberate attempt to
undermine faith in the democratic process, an exhortation to those who
favor new restrictions on access to the ballot box or the worrisome trait
of someone with immense power willing to make wild statements
without any credible evidence.”366 Similarly, Michael Waldman of the
Brennan Center for Justice has observed of Trump’s voter fraud claims,
“The president of the United States is peddling conspiracy theories that
undermine our democracy for political gain.”367 Even Republican
Senator Lindsay Graham of South Carolina has warned that Trump’s
2002), https://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2002/100802ballotintegrity.htm.
363. GITLIN & WEISER, supra note 362 at 1, 3–5.
364. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & OFF. OF PROF’L RESP., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., AN
INVESTIGATION INTO THE REMOVAL OF NINE U.S. ATTORNEYS IN 2006 358 (2008),
https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0809a/final.pdf.
365. Alan Yuhas, Pence to head commission investigating baseless voter fraud claim, Trump
says, GUARDIAN (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/05/donaldtrump-mike-pence-commission-voter-fraud.
366. Dan Balz, Trump’s voter fraud claims undermine the democratic process and his
presidency, WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumps-voterfraud-claims-undermine-the-voting-system-and-his-presidency/2017/01/24/a71d58ee-e288-11e6a453-19ec4b3d09ba_story.html?utm_term=.1e106029896c&wpisrc=nl_daily202&wpmm=1.
367. Waldman, supra note 361.
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reckless claims of voter fraud undermined public “faith in our
democracy.”368
The situation is already quite disturbing but it could get far worse.
In the event of a national crisis before the 2018 or 2020 elections—such
as a war or a major terrorist attack—Trump has given every indication
that his crisis-time leadership will be well outside America’s historical
norms. During the Civil War and the world wars America continued to
hold elections. But there is no guarantee that Trump would honor those
traditions. He has thus far shown a stunning lack of regard for
America’s democratic institutions. It is therefore all too conceivable
that Trump might attempt to cancel or postpone a wartime election on
national security grounds. It is also within the realm of possibility that
Trump might attempt to direct Republican election administrators to
remove from the voting rolls anyone suspected of “disloyalty” to the
government. In short, anything seems possible under President Trump,
a man who has lavished praised on Vladimir Putin, Russia’s
authoritarian ruler.369
Most worrisome of all, the concentration of power in the presidency
gives Trump immense capacity to threaten America’s democratic
institutions. In the 1970s Arthur Schlesinger Jr. warned that the
constitutional limitations on the presidency had gradually given way to
an “imperial presidency” with virtually unlimited power over foreign
affairs.370 In recent years the powers of the presidency have expanded
even further. In 2010 Bruce Ackerman warned that the powers
concentrated in the presidency could “make it into a vehicle for
demagogic populism and lawlessness in the century ahead.”371 Trump’s

368. Jennifer Calfas, Graham to Trump: Stop alleging voter fraud, HILL (Jan. 24, 2017),
http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/315832-graham-to-trump-stop-lying-aboutvoter-fraud.
369. Trump’s long history of admiring, praising and defending Putin is too long to list here,
but some representative samples include Jeremy Diamond, Donald Trump lavishes praise on
‘leader’ Putin, CNN (Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/18/politics/donald-trumppraises-defends-vladimir-putin; John Harwood, Donald Trump’s Admiration of Putin’s Ruthless
Use of Power, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/14/us/politics/
donald-trump-vladimir-putin.html; Louis Nelson, Trump tweets praise of Putin: ‘I always knew he
was very smart!,’ POLITICO (Dec. 30, 2016), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/donald-trumppraises-vladimir-putin-tweet-233072; Sophie Tatum, Trump defends Putin: ‘You think our
country’s so innocent?,’ CNN (Feb. 6, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/04/politics/donaldtrump-vladimir-putin.
370. See ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY viii (1973) (“The
constitutional Presidency . . . has become the imperial Presidency.”).
371. BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 4 (2010).
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campaign rhetoric as well as his conduct in office make Ackerman’s
warning disturbingly prophetic.
The United States may be one of the world’s oldest democracies,
but the institutions that undergird American democracy face an
extraordinary challenge in the twenty-first century. The national mood
is volatile and intensely polarized along partisan and racial lines. The
president of the United States is falsely spreading fear that the election
system is rigged. Public confidence has fallen sharply in the integrity of
the election system and even in the liberal democratic values that the
system is founded upon. There is simply no precedent in modern
American history for the uniquely dangerous situation the nation
currently finds itself in. The long-term ramifications for the nation’s
democratic institutions are unknowable, but the risk that the nation will
evolve into an illiberal democracy is all too clear.
III. STEPS TO DEFEND AND PRESERVE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
Democratic values form the bedrock foundation of modern
American society. But amid the toxic political atmosphere of early
twenty-first century America, the principles that sustain American
democracy are in jeopardy. At a minimum, therefore, three steps are
critically necessary to defend voting rights and preserve America’s
democratic institutions at this dangerous moment in our history.
A. Nonpartisan Election Administration
An election is only fair if it is administered in a neutral, unbiased
way. Accordingly, in an ideal world, all aspects of federal and state
election administration would be placed in the hands of nonpartisan
officials who are accountable to courts, not legislatures. As Daniel
Tokaji has argued, “[t]he most important institutional reform is the
development of state election management bodies that are insulated
from partisan politics.”372 Amid intense hyperpolarization, the longstanding practice of partisan election administration is neither wise nor
sensible. It is simply unrealistic to expect partisan elected officials to
serve as unbiased referees in the hotly contested atmosphere of
contemporary American politics. Richard Hasen put it well when he
observed that “the people running our elections should not have a
vested interest in their outcome.”373 The public agrees. Surveys have

372. Tokaji, supra note 159, at 144.
373. Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election
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found that at least 66% of Americans want non-partisan officials to
administer elections.374 Ironically, therefore, in this era of
hyperpolarization, the principle of non-partisan election
administration is one of the few public policy issues that elicits a broad
consensus of bipartisan support.
There are no shortages of models that the federal and state
governments could look to for guidance. Australia and Canada both
offer examples of major western democracies that rely on nonpartisan
administration of national and local elections.375 Their experience
makes clear that nonpartisan election administration is both achievable
and desirable. The common theme is they both rely on independent
electoral commissions,376 which takes politicians completely out of the
business of running elections.
As America’s neighbor and close ally, Canada provides the most
instructive foreign example. Under Canadian law, all federal and
provincial redistricting (which Canadians call “redistribution”) is done
by independent commissions.377 At the federal level, responsibility for
the administration of Parliamentary elections is assigned to the Chief
Electoral Officer, an independent, non-partisan government office
appointed by unanimous consent of the House of Commons.378
Canada’s commitment to nonpartisan election administration is so
deep that Canadian law prohibits the Chief Electoral Officer from
voting in federal elections.379 The Chief Electoral Officer overseas
Elections Canada, which administers federal elections, and the CEO
makes a post-election report to Parliament of recommendations for the
improvement of election administration nationwide.380 Canada also has
a federally-maintained national voter list, the National Register of
Electors, which is computerized and fully integrated with other
government agencies to ensure its accuracy.381 In addition, each of

Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 974 (2005).
374. Tokaji, supra note 159, at 132.
375. ELECTIONS CANADA, COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF CENTRAL ELECTORAL
AGENCIES (2014), http://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=res&dir=rec/tech/comp&doc
ument=p4&lang=e.
376. Tokaji, supra note 159, at 138.
377. Gaughan, supra note 257, at 1049–56.
378. Jean-Pierre Kingsley, The Administration of Canada’s Independent, Non-Partisan
Approach, 3 ELECTION L.J. 406, 406 (2004).
379. Id.
380. Id. at 408.
381. Id. at 408–09.
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Canada’s 10 provinces have a chief provincial electoral officer of their
own.382
Canada’s reliance on nonpartisan election administration
correlates with far higher voter registration levels than those found in
the United States. Whereas only 76% of eligible American citizens are
registered to vote, 93% of eligible Canadian citizens are registered to
vote.383 Furthermore, Canada’s independent restricting commissions
ensure that Parliamentary districts—known as ridings—have lines
drawn in a non-partisan fashion to promote political competition. As
the Canadian political scientist John Courtney has explained, the
adoption of independent election commissions is “one of the
democratic advances of the last half-century in Canadian political
institutions” and they are “widely seen as fair, nonpartisan, and
independent bodies.”384
There are a few models closer to home as well, although on a much
more modest and limited scale. Iowa’s nonpartisan redistricting process
is a case in point. Iowa state law provides that “[n]o district shall be
drawn for the purpose of favoring a political party, incumbent legislator
or member of Congress, or other person or group, or for the purpose of
augmenting or diluting the voting strength of a language or racial
minority group.”385 To that end, Iowa has established the Legislative
Services Agency, a non-partisan agency tasked with drawing Iowa’s
legislative and congressional district lines in a neutral, non-partisan
manner.386 A handful of other states have adopted independent
commissions for redistricting, including Arizona and California.387
Importantly, however, Arizona, California, and Iowa only use
nonpartisan approaches for redistricting. Other features of election
administration in those states remain under partisan control.
Nonpartisan redistricting such as is practiced in Iowa is a good start,
but the principles of nonpartisanship must be extended to all aspects of
election administration. Scholars have offered a number of promising

382. See, e.g., GREG ESSENSA, ELECTIONS ONTARIO STRATEGIC PLAN, 2013-2017 2–3
(2014), http://www.elections.on.ca/content/dam/NGW/sitecontent/2014/reports/Strategic%20P
lan%20(2013-2017).pdf.
383. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 269, at 2, 3, 8.
384. JOHN C. COURTNEY, ELECTIONS 71 (2004).
385. IOWA CODE § 42.4(5).
386. ED COOK, LEGIS. SERVS. AGENCY, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING IN IOWA
2, 20 (2007), https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/Central/Guides/redist.pdf.
387. ROYCE CROCKER, CONG. RES. SERV., R42831, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING: AN
OVERVIEW 17–18 (2012).
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options to do precisely that. For example, Edward Foley has proposed
creating a system of separate electoral powers modeled on the
Constitution’s separation of substantive government powers.388 In
separating electoral from substantive government powers, Foley
recommends creating three specialized electoral institutions: an
electoral assembly, an electoral executive, and an electoral judiciary.389
In a similar vein, Christopher Elmendorf has argued for the use of a
permanent advisory committee empowered to draft legislation and
submit bills for approval by the legislature or by the people through a
popular referendum.390 Richard Hasen has advocated for the creation
of chief electoral officers in the states on the model of the Canadian
and Australian systems.391 As a further safeguard against partisanship,
Hasen has recommended that the chief electoral officers be appointed
by the respective state governors and confirmed by a supermajority of
the respective state legislatures, thus insuring that both parties have a
role in the selection of a truly nonpartisan chief electoral officer.392 And
Heather Gerken has proposed the systematic ranking of the quality of
state election administration in order to create public pressure on states
that perform poorly.393
As a matter of law and policy, all of those proposals have great
merit. Although the Constitution assigns responsibility for election law
administration to legislative bodies, there is no constitutional barrier
that prevents Congress and the state legislatures from investing nonpartisan agencies with the authority to administer elections. In fact, the
Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to
regulate the terms of federal elections, including requiring that the
states adopt nonpartisan administration of federal elections.394 The
Elections Clause states that:

388. Edward B. Foley, The Separation of Electoral Powers, 74 MONT. L. REV. 139, 140 (2013).
389. Id. at 147.
390. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Representation Reinforcement Through Advisory
Commissions: The Case of Election Law, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1366, 1371 (2005) (“I argue that a
permanent advisory commission, authorized to place its concerns on the legislature’s agenda or a
referendum ballot, and positioned to compete with legislators for the voters’ trust, could
substantially impede political insiders’ efforts to hamstring would-be challengers.”).
391. Hasen, supra note 373, at 983.
392. Id. at 984.
393. See HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX: WHY OUR ELECTION SYSTEM IS
FAILING AND HOW TO FIX IT 5 (2009) (“[W]e should create a Democracy Index that ranks states
and localities based on election performance. . . . The Index would tell voters not only whether
things are working in their own state, but how their state compares to its neighbors.”).
394. See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2253–54 (2013); see
also Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2670 (2015).
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The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives shall be prescribed in each state by the Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators.395

The Supreme Court has interpreted the clause as giving Congress
sweeping authority over the conduct of federal elections. As the Court
recently reiterated, “The power of Congress over the ‘Times, Places and
Manner’ of congressional elections ‘is paramount, and may be
exercised at any time, and to any extent which it deems expedient.’”396
If Congress wanted to take action to promote nonpartisan election
administration, it has the unquestioned constitutional authority to do
so, at least with regard to federal elections.
Nevertheless, despite public support for the idea, the adoption of
nonpartisan election administration is simply not on the horizon. Since
the late eighteenth century, incumbent politicians have zealously
exercised their power over election administration to gain political
advantage over the party out of power. Support for reform is thus
chronically confined to whichever party is the minority party at a given
moment. It is a classic Catch 22 situation: the only party that has an
incentive to see nonpartisan election administration adopted is the
party out of power, but the very fact that it is the minority party makes
it powerless to effect change. Moreover, the minority party
immediately loses interest in reforming the system the moment it
becomes the majority party.
The decentralized nature of the American election system poses
additional obstacles to reform. Although the Elections Clause gives
Congress plenary authority over federal elections, Congress has chosen
to delegate election administration to the states. Consequently, the
United States has a deeply decentralized election system in which the
states and local governments have a commanding role in the
administration of both federal and state elections.397 America’s longstanding commitment to federalism, which dates back to the

395. U.S. CONST. art I, § 4.
396. Inter Tribal Council, 133 S. Ct. at 2253–54.
397. See Nathaniel Persily, “Celebrating” the Tenth Anniversary of the 2000 Election
Controversy: What the World Can Learn from the Recent History of Election Dysfunction in the
United States, 44 IND. L. REV. 85, 85 (2010) (“The first glaring institutional feature evident to even
the most casual observer of the U.S. electoral system is the extreme decentralization of
administrative responsibilities and policymaking.”); Justin Weinstein-Tull, Election Law
Federalism, 114 MICH. L. REV. 747, 752–53 (2016).
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Constitution itself, is not something that will be easily dislodged.398 A
shift to non-partisan administration will likely require that individual
states take action on their own to embrace principles of neutrality in
election administration. Thus, as Edward Foley has argued, the first step
in achieving structural reform of the American political system is to
take a long-term view.399 He advocates the creation of a bipartisan
commission to propose constitutional reforms that take effect decades
after the current generation of politicians have retired.400 As Foley
explains, “It might seem frustrating to have to wait fifty years to
implement a reform that people today, if they set aside self-interest,
would recognize as benefiting the public. But the basic point is that
without the mechanism of long-term implementation delay, the reform
will not be adopted at all. Waiting fifty years, then, is better than never.”
401
Indeed, the unfortunate reality is that it will take years and quite
possibly decades to accomplish the goal of nonpartisan election
administration on a nationwide basis.
Accordingly, in the short and medium term, the integrity and
fairness of American election administration depends on the courts.
Now more than ever, the state and federal court systems operate as the
last line of defense for democratic principles and voting rights in this
poisonous political era.
B. Carolene Products Inspired Courts
The Supreme Court has long recognized the danger posed to
democracy by self-interested legislators controlling the election
administration process. In the famous footnote four of Carolene
Products, the Supreme Court suggested that “more exacting judicial
scrutiny” may be appropriate when legislatures insulate incumbents
from the political process and where “discrete and insular minorities”
are discriminated against.402 The state and federal courts hearing voting
rights cases today must take particular heed of such warnings amid the

398. See Kropf & Kimball, supra note 174, at 109–10 (“Federal legislation to say all the states
must have a non-partisan chief election officer who appoints all the officials is counter to the
political culture of federalism in our country.”).
399. Edward B. Foley, The Posterity Project: Developing a Method for Long-Term Political
Reform, OKLA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2013) (“The only possible solution is to shift gears and adopt a longterm perspective.”).
400. See id. (proposing the creation of a “new Posterity Project designed to develop a series
of specific amendments to the United States Constitution”).
401. Id.
402. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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dangerous excesses of extreme partisanship and widespread false
allegations of election fraud.
The independent nature of the judiciary makes its role in policing
election administration disputes absolutely indispensable. Although
both the state and federal judiciaries serve as a bulwark for protecting
constitutional freedoms, the federal courts in particular have a special
responsibility to defend the integrity of the democratic system from
partisan attacks.403 Endowed with lifetime appointments, federal judges
possess unique freedom from political pressure. Although the Senate
may block judicial appointments, as underscored by the battle over the
Merrick Garland nomination,404 once confirmed a federal judge is not
beholden to the good graces of any political party or elected official.
Thus, while both state and federal courts are crucial to defending voting
rights, federal judges have the strongest and most independent basis for
doing so.
Until recently, however, both the state and federal courts have
usually taken a highly deferential approach to state legislatures in
election administration cases.405 The federal constitution expressly
assigns to the legislative branch control over election administration,
which naturally gives a presumption of legitimacy to new election laws
that are not facially discriminatory. Moreover, as Nathaniel Persily has
pointed out, “most of the classic barriers to participation have been
replaced with complicated and subtle strategies dedicated to
maintaining incumbent parties and officeholders in their current
positions of power.”406 As a result, the courts have often taken a passive
approach even in the context of highly controversial voter ID cases.407

403. See Tokaji, supra note 159, at 129 (“Federal courts, as the institution most independent
of partisan politics, should play an essential role in policing the administration of elections for the
foreseeable future.”).
404. Paul Kane, As the Gorsuch nomination proceeds, this man is taking credit: Mitch
McConnell, WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/as-thegorsuch-nomination-proceeds-this-man-is-taking-credit-mitch-mcconnell/2017/02/18/a9d66a46f5eb-11e6-b9c9-e83fce42fb61_story.html?utm_term=.302a2d2e98f7.
405. See Joshua A. Douglas, (Mis)Trusting States to Run Election, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 553,
602 (2015) (“Current Supreme Court doctrine defers too readily to states to administer
elections.”).
406. NATHANIEL PERSILY, THE PLACE OF COMPETITION IN AMERICAN ELECTION LAW, IN
THE MARKETPLACE OF DEMOCRACY: ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND AMERICAN POLITICS
171 (Michael P. McDonald and John Samples, eds., 2006).
407. See Joshua A. Douglas, Is The Right To Vote Really Fundamental?, 18 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 143, 145 (2008) (“[O]ur legal system has not always given an individual’s right to vote
the same venerated status as it has given many other important rights.”).
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For example, in Crawford v. Marion County408 the Supreme Court
upheld Indiana’s photo ID law because it appeared to be a “neutral,
nondiscriminatory regulation of voting procedure” and the court
feared that striking the law down would frustrate “the intent of the
elected representatives of the people.”409 In Crawford the Supreme
Court emphasized that “if a nondiscriminatory law is supported by
valid neutral justifications, those justifications should not be
disregarded simply because partisan interests may have provided one
motivation for the votes of individual legislators.”410
But there is now strong reason to conclude the Court was wrong
when it assumed that the wave of election “integrity” measures
adopted by partisan legislatures are justified by legitimate public policy
concerns and are non-discriminatory and neutral in application. As
discussed above, in the 9 years since Crawford was decided, academic
studies, government investigations, and court cases have developed
overwhelming evidence that indicates that in-person voter fraud is not
a serious threat to election integrity.411 Moreover, both academic
studies and a growing number of lower federal courts have concluded
that the real purpose of voter identification laws and other election
“reforms” is to depress minority turnout.412 In light of the increasing
evidence of the malignant motives of at least some election integrity
measures, combined with the complete lack of evidence of widespread
voter fraud, the courts as a whole are unwise to continue to defer to the
states when it comes to laws that impose new voting restrictions.
Courts must also break with precedent by taking a more proactive
role during election campaigns. Historically there has been a longstanding judicial reluctance to intervene in election law disputes late in
political campaigns.413 In Purcell v. Gonzalez,414 the Supreme Court
expressed the concern that “[c]ourt orders affecting elections,
especially conflicting orders, can themselves result in voter confusion
and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls” particularly
during the period shortly before an election.415 The Supreme Court has
408. 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
409. Id. at 203.
410. Id. at 204.
411. See discussion supra Part II.B.
412. Id.
413. See Richard L. Hasen, Reining in the Purcell Principle, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 427, 428
(2015) (defining the Purcell principle as “the idea that courts should not issue orders which change
election rules in the period just before the election”).
414. 549 U.S. 1 (2006).
415. Id. at 4–5.
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thus discouraged judges from issuing rulings that change or suspend
voting laws late in election campaign seasons. Without question, the
Purcell principle makes sense in a stable, non-polarized electoral
context in which partisan actors abide by traditional norms of
democratic conduct. But we no longer live in such an age. The
escalating voting wars have emboldened partisans to ram through
legislatures on party-line votes new laws that run a high risk of voter
disenfranchisement. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the
VRA’s preclearance formula means that many disputes over section 2
of the VRA will be adjudicated after elections are held, when the
damage is already done.416 Accordingly, it is a mistake for courts to
blindly apply the Purcell principle when a rapidly expanding number
of new election laws threaten voting rights.417
To be sure, the basic logic of the Purcell principle has obvious merit
in certain categories of cases, such as where the legal dispute involves
ballot design or ballot access. In such cases there must be a reasonable
cut-off point barring further judicial intervention in order to allow
election authorities to print ballots in a timely fashion. This is
particularly important at a time when early and absentee voters now
make up 35% of all ballots cast.418 Accordingly, applying the Purcell
principle in such cases to the period that stretches from the printing of
early and absentee ballots through Election Day is a reasonable middle
ground. It allows courts time to resolve complex voting rights cases
while still giving election authorities sufficient time to print ballots and
prepare polling places. But when the ballot itself is not at issue, courts
should remain prepared to intervene until virtually the moment early
and absentee voting begins.
There are hopeful signs that the judiciary recognizes the deepening
threat to democratic government and the need to intervene even
relatively late in campaigns. During the 2016 election campaign season,
the Fourth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit, and the Tenth Circuit all blocked
voting laws adopted by Republican legislatures. For example, in Fish v.

416. On Section 2 of the VRA, see Stephanopoulos, supra note 304. As he explained, “[t]he
burden of proof is on the plaintiff under Section 2 but on the jurisdiction under Section 5. The
default is that a challenged policy goes into effect under Section 2 but that it does not under
Section 5.” Id. at 57.
417. See Hasen, supra note 413, at 428–29.
418. DREW DESILVER & ABIGAIL GEIGER, PEW RES. CTR., FOR MANY AMERICANS,
ELECTION DAY IS ALREADY HERE (2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/10/21/formany-americans-election-day-is-already-here/.
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Kobach,419 the Tenth Circuit enjoined a Kansas law requiring voter
registration applicants to produce documentary proof of American
citizenship.420 In holding that the National Voter Registration Act
preempted the Kansas law, the court observed that the NVRA
reflected “Congress’s determination that the public interest in the
widespread exercise of the franchise trumps the narrower interest of
ensuring that not a single noncitizen votes (or an insubstantial number
of them).”421 The Tenth Circuit also pointedly noted that “exceedingly
few noncitizens have been shown to have voted compared to the
number of Kansans who stand to lose the right to vote in the coming
elections.”422
The Fifth Circuit also acted to enjoin a discriminatory voting law
before the 2016 election. In Veasey v. Abbott,423 the federal appellate
court ruled that Texas’s voter ID law violated Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act.424 The Fifth Circuit was particularly impressed by the trial
court’s finding that the voter ID law imposed special burdens on the
poor, who were less likely to have the type of photo ID required by the
law, and by the trial court’s additional finding that minorities
constituted a disproportionately large share of Texans living in
poverty.425 The Fifth Circuit thus affirmed the trial court’s finding that
the Texas statute “acted in concert with current and historical
conditions of discrimination to diminish African Americans’ and
Hispanics’ ability to participate in the political process.”426 Also in 2016,
as discussed above, the Fourth Circuit struck down portions of North
Carolina’s sweeping new election law on grounds that it was motivated
by discriminatory racial intent in violation of the Voting Rights Act.427
Moreover, just six weeks before the presidential election, the Sixth
Circuit reversed the state of Ohio’s purge of its voter registration lists.

419. 840 F.3d 710 (10th Cir. 2016).
420. Id. at 717.
421. Id. at 756.
422. Id.
423. 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016).
424. Id. at 265.
425. Id. at 264.
426. Id.
427. See N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 238 (4th Cir. 2016) (“The
record thus makes obvious that the ‘problem’ the majority in the General Assembly sought to
remedy was emerging support for the minority party. Identifying and restricting the ways African
Americans vote was an easy and effective way to do so. We therefore must conclude that race
constituted a but-for cause of SL 2013–381, in violation of the Constitutional and statutory
prohibitions on intentional discrimination.”).
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In A. Philip Randolph Institute v. Husted,428 a group of plaintiff’s
challenged the Ohio Secretary of State’s purge of hundreds of
thousands of voters from the state’s voting rolls on the sole grounds
that the voters had not voted in the previous six years.429 The state
defended the purge on the grounds that it had mailed notices of the
pending purge to affected voters.430 The Sixth Circuit held that the
purge violated the NVRA because a voter’s failure to vote in recent
elections was not a sufficient basis on its own terms to assume that the
voter had changed residences.431
There are even signs that the Supreme Court itself may be ready to
embrace a standard for adjudicating partisan gerrymandering cases. In
November 2016, a 3-judge federal panel in Wisconsin struck down the
state legislature’s redistricting map on grounds that it was an
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.432 The court based its reasoning
on an “efficiency gap” measurement433 developed by Nicholas
Stephanopoulos and Eric McGhee.434 The “efficiency gap” measures
how many wasted votes—i.e. votes for losing candidates or votes for
winning candidates in excess of the bare minimum needed to win—that
a redistricting map results in for each party.435 Under this approach, if
428. 838 F.3d 699 (6th Cir. 2016).
429. See id. at 703 (“[U]nder the Supplemental Process, a voter is purged from the rolls after
six years of inactivity—even if he or she did not move and otherwise remains eligible to vote.”);
see also Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson, Hundreds of Thousands of Ohio Voters Restored to
Rolls, BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.bna.com/hundreds-thousands-ohion57982077690.
430. See A. Philip Randolph Inst., 838 F.3d at 703 (“[V]oters sent a confirmation notice are
removed from the rolls if they subsequently fail to vote for four years and fail to either respond
to the notice or re-register.”); id. at 711 (“[T]he Secretary reiterates that the Supplemental Process
incorporates subsection (d)’s requirement that the voter must fail to respond to a confirmation
notice before that voter can be removed from the rolls.”).
431. Id. at 712.
432. Whitford v. Gill, No. 15-cv-421-bbc, 2016 WL 6837229, at *71 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 21, 2016).
433. See id. at *9 (“They therefore urge the court to adopt a new measure for assessing the
discriminatory effect of political gerrymanders—the efficiency gap (or ‘EG’). ‘The efficiency gap
is the difference between the parties’ respective wasted votes in an election, divided by the total
number of votes cast.’”).
434. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the
Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 834 (2015) (“We dub our new measure the ‘efficiency
gap.’ It represents the difference between the parties’ respective wasted votes in an election—
where a vote is wasted if it is cast (1) for a losing candidate, or (2) for a winning candidate but in
excess of what she needed to prevail.”).
435. See id. at 834 (The efficiency gap “represents the difference between the parties’
respective wasted votes in an election—where a vote is wasted if it is cast (1) for a losing candidate,
or (2) for a winning candidate but in excess of what she needed to prevail. Large numbers of votes
commonly are cast for losing candidates as a result of the time-honored gerrymandering
technique of ‘cracking.’ Likewise, excessive votes often are cast for winning candidates thanks to
the equally age-old mechanism of ‘packing.’ The efficiency gap essentially aggregates all of a
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the minority party consistently has significantly more wasted votes than
the majority party, it serves as strong evidence of an unconstitutional
gerrymander, absent a legitimate justification for the difference.
Relying on the efficiency gap measurement, the Wisconsin court held
that the legislature’s redistricting plan was indeed an unconstitutional
gerrymander because it systematically diluted the voting strength of
Democratic voters without a constitutionally valid reason for doing
so.436 Wisconsin has appealed the court’s ruling to the Supreme Court,
which means that potentially partisan gerrymandering’s days could be
numbered.437
The recent intervention of federal courts across the country to
block laws that undermine the right to vote is encouraging. The rulings
indicate that the courts increasingly recognize that partisan changes to
voting rights must be scrutinized with great skepticism by the judiciary.
The 2016 rulings are also heartening for another reason. The judges
who wrote the opinions were appointed by both Republican and
Democratic presidents. Judge Diana Gribbon Motz, the Fourth Circuit
judge who wrote the opinion in McCrory, was appointed by Bill
Clinton,438 whereas Jerome Holmes,439 the Tenth Circuit judge who
wrote the opinion in Fish v. Kobach, and Catharina Haynes, the Fifth
Circuit judge who wrote the opinion in Veasey v. Abbott,440 were both
appointed by George W. Bush. To be sure, the judges in those circuits
did not unanimously agree on the issues before them and some
conservative judges filed strong dissents.441 But the political and
ideological diversity of the judges in each circuit majority is grounds for
at least cautious optimism. It demonstrates that the effort to preserve
voting rights and defend our democratic institutions is not an issue that
district plan’s cracking and packing choices into a single, tidy number.”).
436. See Whitford, 2016 WL 6837229, at *1 (“We find that Act 43 was intended to burden the
representational rights of Democratic voters throughout the decennial period by impeding their
ability to translate their votes into legislative seats. Moreover, as demonstrated by the results of
the 2012 and 2014 elections, among other evidence, we conclude that Act 43 has had its intended
effect. Finally, we find that the discriminatory effect is not explained by the political geography
of Wisconsin nor is it justified by a legitimate state interest. Consequently, Act 43 constitutes an
unconstitutional political gerrymander.”).
437. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. WHITFORD V. GILL (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.brennan
center.org/legal-work/whitford-v-gill.
438. See Judge Diana Gribbon Motz, 4th Cir. http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/judges/judges-ofthe-court/judge-diana-gribbon-motz.
439. See Judge Jerome A. Holmes, 10th Cir. https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/judges/judgejerome-holmes.
440. See Judge Catharina Haynes, Fed. Judicial Ctr. http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo
?jid=3169&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na.
441. See, e.g., Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 322 (5th Cir. 2016) (Clement, J., dissenting).
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must inevitably divide liberals and conservatives. Voting rights and fair
elections are cornerstone principles of democracy that should attract
support from all ends of the ideological spectrum.
C. The Bipartisan Supermajority Principle
As the Supreme Court’s struggle to identify a standard for
adjudicating partisan gerrymandering cases demonstrates, the courts
do not have the authority to invalidate new election laws merely on
policy grounds. They must have a constitutional or statutory basis to do
so and they must have judicially manageable standards for adjudicating
the dispute.
Consequently, one of the major stumbling blocks the courts have
faced over the years in defending voting rights is the complicated
constitutional basis of the right to vote. A unique feature of American
democracy is that the fundamental right to vote is primarily vested in
state law, not federal law.442 The Constitution bars racial and gender
discrimination in voting and requires that due process and equal
protection under law be afforded to all qualified voters.443 But the
states, not the federal government, determine voter qualifications.444 As
the Supreme Court recently emphasized, “the Elections Clause
empowers Congress to regulate how federal elections are held, but not
who may vote in them”445
The modest textual basis of federal voting rights has left the full
parameters of the constitutional protections afforded to voters unclear
and highly contested. Accordingly, scholars have played a key role in
proposing various constitutional rationales for courts to invoke. Some
have developed individual theories of the right to vote.446 Richard
Hasen, for example, contends that the courts should focus on defending
“certain core rights” of equality under the law for all voters.447 Atiba

442. See Douglas, supra note 26, at 93 (“In fact, unlike virtually every state constitution, the
U.S. Constitution does not actually confer the right to vote on anyone. Instead, the right to vote
stems from the general language of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and
the negative mandates on who the government may not disenfranchise.”).
443. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, XV, XIX, XXVI.
444. See, e.g., Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2258 (2013)
(“[T]he Elections Clause empowers Congress to regulate how federal elections are held, but not
who may vote in them.”); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964).
445. Inter Tribal Council., 133 S. Ct. at 2258.
446. See, e.g., RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDING
EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 139, 154 (2003); Ellis, supra note 16, at 1036
(warning of the “use of economic restraints to effectively increase the cost of voting to the voter”).
447. Hasen, supra note 446, at 154.
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Ellis has warned that the costs associated with voting can effectively
disenfranchise voters based on their socioeconomic status.448 He argues
that courts should prevent such disenfranchisement by “formulating a
uniform right to vote which is not bound by socioeconomic biases or
the whims of a potentially tyrannical majority.”449 Others have
articulated a structural theory of voting rights that emphasizes
preserving democratic institutions and political competition.450 For
example, Richard Pildes has contended that “familiar models of
individual rights and equality are inadequate to address constitutional
harms presented by the problem of political self-entrenchment.”451 He
recommends that courts focus on the constitutional obligation “to
design recount processes, and perhaps voting or democratic processes
more generally, that sufficiently cabin the risk of partisan, selfinterested manipulation.”452 Building on both the individual rights and
structuralist approaches, Guy-Uriel Charles contends that courts may
“use an individual rights framework to confront the structural
pathologies of the electoral process.”453 Franita Tolson has called for a
focus on the constitutional text, pointing to the Voter Qualifications
Clause of the federal constitution as a powerful safeguard for voting
rights in federal elections.454 She argues that the clause offers courts a
basis to “apply heightened scrutiny to all regulations governing the
right to vote” and thereby “strike down restrictive regulations that are
not supported by empirical evidence, or that do not directly respond to
a problem in the state’s electoral system.”455
The state constitutions also provide a potentially powerful ally for
judges to turn to in defending voting rights. Although the federal
constitution does not confer an express right to vote, 49 of the 50 state

448. Ellis, supra note 16, at 1067.
449. Id.
450. See Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting is Different, 84 CAL. L. REV.
1201, 1219 (1996) (“The relevant equal protection concern in this context, therefore, is not the
protection of an empty individual right to be free from racial classification, but rather the
collective right, recognized in Hunter v. Erickson, of groups of voters who affiliate along racial
lines to participate in the political process on an equal footing with voters who choose to affiliate
based on other shared characteristics.”).
451. Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV.
28, 41 (2004).
452. Id. at 49.
453. Guy-Uriel Charles, Judging the Law of Politics, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1099, 1102 (2005).
454. Franita Tolson, Protecting Political Participation Through the Voter Qualifications
Clause of Article I, 56 B.C. L. REV. 159, 161–62 (2015).
455. Id. at 162.
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constitutions expressly do so.456 Crucially, the state constitutions define
voting rights as mandatory, which means that in almost every state the
fundamental right of the state’s citizens to vote takes precedence over
the legislature’s control of election regulation.457 Joshua Douglas has
made a compelling case that the state constitutions therefore provide a
strong legal foundation for courts to defend voting rights in an era of
partisan manipulation of election laws. Citing the state constitutions’
express guarantee of the fundamental right to vote, Douglas has
proposed reversing the long-standing Burdick test, whereby the
ultimate burden rests with plaintiffs to prove that an election law
infringes on voting rights.458 The Burdick test is a hard one for plaintiffs
to meet because, as Douglas explains, “[a] court following Burdick will
reverse the presumption of validity and hold the state to a higher
threshold only if the court finds that the law imposes a severe
burden.”459 Since most voter identification laws affect a relatively small
percentage of the population, it is difficult for plaintiffs to show that the
laws are severely burdensome. Douglas, however, proposes using the
state constitutional guarantees as justification for flipping the
framework to put the heavier burden on the government to justify the
laws.460 He argues that laws adding voter qualifications should be
presumptively invalid as a matter of state constitutional law unless the
state overcomes “that presumption with direct evidence showing that
the law is consistent with the state constitution’s specific conferral of
legislative power to regulate elections.”461 Douglas’s proposal is one
that federal and state courts would be wise to adopt.
Whatever constitutional theories the courts choose to adopt, the
bottom line is partisan advocates of new restrictions on voting rights do

456. See Douglas, supra note 26, at 91 (“Virtually every state constitution confers the right to
vote to its citizens in explicit terms.”).
457. See id. at 136 (“State constitutions thus grant the right to vote in mandatory terms and
only secondarily delegate legislative control to regulate some aspects of the election process.”).
458. Id. at 138. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)) (“A court considering a challenge to a state election law
must weigh ‘the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate’ against ‘the precise interests
put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,’ taking into
consideration ‘the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s
rights.’”).
459. See Douglas, supra note 26, at 138.
460. See id. at 138–39 (“Flipping the normal federal framework and imposing a presumption
of invalidity to laws that add voter qualifications is justified because state constitutions already
support this analytical move.”).
461. Id. at 139.
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not deserve the benefit of the doubt. Judges must be much more
skeptical of partisan election authorities’ claims that “election
integrity” necessitates strict voting regulations.462 The courts should
scrutinize such claims closely and should not defer to state legislatures
when obvious partisan motivations lie behind the adoption of such
laws.463 As John Hart Ely observed, courts should intervene to address
“malfunctioning” political processes where the incumbents are
“choking off the channels of political change to ensure that they will
stay in and the outs will stay out” or are “systematically disadvantaging
some minority . . . and thereby denying the minority the protection
afforded to other groups by a representative system.”464 The federal
courts have adopted such an approach in the context of campaign
finance law. For example, the Supreme Court has struck down
excessively low contribution limits which threatened to undermine
democratic accountability.465 As the Supreme Court explained in the
2006 case of Randall v. Sorrell, extremely low contribution limits “harm
the electoral process by preventing challengers from mounting
effective campaigns against incumbent officeholders, thereby reducing
democratic accountability.”466 The justices should take a similarly
skeptical approach to nakedly partisan election laws that burden voting
rights.
In hyperpolarized America, the fact is neither party can be trusted
on its own to do the right thing when it comes to administering state
and federal elections. Accordingly, in evaluating election law changes
that put additional burdens on voting rights, the courts should take into
consideration whether the new law elicited broad bipartisan support or
was instead adopted by a party-line vote. If courts embrace the idea of
reversing the Burdick test, a bipartisan supermajority principle could
serve as one criterion for assessing whether the state has met its burden
in overcoming the presumption of invalidity. The principle is simple and
easy to apply. Under it, a state could support its argument that an
election law change is necessary by showing that the law received
support from a bipartisan supermajority of two-thirds of the legislature.

462. Douglas, supra note 301, at 556.
463. Id. at 555–56.
464. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 103
(1980).
465. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 262 (2006) (striking down Vermont’s low
contribution limits on grounds that they “burden First Amendment interests in a manner that is
disproportionate to the public purposes they were enacted to advance”).
466. Id. at 232.
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Under the bipartisan supermajority principle, at least one-third of the
members of the minority party must vote in favor of the voting law
change. Embracing the supermajority principle for voting laws would
help courts assess whether a partisan motive is the real force behind an
election “integrity” measure.
The bipartisan element is crucial to the supermajority criterion. In
an America sharply divided into red and blue, a simple supermajority
principle will not be effective in every state. For example, a two-thirds
majority rule would not prevent deeply red states like Alabama—
where Republicans hold large majorities—and deeply blue states like
Massachusetts—where Democrats hold large majorities—from
enacting voting laws in a party-line vote. Republicans currently hold a
72 to 33 seat majority in the Alabama House of Representatives and a
26 to 8 seat majority in the Alabama State Senate.467 Democrats
currently hold a 125 to 35 seat majority in the Massachusetts House of
Representatives and a 34 to 6 seat majority in the Massachusetts State
Senate.468 Such large margins make it possible for the majority party to
achieve supermajorities in support of legislation even if not a single
member of the minority party supports the law. Thus, by requiring that
supermajorities cross partisan lines, the risk of a party-line
supermajority vote is eliminated.
In an ideal world, party leaders would adopt the bipartisan
supermajority rule out of a sense of patriotic devotion to America’s
democratic institutions. But that is obviously not a sensibility that is
broadly shared in American politics today. In an age of
hyperpolarization, party leaders and rank-and-file party members view
bipartisanship as an act of political heresy. Thus, for the time being at
least, the only hope for bipartisanship in election administration is if
the courts require it.
There are limits to the bipartisan supermajority principle. The
courts should not require that every election law change receive the
support of a bipartisan supermajority. The United States is founded on
a principle of majority rule, not supermajority rule, and courts should
be sensitive to that fact. But even the Constitution itself requires

467. See Alabama’s 2014 Elections, BALLOTPEDIA https://ballotpedia.org/Alabama_
elections,_2014; Alabama House of Representatives elections, 2014, BALLOTPEDIA
https://ballotpedia.org/Alabama_State_Senate_elections,_2014.
468. See Massachusetts House of Representatives, BALLOTPEDIA https://ballotpedia.org/
Massachusetts_House_of_Representatives; Massachusetts State Senate, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Massachusetts_State_Senate.
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supermajorities in certain cases, such as to override a presidential
veto,469 to ratify a treaty,470 to convict on impeachment,471 or to amend
the Constitution itself.472 Voting rights are so central to a healthy
democracy that they merit special safeguards as well. Courts will thus
need to be both creative and cautious in crafting the constitutional
basis for a bipartisan supermajority principle in voting rights cases.
History shows that the courts absolutely have the capacity to develop
narrowly focused election law doctrines that protect Constitutional
rights and democratic principles. In the 1960s the Supreme Court
developed the “One Person, One Vote” doctrine to require equal
population in legislative and congressional redistricting.473 The moment
has come for similar judicial creativity, precision, and boldness in this
hyperpolarized political era. At a time when the political parties
increasingly view each other as a threat to the nation’s well-being,
aggressive judicial intervention to defend voting rights is appropriate
and necessary.
If at some future date the two parties manage to pull themselves
out of the mutually destructive cycle of hyperpolarization, it would be
possible for Republicans and Democrats to find common ground in
election administration. There are sensible good government reforms
that can and should be undertaken in bipartisan fashion to ensure the
security of the election process. One area of election administration
that badly needs bipartisan attention is America’s outdated voter
registration system. As discussed above, a 2012 study by the Pew Center
found 24 million outdated or inaccurate voter registration records.474 In
contrast to Canada, which relies on a nationwide electronic registration
system, most American states still rely on costly, inefficient, and error
prone paper registration processes.475 In 2014 the bipartisan
Presidential Commission on Election Administration proposed a series
of reforms to the election administration system, including the creation
469. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
470. Id. art. II, § 2.
471. Id. art. I, § 3.
472. Id. art. V.
473. See, e.g., Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (“The conception of political equality
from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth,
Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing—one person, one vote.”);
see also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 13 (1964) (“The debates at the Convention make at least
one fact abundantly clear: that when the delegates agreed that the House should represent
‘people’ they intended that in allocating Congressmen the number assigned to each State should
be determined solely by the number of the State’s inhabitants.”).
474. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 269, at 1.
475. Id. at 2, 3.
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of a national online voter registration database and the modernization
of the states’ voting technology.476 A bipartisan commitment to
allocating sufficient funds to modernize and standardize the voter
registration system and voting rolls along the lines proposed by the
Presidential Commission is a reasonable reform to expect from
Congress and the state legislatures.
Even voter ID laws could one day achieve a bipartisan consensus if
drafted in an inclusive way. The nationwide issuance of free
government-issued photo IDs would be a sensible measure for
improving election security without disenfranchising voters. One of the
most promising proposals is to add photos to Social Security cards.477
Every American already receives a Social Security card for free from
the government.478 Adding a photograph to the card would thus enable
virtually every American, regardless of socio-economic status, to
possess a government-issued photo ID. The Social Security card photo
would satisfy the election security goals of proponents of voter ID laws
while alleviating the concerns of opponents of such laws that the poor
will be disenfranchised by a lack of access to a government-issued
photo ID. Whatever form of government issued identification is
required, it is essential that the government provide the necessary
forms of identification for free to the poor and infirm, including
supporting documents such as birth certificates. It is also long overdue
for the state governments to automatically register all qualified voters.
As the Brennan Center for Justice has argued, automatic voter
registration “boosts registration rates, cleans up the rolls, makes voting
more convenient, and reduces the potential for voter fraud, all while
lowering costs.” 479

476. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON ELECTION ADMIN., THE AMERICAN VOTING
EXPERIENCE: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 3–4 (2014) https://www.supportthevoter.gov/files/2014/01/ AmerVoting-Exper-final-draft-01-09-14-508.pdf.
477. Juliet Eilperin & Karen Tumulty, Democrats embrace adding photos to Social Security
cards, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/democratsembrace-adding-photos-to-social-security-cards/2014/04/10/cfffe55a-c0cc-11e3-b574-f8748871856
a_story.html?utm_term=.d8274dcf2f9a; Juliet Eilperin, Trump meets with Martin Luther King III
on Monday to discuss voting rights, WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/powerpost/wp/2017/01/16/trump-to-meet-with-martin-luther-king-iii-on-monday-todiscuss-voting-rights/?utm_term=.e6665024e73a.
478. SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., NEW OR REPLACEMENT SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER AND
CARD, https://www.ssa.gov/ssnumber; Carolyn Puckett, The Story of the Social Security Number,
69 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 55 (2009), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v69n2/ssb-v69n2.pdf.
479. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., AUTOMATIC VOTER REGISTRATION (2017), https://www.
brennancenter.org/analysis/automatic-voter-registration.
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In a non-polarized political climate in which traditional democratic
norms prevail, many other sensible election law reforms would be
attainable. Indeed, there is no doubt that genuine efforts to protect
election integrity are valid and important. As the Supreme Court has
emphasized, “A State indisputably has a compelling interest in
preserving the integrity of its election process.”480 But voting rights are
equally important. In Purcell v. Gonzalez,481 the Court explained that
election administration involves a balance between “the State’s
compelling interest in preventing voter fraud” and eligible citizens’
“strong interest in exercising the ‘fundamental political right’ to
vote.”482 Congress and the state legislatures can strike the right balance
between those competing interests, but only if they act in a bipartisan
fashion.
CONCLUSION
The United States is not an illiberal democracy yet, but the warning
signs are clear. In this time of extreme polarization, partisans are
incentivized to break with democratic norms and adopt tactics that
undermine voting rights and destabilize democratic institutions. The
inevitable result is a cycle of escalation. The United States is already in
the early stages of that cycle, and judicial intervention is now required
before partisan escalation reaches the point of no return.
Accordingly, in this perilous era, the state and federal courts must
embrace a renewed commitment to defending America’s democratic
institutions in general, and voting rights in particular, from partisan
attacks. The time for judicial passivity in voting rights is over. As the
Supreme Court explained in Wesberry v. Sanders,483 “[n]o right is more
precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of
those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live.”484
Above all, structural changes are necessary to preserve and maintain
America’s democratic institutions for the long run. The success of any
democracy depends on establishing clear rules that are administered in
a fair and transparent way. Democracy is about more than just winners
and losers—it is about institutions that fairly administer elections to

480.
481.
482.
483.
484.

Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989).
549 U.S. 1 (2006).
Id. at 4.
376 U.S. 1 (1964).
Id. at 17.

GAUGHAN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY

4/20/2017 11:44 AM

139

ensure that the voters’ will is heard.485 As James Madison once
observed, “no man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because
his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably,
corrupt his integrity.”486
Madison’s principle of neutrality must guide us in election
administration today. The historical record makes it starkly apparent
that partisan control of the election administration process is a threat
to the long-term vitality of American democracy. Left unchecked,
partisans will always craft election rules to favor their party and
disadvantage their opponents. The threat is particularly dangerous at a
time of hyperpolarization. Accordingly, Americans must build
structural safeguards into our election system to guard against the
machinations of partisan extremism. As George Washington explained
in his Farewell Address, “the common and continual mischiefs of the
spirit of party are sufficient to make it the interest and duty of a wise
people to discourage and restrain it.”487 The fate of American
democracy depends on whether we heed Washington’s advice.

485. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 183, at 644 (“The democratic politics we experience
is not an autonomous realm of parties, public opinion, and elections, but a product of specific
institutional structures and legal rules.”).
486. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 79 (James Madison) (Mary Carolyn Waldrep & Jim Miller
eds., 2014).
487. George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796), reprinted in SPEECHES OF THE
AMERICAN PRESIDENTS 17, 21 (Janet Podell & Steven Anzovin eds., 2d ed. 2001).

